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INTRODUCTION: TRANSFORMING LEGAL EDUCATION
STEVEN I. FRIEDLAND
For as long as we can remember, legal education has been delivered
in essentially the same fashion, in buckets. Not literally, of course, but rather
through an expert in a specific subject matter domain.1 The expert mines a
bucket of substantive law, such as Contracts or Torts, relating it to students
through a book of appellate cases.2 The students received this knowledge,
studied it outside of class for its meaning, and then returned to class in a
rather formalized linear structure to learn more about the nature and ethos of
the bucket.3 With a presumptive identity of teaching and learning—that is, if
the teacher was teaching, the students must be learning—things such as
learning science, cultural awareness, power structures, specific objectives
about developing a variety of lawyering skill-sets, and measuring those
developments formatively, were at best peripheral to the learning process.
The legal educational orthodoxy, however, is losing momentum—no
longer an unquestioned beacon of educational superiority—and the rapidity
and centrality of the potential changes have taken many people by surprise.
The changes have been generated by forces located outside of the Academy,
leading to the commoditization of legal education.4 As related in the article
by Professors SpearIt and Smith Ledesma, students are voting with their
pocketbooks5 and a shrinking number are applying to law school.6 Further,
the type of law jobs available in a globalized, tech-savy legal market is
evolving. The economic forces are also influenced by the clients and the
lawyers who operate within the system. Clients are no longer blithely
1.
Traditional subject matter domains included Torts, Contracts, Civil
Procedure and Property Law.
2.
For one of the earliest casebooks, see, e.g., C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION
OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vi (1871).
3.
The irony is that a law graduate in the early 1900s might very well feel
right at home in the law school classroom of the early 2000s, especially when leafing through
the books used to facilitate core courses.
4.
See Terrence Loose, What You Should Do Instead of Law School, YAHOO!
EDUCATION, http://education.yahoo.net/articles/best_law_school_alternatives.htm (last visited
Feb. 16, 2014).
5.
It was believed for many years that attending law school was a good idea
for many people as a background for other endeavors, even if they did not want to practice
law.*
6.
There has been at least a double-figure percent decrease in students taking
the LSAT in each of the past three years, according to the Law School Admission Council.
See LSATS Administered—Counts and Percent Increases by Admin and Year, LSAC,
http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/lsats-administered (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
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accepting the fee structures of their lawyers, particularly institutional clients
served by big firms; in-house lawyers are also responsible for managing fees,
not just cases. The day of assigning multiple senior and junior lawyers in a
law firm or business to a job, and clients paying the resulting fees without
question, seems to be over. Consequently, the compact with the profession,
through which law graduates are effectively given subsidized training by the
lawyers that hire them, has been breached and may never return. Instead, a
very public cost/benefit debate is occurring—is legal education worth its
price?7
It is not just the legal profession that is changing, but law students as
well. Born-digital students seem to prefer more flexibility, mobility, and
different learning approaches than the singular, Socratic-style, in-class
linearity of generations past. The idea of one size of learning fitting all is
losing its appeal, especially for gamers and those living within a deviceobsessed culture.
Despite all of the negativity swirling around legal education, there is,
to some, a silver lining—this sea change brings opportunity.8 There is now a
huge chance to reframe legal education so it is stronger and better situated in
the global marketplace. After all, it is hard to find a part of law that is so
local it is not connected to or affected by a broader, if not global, stage.
This new path for legal education likely involves a different
understanding of a law school’s dual roles. One role is teaching about a
specialized knowledge domain, the law, often short-circuited into a way of
thinking called thinking like a lawyer.9 This role provides law schools
admission to the academy, the world of graduate education, through
resemblance to other programs in length and rigor. The other role is teaching
students to become professional lawyers, operating with and applying the
knowledge learned in the marketplace. Any reconceptualization likely
involves an education that is designed to transition students into law practice
so that they not only pass the bar exam, but understand what it takes to
succeed in their respective fields. The education probably will involve using
learning science and experiential education throughout the educational
process, not just sporadically, but in domain-specific applications to
maximize its value. A new approach involves creating beneficial learning
7.
E.g., Loose, supra note 4. This commoditization is economic-oriented,
mostly looking at the value of legal education compared to other graduate programs or no
extra schooling at all. See, e.g., id.
8.
This opportunity is to effect lasting and beneficial modifications that adapt
to the needs of the constituencies in the long-term, not simply a short-term increase in paying
applicants.
9.
This term has been over-used to justify what traditional law teachers do,
without any specific data-driven outcomes analysis.
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environments, those that are learner- and community-centered, and those that
create engagement and not disinterest. It is technology-driven and empathymotivated, paying attention to Yeats’ famous quote, “education is not the
filling of a pail, but the lighting of a fire.”
This edition of the Nova Law Review at Nova Southeastern
University, Shepard Broad Law Center illustrates how the changing world of
legal education provides an opportunity to revise and adapt our
understandings and assumptions as we go forward. The authors all use the
theme of reframing—altering the pillars of legal education or even the law
itself.
Professors SpearIt and Stephanie Smith Ledesma, in Experiential
Education As Critical Pedagogy: Enhancing the Law School Experience,
use critical pedagogy to examine the benefits of increasing the use of
experience in legal education, particularly as a response to the downturn of
law school applicants, law jobs, and publicity about the value of law school.
The focus of the article is how changes in methodology serve not only to
educate, but also to empower students. The article thus expands boundaries
and offers an uncommon window into the power relationships that lie within
the legal education arena. The authors view the empowerment of students
through an experiential student-centered education not only as an intrinsic
benefit, but one with various instrumental outcomes, especially if doctrinal
faculty are engaged in the experiential process. The most significant
outcome for the authors is the opportunity for students to experience justice
and not simply read about it in a book.
Professors Curcio, Ward, and Dogra offer the very timely A Survey
Instrument to Develop, Tailor, and Help Measure Law Student Cultural
Diversity Education Learning Outcomes. In light of the fact that the
American Bar Association appears ready to adopt a learning outcomes model
for its member schools, the authors suggest that competency in working
across cultures, the importance of which is already understood in law
practice in a multicultural world, should be adopted in a more systemic and
systematic way in law schools. The authors go far beyond just opining about
the usefulness of such a pedagogy however, and provide a sample survey that
could identify and measure culturally competent learning outcomes. While
law schools have been challenged by how to adapt curricula that blend
together demands for a more modern and pragmatic education, the authors
propose how their survey instrument and research can assist law schools in
incorporating cultural sensitivity and specific learning outcomes within an
existing curriculum, without starting from the beginning. Thus, this article
has something for the entire legal community, speaking to professors,
students, practitioners, and accreditors, all at the same time.
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Professor Elizabeth Shaver infuses the domain of legal research and
writing with creativity and alternative pedagogy in LRW’s The Real World:
Using Real Cases to Teach Persuasive Writing. Professor Shaver uses the
MTV reality show, The Real World, to illustrate how to reposition teaching
and learning in legal research and writing. In particular, she describes an
exercise that utilizes actual briefs and judicial opinions to teach the different
components of persuasive writing. Included in these components are the
development of a theme, organization of the arguments, and effective use of
case law as authority. Through the exercise, students become practitioners
and importantly, learn how to spot and develop persuasive writing.
Significantly, Professor Shaver thoughtfully organizes the order of learning
for her students—knowledge of the rules and principles comes first, and then
the application of that knowledge through judgment and evaluation about the
components of persuasive advocacy follows.
In describing the
comprehensive exercise, Professor Shaver provides a roadmap to her
thinking about learning and persuasive writing in general.
Ms. Feluren, in Moving the Focus Away From the IQ Score Towards
the Subjective Assessment of Adaptive Functioning: The Effect of the DSM-5
on the Post-Atkins Categorical Exemption of Offenders With Intellectual
Disability From the Death Penalty, writes about the impact of the new
version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (“DSM”)—the DSM-5, the
authoritative resource for diagnosis used by psychiatrists and
psychologists—on the death penalty for persons who have an intellectual
disability. In Atkins v. Virginia,10 a seminal case about the Eighth
Amendment’s limits on the death penalty for the mentally disabled, the
Supreme Court drew a line against imposing the death penalty against a
person who was significantly impaired mentally.11 Ms. Feluren analyzes the
interface between the mental health system, as illustrated by the DSM-5, and
the legal system, utilizing history and the textual changes to predict how the
changes in the DSM-5 ought to be handled within the constitutional
framework.
Ms. Duquette writes about products liability and mass shootings in
the United States in The Rx and the AR: A Products Liability Approach to
the Mass Shooting Problem. Ms. Duquette presents a different perspective
on how to deal with the issue of mass shootings—using controls over the
distribution of prescription medications, instead of focusing on guns. Ms.
Duquette’s point is that many of the mass murderers were prescribed either
antidepressant or antipsychotic medications and presumably were adversely

10.
11.
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affected by them. As such, the pharmaceutical industry should be part of the
calculus in efforts to remedy this problem.
These articles provide for wonderful reading on many levels, from
thoughtful dispositions about topical and nuanced questions, to ways to ably
respond to a rapidly transforming world, one where the entire nature of legal
education and law could see more change in the next decade than it did in the
previous century. Law review articles are sometimes criticized for their lack
of utility, but this is one criticism that cannot be leveled at this volume. In
fact, it is clear these articles will contribute to the national narrative about
transforming legal education and law. The new narrative created by these
pieces helps to pave the way for decades of tradition to give way to a
different and stronger foundation built to withstand emerging contexts—
leading to more suitable outcomes for a volatile and very challenging era for
legal education and the rule of law.
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Legal education reformers are increasingly focused on an
outcome-oriented approach to legal education. Law school
accreditors are poised to adopt learning outcomes standards
requiring each law school to identify the knowledge, attitudes, and
skills its law graduates should possess. Among the skills suggested
for inclusion in law school learning outcomes is the ability to work
effectively across cultures. Despite the importance of cultural
competence for effective legal practice, law schools have not yet
developed a systematic method for helping students develop
awareness of how cultural perspectives shape lawyer-client
interactions, affect transactions, and influence the development of
the law.
This article identifies ways law schools might
conceptualize learning outcomes that will enhance law students’
abilities to effectively represent clients in today’s multicultural
world and global legal environment. It provides legal educators
with a statistically valid and reliable survey instrument developed
to help identify, and potentially measure, some of those learning
outcomes. It discusses the survey design and findings. Finally,
this article suggests several ways our survey instrument and
research can help legal educators conceptualize ways to integrate
the inclusion of cultural sensibility learning and learning
outcomes into the law school curricula.

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, law schools have been heavily berated for illpreparing students for real-world law practice.1 In response to widespread
attacks on the legal education system, many U.S. law schools have begun
rewriting their curricula.2 Legal education reformers have placed increasing
1.
A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective,
69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1949, 1951–53 (2012). A. Benjamin Spencer has described this as
“[the] perfect storm in legal education: Law school graduates are under-employed, overindebted, and under-prepared for practice,” prompting an attack on legal education practices.
Id.
2.
See U. DENVER STURM C. LAW, http://www.denverlawplan.com (last
visited Feb. 16, 2014); Brian Leiter, Washington & Lee’s Radical Transformation of the 3rd
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emphasis on learning outcomes, sparking discussion about the value of an
outcome-oriented approach to legal education as well as debate over which
outcomes should be included in standard curricula.3 Law school accreditors
are poised to adopt learning outcomes standards requiring each law school to
identify the knowledge, attitudes, and skills law graduates should possess.4
Among the skills proposed for inclusion in the mandatory outcomes was the
ability to work effectively across a range of cultures.5
Despite the fact that lawyers frequently deal with people from
diverse backgrounds in the increasingly globalized practice of law, law
schools have not yet developed a systematic method for helping students
develop awareness of how cultural perspectives shape lawyer-client
interactions, affect transactions, and influence the development of the law.6
This aspect of education, often called cultural competence, has largely been
relegated to the domain of clinical faculty or specialty courses. Law school
Year of Law School, BRIAN LIETER’S L. SCH. REP. (Mar. 24, 2008), http://
www.leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2008/03/washington-lees.html; Symposium Program,
Ne. Univ. Sch. of Law, Experience the Future: Inaugural National Symposium on Experiential
Education in Law (Oct. 26–28, 2012), http://www.northeastern.edu/law/pdfs/academics/expfuture-papers/program-2012.pdf.
3.
See Janet W. Fisher, Putting Students at the Center of Legal Education:
How an Emphasis on Outcome Measures in the ABA Standards for Approval of Law Schools
Might Transform the Educational Experience of Law Students, 35 S. ILL. U. L.J. 225, 225–26
(2011); Beverly Petersen Jennison, Beyond Landgell: Innovating in Legal Education, 62
CATH. U. L. REV. 643 passim (2013). For a comprehensive discussion of the shift to learning
outcomes in legal education, see Mary A. Lynch, An Evaluation of Ten Concerns About Using
Outcomes in Legal Education, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 976 (2012).
4.
The proposed accreditation standard incorporating learning outcomes,
Standard 302, is currently in its final phase of adoption, having been published for “notice and
comment” by the American Bar Association Council of the Section of Legal Education and
Admission to the Bar. The most recent version of proposed Standard 302 is available at
Proposed Standards for Approval of Law Schools, Am. Bar Ass’n, Section of Legal Educ. &
Admissions to the Bar, on Chapter 3: Program of Legal Education (Mar. 2014), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_
and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/march2014councilmeeting/2014
_02_compilation_of_proposed_changes_to_standards_clean.authcheckdam.pdf.
5.
See, e.g., Letter from Jackie Gardina, Co-President, Soc’y of Am. Law
Teachers & Ngai Pindell Co-President, Soc’y of Am. Law Teachers, to Dean Jeffery E. Lewis,
Chair, Am. Bar Ass’n Standards Review Comm. (Apr. 13, 2012), available at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/legal_education/committees/stan
dards_review_documents/20120416_comment_general_salt_s211_212.authcheckdam.pdf.
6.
Numerous legal educators have argued that cultural sensibility skills
should be infused throughout the curriculum. See ANTHONY O’DONNELL & RICHARD
JOHNSTONE, DEVELOPING A CROSS-CULTURAL LAW CURRICULUM 13 (1997); Nelson P. Miller
et al., Equality as Talisman: Getting Beyond Bias to Cultural Competence as a Professional
Skill, 25 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 99, 111–13 (2008); Beverly I. Moran, Disappearing Act: The
Lack of Values Training in Legal Education–a Case for Cultural Competency, 38 S.U. L. REV.
1, 24–26 (2010).
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accreditors have thus far declined to include cultural competence as one of
the mandatory outcomes, in contrast to the accrediting bodies for medical
and other professional schools.7 Instead, the proposed accreditation standard
allows individual law schools to decide whether cultural competence should
be amongst the school’s designated learning outcomes.8 As schools respond
to the demand for more experiential learning, and as they develop their list of
learning outcomes, law schools should consider whether they should prepare
students to become what we call a culturally sensible lawyer9—a lawyer who
can work effectively across cultures.
This article discusses the theoretical and practical aspects of
developing a culturally sensible lawyer and a statistically reliable survey
instrument we developed to help law schools assess some baseline cultural
sensibility knowledge, attitudes, and skills learning outcomes. Part I
discusses why cultural sensibility should be a designated legal education
learning outcome. It begins with a brief discussion about the paradigm shift
to learning outcome accreditation standards. It then explains how the
construct of cultural competence evolved into a construct of cultural
sensibility. Emphasizing an open-mindedness about one’s own and others’
cultures, cultural sensibility education works toward helping students avoid
making assumptions about other cultures or legal systems, as well as
avoiding behaviors based upon impressions of cultural domination or
superiority. This part then discusses why cultural sensibility is important for
all lawyers, not just those engaged in international transactions or social
justice issues. Using the cultural sensibility framework, Part II discusses
how law schools and law professors might conceptualize knowledge, skills,
7.
See LIAISON COMM. ON MED. EDUC., FUNCTIONS AND STRUCTURE OF A
MEDICAL SCHOOL: STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION OF MEDICAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS
LEADING TO THE M.D. DEGREE 10 (2012), available at http://www.lcme.org/publications/
functions2012may.pdf (requiring medical schools to document objectives relating to the
development of skills in cultural competence); see also THE NAT’L ARCHITECTURAL
ACCREDITING BD., INC., 2009 CONDITIONS FOR ACCREDITATION 22 (2009), available at http://
www.naab.org/accreditation/2009_conditions (listing cultural diversity as one of its student
performance criteria).
8.
See Proposed Standards for Approval of Law Schools, Am. Bar Ass’n,
Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, on Chapter 3: Program of Legal Education
(Mar. 2014), supra note 4.
9.
Some ideas in this article explicate thoughts originally expressed in earlier
pieces. See Andrea A. Curcio et al., Using Existing Frameworks to Develop Ways to Teach
and Measure Law Students’ Cultural Competence, in THE LEGAL PROFESSION: EDUCATION
AND ETHICS IN PRACTICE 21, 21 (David A. Frenkel ed., 2013) [hereinafter Curcio et al., Using
Existing Frameworks to Develop Ways to Teach and Measure Law Students’ Cultural
Competence]; Andrea A. Curcio et al., Educating Culturally Sensible Lawyers: A Study of
Student Attitudes About the Role Culture Plays in the Lawyering Process, 16 U. W. SYDNEY L.
REV. 100, 104 (2012) [hereinafter Curcio et al., Educating Culturally Sensible Lawyers].
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and attitude learning outcomes related to the development of a culturally
sensible lawyer. Part III explains theoretical models that explore the
progression students experience as they develop their ability to work
effectively across cultures. These models challenge the notion that anyone
can ever become fully culturally competent, positing that culture—and our
experience of culture—is an evolving and dynamic process10 that occurs
along a cultural sensibility learning continuum.
In light of the cultural sensibility learning outcomes and learning
continuum, Part IV discusses a statistically reliable survey instrument we
developed to measure some aspects of students’ cultural sensibility
knowledge, attitudes, and skills. We explain the survey development and
methodology and discuss the survey results. In Part V, we discuss how the
survey can be used to inform teaching, and develop learning outcomes. Our
survey results suggest that the focus of cultural sensibility teaching needs to
be helping students understand that we all have multi-faceted cultural
backgrounds and experiences that affect how we perceive and analyze legal
problems and how we interact with clients and colleagues. Our results
suggest legal educators can use the survey to develop learning outcomes
tailored to their students and that the survey can serve as one measure of
achievement of some of those cultural sensibility learning outcomes.
I.
A.

WHAT IS CULTURAL SENSIBILITY AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?
Cultural Sensibility and the Law School Accreditation Context

Historically, law school accreditors have focused on input
measurements, requiring schools to provide substantial instruction with
regard to certain kinds of knowledge, skills, and values.11 In addition to
focusing on specific types of instruction, assessing law schools based on
input measurements means emphasizing factors such as “faculty-student
ratios [and] per pupil expenditures.”12 Law school accreditors’ inputoriented focus significantly differs from the focus of accreditors in other
10.
Lan Cao, The Ethnic Question in Law and Development, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 1044, 1069 (2004); Doris Estelle Long, Crossing the Innovation Divide, 81 TEMPLE L.
REV. 507, 541 (2008).
11.
CATHERINE L. CARPENTER ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF EDUC. &
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, REPORT OF THE OUTCOME MEASURES COMMITTEE 19 (2008),
available at http://apps.americanbar.org/legaled/committees/subcomm/Outcome%20Measures
%20Final%20Report.pdf; Susan Hanley Duncan, The New Accreditation Standards Are
Coming to a Law School Near You—What You Need to Know About Learning Outcomes &
Assessment, 16 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 605, 610 (2010).
12.
Lauren Carasik, Renaissance or Retrenchment: Legal Education at a
Crossroads, 44 IND. L. REV. 735, 764 (2011).
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professions,13 and this approach has been widely criticized for failing to
prepare students for legal practice.14 For instance, an influential 2007 report
by the Clinical Legal Education Association critiqued the input-oriented
approach, stating: “In the history of legal education in the United States,
there is no record of any concerted effort to consider what new lawyers
should know or be able to do on their first day in practice or to design a
program of instruction to achieve those goals.”15 Subsequently, the report
noted, law school graduates were ill-prepared for practice, and law schools
were guilty of doing a disservice to communities by failing to focus more on
learning outcomes rather than educational inputs.16
The traditional focus on learning inputs, however, has been rapidly
changing in recent years as law school educators and accreditors have
increasingly acknowledged the importance of an outcome-oriented approach
to legal education.17 In 2007, the American Bar Association (“ABA”)
Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar appointed a Special
Committee on Outcome Measures (“Outcomes Committee”), and in 2008,
this Outcomes Committee released a report encouraging the section to “‘reexamine the current ABA Accreditation Standards and reframe them, as
needed, to reduce their reliance on input measures and instead adopt a greater
and more overt reliance on outcome measures.’”18
Since 2008, the ABA Standards Review Committee has been
working to develop an accreditation standard that identifies mandatory
learning outcomes.19 The latest version of proposed ABA accreditation
standards includes Standard 302, which is entitled “Learning Outcomes” and
13.
Id. at 763–64 & n.153.
14.
ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION
AND A ROAD MAP 1–5 (1st ed. 2007); Spencer, supra note 1, at 2009.
15.
STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 14, at 3. For more discussion of the Best
Practices Report and other background, see Carasik, supra note 12, at 743; Mary Crossley &
Lu-in Wang, Essay, Learning by Doing: An Experience with Outcomes Assessment, 41 U.
TOL. L. REV. 269, 272 (2010); Fisher, supra note 3, at 225–30; Spencer, supra note 1, at
2009–10.
16.
See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 14, at 7–8; Spencer, supra note 1, at
2009–10.
17.
See Crossley & Wang, supra note 15, at 269–73; Lynch, supra note 3 at
981–84; Spencer, supra note 1, at 2016–17.
18.
Crossley & Wang, supra note 15, at 271–72.
19.
CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 11, at 1. The outcome measures have
undergone numerous revisions and been the subject of substantial debate within the academy.
Crossley & Wang, supra note 15, at 271–72. For a thorough discussion of the debate within
the academy, see generally, Lynch, supra note 3. The various iterations of the proposed
Learning Outcomes Standards, and the public comments on those iterations, are available at
Notice and Comment, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/
notice_and_comment.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
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would require law schools to establish learning outcomes that demonstrate
student competency in a number of areas.20
Learning outcomes have been defined as “something [the] students
can do now that they could not do previously . . . [a change in people] as a
result of a learning experience.”21 Those advocating for an outcomes-based
education argue that outcome-oriented assessment benefits students, law
schools, and the community at large. Students benefit from having clearly
stated learning goals and faculty and law schools are able to determine the
effectiveness of the institution’s curriculum.22 Further, they argue that law
school accreditors protect consumers by encouraging educators to focus on
institutional effectiveness and the training of competent lawyers.23 While
there are legitimate concerns about the effect and implementation of learning
outcomes,24 law school accreditors soon will join other professions and
require schools to identify learning outcomes and demonstrate achievement
of those outcomes.25
As law schools make the paradigmatic shift toward focusing on what
students have learned rather than on areas or types of instruction, legal
educators will need to identify learning outcomes both on a course and
curricular level. Additionally, law school accreditors will be looking for
ways to identify and analyze learning outcomes. Cultural sensibility—more
commonly known as cultural competency—is amongst the learning
outcomes schools may choose to establish to satisfy the requirement that
schools prepare law students for “competent and ethical participation as a
20.

Standard 302 will require schools to establish learning outcomes that,

at a minimum, include competency in the following: (a) knowledge and
understanding of substantive and procedural law; (b) Legal analysis and reasoning,
legal research, problem-solving, and written and oral communication in the legal
context; (c) Exercise of proper professional and ethical responsibilities to clients
and the legal system; and (d) Other professional skills needed for competent and
ethical participation as a member of the legal profession.

Proposed Standards for Approval of Law Schools, Am. Bar Ass’n, Section of Legal Educ. &
Admissions to the Bar, on Chapter 3: Program of Legal Education (Mar. 2014), supra note 4.
Interpretation 302-1 encourages schools to consider fulfilling the mandate of Standard 302(d)
by designating and measuring a wide range of additional skills, including cultural competency
and self-evaluation. Id.
21.
Paul Watson, The Role and Integration of Learning Outcomes Into the
Educational Process, 3 ACTIVE LEARNING HIGHER EDUC. 205, 208 (2002).
22.
Lori A. Roberts, Assessing Ourselves: Confirming Assumptions and
Improving Student Learning by Efficiently and Fearlessly Assessing Student Learning
Outcomes, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 457, 461, 466–67 (2011).
23.
Id. at 464; see also Steven I. Friedland, Outcomes and the Ownership
Conception of Law School Courses, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 947, 959, 962 (2012).
24.
See infra text accompanying notes 105–08.
25.
See Proposed Standards for Approval of Law Schools, Am. Bar Ass’n,
Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, on Chapter 3: Program of Legal Education
(Mar. 2014), supra note 4.
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member of the legal profession.”26 Recognizing the importance of preparing
students to work in our multi-cultural world, this article provides law schools
with a method to conceptualize, and begin to measure, some cultural
sensibility learning outcomes.
B.

Evolution from Cultural Competence to Cultural Sensibility

Culture is a social construct, steeped in the history, politics, and
economics of a given community,27 and culture is not value-free.28 Culture
encompasses a wide range of factors that influence individuals’ perspectives
and behaviors. The term culture itself has been the subject of great debate.29
Although no singularly accepted definition of culture exists, some medical
educators define culture as: “[I]ntegrated patterns of human behavior that
include the language, thoughts, [communications], actions, customs, beliefs,
[values], and institutions of racial, ethnic, social, or religious groups.”30 By
including the term social groups, this definition indicates that many aspects
of culture exist, including but not limited to: Socio-economic status, sexual
orientation, disability, gender, physical characteristics, marital status, role in
family, religion, and age.31 Of course, all members of a particular social
group do not share all of the same experiences,32 and people have multiple
26.
See Proposed Standards for Approval of Law Schools, Am. Bar Ass’n,
Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, on Chapter 3: Program of Legal Education
(Mar. 2014), supra note 4.
27.
O’DONNELL & JOHNSTONE, supra note 6, at 7–9.
28.
Nisha Dogra & Khalid Karim, Diversity Training for Psychiatrists, 11
ADVANCES PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT 159, 159 (2005); Amir N. Licht, Legal Plug-Ins:
Cultural Distance, Cross-Listing, and Corporate Governance Reform, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. 195, 217–19 (2004).
29.
Raquel Aldana, Cross-Cultural Legal Competence as Transformation
(n.d.) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad
Law Center Library); Linz Audain, Critical Cultural Law and Economics, the Culture of
Deindividualization, the Paradox of Blackness, 70 IND. L.J. 709, 715 n.16 (1995); Mary Helen
McNeal, Slow Down, People Breathing: Lawyering, Culture and Place, 18 CLINICAL L. REV.
183, 204–05 (2011).
30.
ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., CULTURAL COMPETENCE EDUCATION FOR
MED. STUDENTS 1 (2005), available at https://www.aamc.org/download/54338/data/.
31.
See Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence
in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 33, 41 (2001); Adam B. Cohen, Many Forms of Culture, 64
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 194, 194–95 (2009).
32.
Bradley W. Bergey & Avi Kaplan, What Do Social Groups Have to Do
with Culture? The Crucial Role of Shared Experience, FRONTIERS PSYCHOL., Nov. 2010, at 1,
1, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3153807/pdf/fpsyg-01-00199.pdf; Bryant,
supra note 31, at 41. See generally Alexis Anderson et al, Challenges of “Sameness”: Pitfalls
and Benefits to Assumed Connections in Lawyering, 18 CLINICAL L. REV. 339 (2012)
(discussing the need to train students to be aware of the risks of sameness and assumptions of
sameness when lawyers interact with clients).
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cultural backgrounds that all converge to influence perceptions and
behaviors.33 Thus, not only is the definition of culture elusive, one cannot
assume that simply because someone has a particular cultural background
they will act in a certain manner or hold certain beliefs.
The way educators conceptualize frameworks for teaching students
to work effectively across cultures reflects evolving understandings of
cultural complexity. Educators spanning numerous disciplines initially
designated such work as cultural competence education.34 Although
valuable insights exist from many disciplines, we focus on the cultural
diversity teaching and assessment developments in the health care fields
because of the parallels between medical and legal education with regard to
developing students’ abilities to successfully work across cultures.35
Decades ago, health care educators recognized the need for cultural
competence education because studies indicated there were significant
disparities in health outcomes related to patients’ race and ethnicity.36 Early
health care educational endeavors proceeded on the premise that certain
races and ethnicities had particular attitudes, beliefs, or experiences that
impacted the delivery of health care services.37 This cultural competence
model “emphasized a notion that clinicians and trainees need to develop
expertise in particular cultures to be effective providers.”38 Based on this
early conceptualization of cultural competence, students were expected to
have a certain level of knowledge about particular cultures—e.g., knowledge
about the culture’s history and origin and beliefs of people belonging to that
33.
See Dogra & Karim, supra note 28, at 163; Ascanio Piomelli, CrossCultural Lawyering by the Book: The Latest Clinical Texts and a Sketch of a Future Agenda,
4 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 131, 133 (2006) [hereinafter Piomelli, Cross-Cultural
Lawyering by the Book].
34.
See, e.g., THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF INTERCULTURAL COMPETENCE 272–
403 (Darla K. Deardorff, ed., 2009) (discussing developing intercultural competence in
numerous disciplines).
35.
See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION
FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 80–81, 130–31 (1st ed. 2007) (discussing how legal educators
can learn from our medical educator counterparts); Jennifer S. Bard, “Practicing Medicine
and Studying Law”: How Medical Schools Used to Have the Same Problems We Do and
What We Can Learn from Their Efforts to Solve Them, 10 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 135,
150–55 (2011) (discussing similarities and differences between legal and medical education
efforts to develop students’ practice skills).
36.
Franklin A. Gevurtz, Report Regarding the 2011 Pacific McGeorge
Workshop on Promoting Intercultural Legal Competence (The “Tahoe II” Conference), 26
PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 63, 71 (2013).
37.
Niranjan S. Karnik & Nisha Dogra, The Cultural Sensibility Model: A
Process-Oriented Approach for Children and Adolescents, in 19 CHILD AND ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA 719, 721 (Shashank V. Joshi & Andres J.
Pumariega eds., 2010).
38.
Id.
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culture both generally and as they related to the provision of health care.
Students were also expected to develop skills based upon that knowledge,
including the ability to communicate with sensitivity, to understand the
patient’s perspective, and to develop culturally sensitive treatment plans.39
Finally, students were expected to acquire attitudes that demonstrated an
understanding of, and respect for, differences based upon cultural beliefs and
practices.40 However, little attention was devoted to examination of how
one’s own culture influences responses to these ideas.
As medical educators used the cultural competence framework to
develop teaching materials and assess student-learning outcomes, they
discovered shortcomings inherent in that framework. Although the impetus
for development of cultural competence learning outcomes was to address
health care disparities based upon race and ethnicity,41 some commentators
criticized the narrow conceptualization of culture used when measuring
health care students’ learning outcomes.42 Additionally, early educational
models were criticized for proceeding on the assumption that one could
develop expertise in a particular culture simply by learning about broad
generalizations related to cultural beliefs and practices.43 Because culture is
a complex, multi-faceted concept, and because all people have multiple
cultural backgrounds and experiences that influence the lenses through which
they see the world, it is impossible for anyone to become competent in
another’s culture.44 It also became clear that given the number of different
cultures that exist, the curriculum would become quickly overloaded with an
emphasis on acquisition of specific cultural knowledge.45
39.
Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in
Client-Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345, 409–10 (1997) (discussing
learning outcomes for mental health counselors); Karnik & Dogra, supra note 37, at 724
(discussing learning outcomes for medical students).
40.
Karnik & Dogra, supra note 37, at 724.
41.
Aysegul Gozu et al., Review, Self-Administered Instruments to Measure
Cultural Competence of Health Professionals: A Systematic Review, 19 TEACHING &
LEARNING MEDICINE 180, 181 (2007).
42.
See Arno K. Kumagai & Monica L. Lypson, Beyond Cultural
Competence: Critical Consciousness, Social Justice, and Multicultural Education, 84 ACAD.
MED. 782 passim (2009); Zofia Kumas-Tan et al., Measures of Cultural Competence:
Examining Hidden Assumptions, 82 ACAD. MED. 548 passim (2009).
43.
Angela C. Jenks, From “List of Traits” to “Open-Mindedness”:
Emerging Issues in Cultural Competence Education, 35 CULTURE, MED., & PSYCHIATRY 209,
215 (2011).
44.
Kumagai & Lypson, supra note 42, at 782–83; see also Kumas-Tan et al.,
supra note 42, at 552.
45.
Elois Ann Berlin & William C. Fowkes, Jr., A Teaching Framework for
Cross-Cultural Heath Care: Application in Family Practice, 139 W. J. MED. 934, 938 (1983)
(noting that it was “unrealistic to [believe] that health care providers [could] gain [an] in-depth
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To remedy the theoretical problems inherent in the cultural
competency model, medical educators began talking about developing
students’ cultural sensitivity or cultural humility. These models defined
culture more broadly and encompassed a much wider range of cultural
factors, including race, ethnicity, gender, religion, sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, and other factors that influenced people’s worldviews.46
Educators also examined developing students’ awareness of the role that
culture plays in the delivery of health care services and using that awareness
as a communication tool when treating patients.47 A culturally sensitive or
culturally humble medical practitioner was taught to be aware that others
may come from a different belief system or perspective and that they needed
to respect that belief system and develop an appropriate treatment plan in
light of the patient’s cultural background.48 Students also were taught to be
self-reflective about their own biases and stereotypes and how those might
affect the ways in which they interacted with and treated patients.49 They
were encouraged to reflect upon their own preconceptions and to respect
differences between their worldview and that of their patient to optimize
patient care.50
Clinical legal educators adopted this culturally sensitive approach,
encouraging law students to be self-reflective about their own cultural
experiences and how those experiences affected the students’ interpretation
of client interactions and behaviors.51 Students were encouraged to be
knowledge about . . . health-affecting beliefs and practices of every ethnic or cultural group
they [were] likely to encounter”).
46.
Lisa Bliss et al., Client and Patient Relationships: Understanding
Cultural and Social Context, in POVERTY, HEALTH AND LAW: READINGS AND CASES FOR
MEDICAL-LEGAL PARTNERSHIP 125, 147 (Elizabeth Tobin Tyler et al. eds., 2011); see also
Melanie Tervalon & Jann Murray-García, Cultural Humility Versus Cultural Competence: A
Critical Distinction in Defining Physician Training Outcomes in Multicultural Education, 9 J.
HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 117, 120 (1998).
47.
Tervalon & Murray-García, supra note 46, at 119–20; see also Bliss et al.,
supra note 46, at 148, 150.
48.
Bliss et al., supra note 46, at 146, 148.
49.
Id. at 148.
50.
Naser Z. Alsharif, Cultural Humility and Interprofessional Education and
Practice: A Winning Combination, AM. J. PHARMACEUTICAL EDUC., Sept. 10, 2012, at 1, 1.
51.
The seminal work in this area was done by Professors Susan Bryant and
Jean Koh Peters. E.g., Bryant, supra note 31. Their 2001 article paved the way for clinical
legal educators grappling with how best to teach law students to account for the role culture
plays in the lawyering process. Id. Since then, many clinical educators have addressed how
to help students understand the impact cultural experiences have on the lawyer-client
relationship. See, e.g., Bliss et al., supra note 46, at 148; Antoinette Sedillo López, Making
and Breaking Habits: Teaching (and Learning) Cultural Context, Self-Awareness, and
Intercultural Communication Through Case Supervision in a Client-Service Legal Clinic, 28
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 37, 43–44 (2008); Miller et al., supra note 6, at 111–12; Piomelli,
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sensitive to cultural practices that differed from their own and to approach
interactions with humility rather than hubris.52 However, this humility or
sensitivity approach did not account for the fact that cultural experiences
vary over our lifetimes and did not necessarily include encouraging students
continuously to examine whether their own worldviews or beliefs might need
to shift. This approach also had the potential to encourage passive or blind
acceptance of what the practitioner is told about other cultures. Female
genital mutilation—as an extreme example—might not be challenged for
fear of being disrespectful of another’s culture.53 Similarly, this approach
could lead to unexamined acceptance of cultural practices as a defense to
charges of domestic violence.54 As educators continue to reflect upon—and
improve—how to teach students to work effectively in today’s multicultural
society, they develop new models. For example, recently, doctors Karnik
and Dogra proposed moving from a cultural sensitivity model to a cultural
sensibility model. They describe cultural sensibility as “an openness to
emotional impressions, susceptibility, and sensitiveness” that allows one to
reflect and change because of his or her interactions with people from
different cultural backgrounds.55 This conceptual framework emphasizes
that everyone has a cultural background that affects his or her perceptions,
Cross-Cultural Lawyering by the Book, supra note 33, at 141; Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing
and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 373, 384 (2002).
Professors Bryant and Koh have brought their work with law students to the attention of
practicing lawyers, who confront these same issues. See Sue Bryant & Jean Koh Peters, Five
Habits for Cross-Cultural Lawyering—Introduction, ILL. LEGAL ADVOC., http://
www.illinoislegaladvocate.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.dsp_content&contentID=5985
(last updated Oct. 2007).
52.
Margaret Martin Barry et al., Teaching Social Justice Lawyering:
Systematically Including Community Legal Education in Law School Clinics, 18 CLINICAL L.
REV. 401, 418 (2012); Sedillo López, supra note 51, at 45–48, 68; Liwen Mah, Comment, The
Legal Profession Faces New Faces: How Lawyers’ Professional Norms Should Change to
Serve a Changing American Population, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1721, 1754 (2005).
53.
Some cultural relativists argue that one must respect the cultural practice
of female genital mutilation while others argue that this practice violates basic human rights.
For insights into this debate see Henriette Dahan Kalev, Cultural Rights or Human Rights,
The Case of Female Genital Mutilation, 51 SEX ROLES 339, 347 (2004), available at http://
www.intact-network.net/intact/cp/files/1296997267_Cultural%20Rights%20or%20Human%
20Rights.pdf.
54.
For a very thoughtful analysis of the tensions between acceptance and
challenging culturally based defenses in domestic violence cases, see Holly Maguigan,
Cultural Evidence and Male Violence: Are Feminist and Multiculturalist Reformers on a
Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 passim (1995).
55.
Karnik & Dogra, supra note 37, at 723 (laying out the cultural sensibility
framework). This work was based upon research originally outlined by Dr. Dogra in 2003.
Nisha Dogra, Cultural Expertise or Cultural Sensibility? A Comparison of Two Ideal Type
Models to Teach Cultural Diversity, 5 INT’L J. OF MED. 223, 224–226 (2003).
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beliefs, and actions.56 The cultural sensibility framework focuses on
students’ understanding that culture is a complex compilation of numerous
influences and emphasizes developing students’ understanding of how
culture, in turn, influences interactions or knowledge.57 This approach
considers whether students are able to use their understanding of culture to
develop constructive and positive relationships or skills.58 Finally, the model
looks at whether students are willing to be self-reflective about the role
culture plays in interactions and use information they have learned to be
open to re-examining, and potentially changing, their own perspectives,
behaviors, and attitudes.59 At the heart of this framework is the notion that
cultural experiences are not static. Students and practitioners continue to
develop; and their experiences continue to influence their worldviews.60
This cultural sensibility framework, focused on the need to develop
cultural self-awareness, compliments the work of many clinical legal
educators,61 as well as views expressed by legal educator experts at the 2011
Pacific McGeorge Workshop on Promoting Intercultural Legal
Competence.62 This framework focuses on the need to teach students to
recognize the influence their own cultural backgrounds and perspectives
have on how they interpret legal rules and how they interact with others.63
The goal of cultural sensibility education is to build self-awareness and to
move students away from looking at those with different cultural experiences
as the Other.64 Cultural sensibility education seeks to create an openmindedness that allows students to avoid making assumptions about other
cultures or legal systems,65 teaching students to avoid behaviors based upon
cultural domination or superiority,66 and encouraging them to be open to
reconsidering, and potentially altering, their own way of viewing lawyerclient interactions and legal problems.

56.
Dogra & Karim, supra note 28, at 159–60.
57.
Id. at 163–64 tbl.1; Karnik & Dogra, supra note 37, at 726–28 tbl.1.
58.
Karnik & Dogra, supra note 37, at 726–28 tbl.1.
59.
Id.
60.
Id.
61.
See, e.g., Bryant, supra note 31, at 40; Jacobs, supra note 39, at 405–06;
Sedillo-Lopez, supra note 51, at 47–48; Carwina Weng, Multicultural Lawyering: Teaching
Psychology to Develop Cultural Self-Awareness, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 369, 374–75 (2005).
62.
See generally Gevurtz, supra note 36.
63.
See Bryant, supra note 31, at 40; Weng, supra note 61, at 390, 396.
64.
See Weng, supra note 61, at 396–98 (discussing the need for students to
become culturally self-aware and to recognize that a person’s culture shapes his or her
attitudes, values and assumptions about the law and legal processes).
65.
Gevurtz, supra note 36, at 79–82.
66.
Id. at 82.
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Why Cultural Sensibility is Important for Lawyers

Cultural experiences underpin how we read and interpret legal
principles and rules and how we apply those rules to facts.67 Cultural
experiences also account for the way we understand and communicate
information.68 Cultural perspectives permeate transnational transactions and
cross-border disputes as well as domestic legal issues and interactions.
Additionally, different countries and cultures have different views about
attorneys’ functions in society and in particular situations.69
Lawyers working in an international law context, be it in a large law
firm’s business practice or on international human rights issues, should
understand the role culture plays in their work.70 Likewise, understanding
how to effectively work across cultures is important to lawyers who deal
with cross-border disputes and transactions in many different legal
specialties such as immigration law,71 environmental law,72 family law,73

67.
Over a decade ago, Professor Marjorie Silver eloquently argued that law
students should be taught that all lawyering is cross-cultural and that our cultural perspectives
inform our legal and factual analysis. See Marjorie Silver, Emotional Competence, Multicultural Lawyering and Race, 3 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 219 (2002). Others have noted that culture
permeates legal interpretation. See, e.g., Kris Franklin, Pedagogy, “Theory Saved My Life”, 8
N.Y. CITY L. REV. 599, 607 (2005) (noting “interpretation is both a basic human activity and
wholly historically and culturally conditioned”); see Dan M. Kahan, Essay, “Ideology in” or
“Cultural Cognition of” Judging: What Difference Does It Make?, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 413,
420 (2009).
68.
See Tae-Seop Lim, Language and Verbal Communication Across
Cultures, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL AND INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION 69, 70, 73–
76 (William B. Gudykunst & Bella Mody eds., 2d ed. 2002); Peter A. Andersen et al.,
Nonverbal Communication Across Cultures, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL AND
INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION 89, 90–91 (William B. Gudykunst & Bella Mody eds., 2d
ed. 2002).
69.
Gevurtz, supra note 36, at 75.
70.
In the law firm context, see John Barkai, What’s a Cross-Cultural
Mediator to Do? A Low-Context Solution for a High-Context Problem, 10 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 43, 44 (2008); Nancy S. Kim, Reasonable Expectations in Sociocultural
Context, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641, 642, 655–60 (2010). For application in the human
rights context, see Kathleen Kelly Janus & Dee Smythe, Navigating Culture in the Field:
Cultural Competency Training Lessons from the International Human Rights Clinic, 56
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 445, 446 (2011–2012).
71.
Nora V. Demleitner, How Much Do Western Democracies Value Family
and Marriage?: Immigration Law’s Conflicted Answers, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273 passim
(2003); Gevurtz, supra note 36, at 74.
72.
Gevurtz, supra note 36, at 74.
73.
Annie Bunting, Elijah and Ishmael: Assessing Cultural Identity in
Canadian Child Custody Decisions, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 471, 472–73 (2004); Gevurtz, supra
note 36, at 74.
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criminal law,74 and employment law,75 as well as in equity, property, and
torts issues.76 However, the need to understand how cultural experiences
affect the legal process is not limited to those engaging in international or
cross-border transactions and disputes. Most lawyers will encounter
colleagues, judges, jurors, and clients whose cultural perspectives and
experiences differ from their own. Failure to understand the role culture
plays can limit a lawyer’s ability to meet critical legal needs and provide
access to justice as well as impede client representation generally.77
Global competence, competently representing domestic clients, and
access to justice issues all require lawyers to understand the role culture
plays in the lawyering process. Thus, scholars and educators working to
develop students’ intercultural legal competence have identified two reasons
for doing so: (1) to enable law graduates to successfully represent clients in
transactions and litigation situations that involve different countries, cultures
or legal systems,78 and (2) to better serve those from underrepresented
cultures and countries, providing greater access to justice.79
Developing law students’ abilities to work effectively across cultures
is important because lawyers’ failure to recognize and account for culturally
different approaches to communication and problem solving may result in
74.
See Scharlette Holdman & Christopher Seeds, Cultural Competency in
Capital Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 883, 883–84 (2008); see also Gevurtz, supra note 36,
at 74.
75.
Gevurtz, supra note 36, at 74.
76.
O’DONNELL & JOHNSTONE, supra note 6, at 24, 66, 105 (suggesting ways
to incorporate cultural sensibility teaching into a range of doctrinal courses); see also Gevurtz,
supra note 36, at 74.
77.
For a discussion of the need for cultural sensibility to improve access to
justice, see Gevurtz, supra note 36, at 74–75; see also Holdman & Seeds, supra note 74, at
894, 896 (discussing how cultural competency is critical in capital cases involving clients
from underserved and outsider communities); Ascanio Piomelli, Sensibilities for Social
Justice Lawyers, 10 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 177, 185–86 (2013) [hereinafter
Piomelli, Sensibilities for Social Justice Lawyers] (discussing the need for social justice
lawyers to pay attention to class, race and gender to recognize, and account for, cultural
encapsulation). For a discussion of the need for cultural sensibility skills in general client
representation, see infra text accompanying notes 80–85.
78.
Gevurtz, supra note 36, at 71; Catherine J. Iorns Magallanes, Teaching for
Transnational Lawyering, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 519, 520 (2005) (noting cultural competence is
“key to so many other methods of thinking and problem-solving that it should be taught as
foundational to transnational lawyering”).
79.
Gevurtz, supra note 36, at 71; Nelson Miller & Victoria Kremski, Who Is
the Customer and What Are We Selling? Employer-Based Objectives for the Ethical
Competence of Law School Graduates, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 223, 236–37 (2009); Piomelli,
Sensibilities for Social Justice Lawyers, supra note 77, at 185–86; Rose Voyvodic, Lawyers
Meet the Social Context: Understanding Cultural Competence, 84 CANADIAN B. REV. 563,
581–82 (2006).
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misunderstandings,80 misapplication of the legal rules and principles to
facts,81 failed international and cross-border transactions,82 the development
and interpretation of laws and legal rules that fail to account for differing
perspectives,83 and, in some cases, the continued marginalization of those
who do not belong to the dominant culture.84 In all practice areas, cultural
misunderstandings may impede lawyers’ abilities to effectively interview,
investigate, counsel, negotiate, litigate, and resolve conflicts.85
Helping law students understand the role culture plays in the
lawyering process serves both lawyer and client. As one health care educator
noted, improved doctor-patient communications leads to more accurate
diagnosis and treatment, increased patient satisfaction, and ultimately fewer
malpractice claims.86 The same reasoning applies to lawyers. Studies show
that client satisfaction often relates as much to how lawyers communicate as
to actual results achieved in a given case.87 Effective lawyers must be able to
recognize, and appropriately respond to, their own and others’ cultural
perceptions and beliefs because these often play a central role in lawyerclient communications.88

80.
Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good
Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 437, 510–12 (2008); see also Bryant, supra note 31, at 42; see generally RICHARD
BRISLIN, UNDERSTANDING CULTURE’S INFLUENCE ON BEHAVIOR (1993).
81.
Bryant & Peters, supra note 51 (noting that “[l]awyers in cross-cultural
settings may have greater difficulty sorting out when they are making assumptions and when
they are using facts”).
82.
Annette Demers, Cultural Competence and the Legal Profession: An
Annotated Bibliography of Materials Published Between 2000 and 2011, 39 INT’L J. LEGAL
INFO 22, 22–23 (2011) (relaying story of failed international business transaction because of
lawyer’s lack of awareness of cultural practices and expectations).
83.
O’DONNELL & JOHNSTONE, supra note 6, at 1.
84.
Anthony V. Alfieri, (Un)Covering Identity in Civil Rights and Poverty
Law, 121 HARV. L. REV. 805, 837 (2008) (arguing that “the failure to train civil rights and
poverty lawyers in practices of cross-cultural and difference-based identity analysis
perpetuates stigma-induced marginalization in law and society”).
85.
Sternlight & Robbennolt, supra note 80, at 437, 442, 509–12.
86.
Wendy Levinson et al., Physician-Patient Communication: The
Relationship with Malpractice Claims Among Primary Care Physicians and Surgeons, 277 J.
AM. MED. ASS’N 553, 558 (1997).
87.
Clark D. Cunningham, Legal Education After Law School: Lessons from
Scotland and England, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 193, 203 (2005) (noting that studies found
professional negligence claims often were not based upon case outcome but instead related to
lawyer-client communication failures, including lawyers’ “failure to listen to the client, to ask
appropriate questions, and to explain relevant aspects of the matter”).
88.
Bliss et al., supra note 46, at 141–43.
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IDENTIFYING LEARNING OUTCOMES RELATED TO THE
DEVELOPMENT OF A CULTURALLY SENSIBLE LAWYER

Educators committed to helping law students become culturally
sensible professionals must consider how best to develop students’ abilities
to work effectively across cultures. Before designing a course or curriculum,
it is useful to identify what students should learn in order to best design
assignments, teaching methods, and assessments.89 One way to focus on
student learning is to articulate learning outcomes. Learning outcomes can
help measure student progress.90 Learning outcomes can also provide
valuable feedback about gaps in the course or curriculum and whether
particular teaching modules or methods should be modified.91
As mentioned above, learning outcomes are “something [the]
students can do now that they could not do previously. . . . [A change in
people] as a result of a learning experience.”92 The shift to learning
outcomes is an educational paradigm shift in which the focus is upon what
students have learned rather than on areas or types of instruction.93 The
focus is on learner achievements rather than teacher intentions.94 Learning
outcomes commonly consist of three aspects of student learning: (1) the
acquisition of knowledge (what instructors want students to know), (2)
attitudes (the professional values or attitudes instructors want students to
demonstrate), and (3) skills (what instructors want students to be able to
do).95 These concepts constitute the knowledge–attitudes–skills framework
used to develop student learning outcomes in other disciplines. Although
specific outcomes are often categorized separately, there is frequently some
overlap and linkage. As a group of medical school deans noted, “[i]nevitably
there is overlap between the different domains with some outcomes being
89.
MICHAEL HUNTER SCHWARTZ ET AL., TEACHING LAW BY DESIGN:
ENGAGING STUDENTS FROM THE SYLLABUS TO THE FINAL EXAM 37 (2009); GRANT WIGGINS &
JAY MCTIGHE, UNDERSTANDING BY DESIGN 13–14 (2d ed. 2005).
90.
Fisher, supra note 3, at 237.
91.
Id. at 236–37; see also Deborah Maranville et al., Lessons for Legal
Education from the Engineering Profession’s Experience with Outcomes-Based Accreditation,
38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1017, 1032–33 (2012); Lynch, supra note 3, at 995–97.
92.
Watson, supra note 21, at 208.
93.
CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 11, at 16–17; Friedland, supra note 23, at
960.
94.
STEPHEN ADAM, LEARNING OUTCOMES CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
EUROPE: UPDATE ON THE ISSUES AND APPLICATIONS OF LEARNING OUTCOMES ASSOCIATED
WITH THE BOLOGNA PROCESS 14 (2008), available at http://www.ond.vlaanderen.be/
hogeronderwijs/bologna/BolognaSeminars/documents/Edinburgh/Edinburgh_Feb08_Adams.p
df.
95.
Writing Learning Outcomes, AM. ASS’N. L. LIBR., http://www.aallnet.org/
Archived/Education-and-Events/cpe/outcomes.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
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common to more than one domain, but such duplication serves to illustrate
the inextricable links and interdependence between the different elements
comprising a competent and reflective practitioner.”96
Learning outcomes may be designed by individual faculty members
for a specific course and outcomes may be curricular in light of expectations
of the knowledge–attitudes–skills graduates should demonstrate.97 Learning
outcomes vary depending upon course or curricular content or individual
faculty members’ learning objectives. Both curricular and course learning
outcomes are shaped by educators’ own world views and educational
philosophies,98 and it is useful for educators to consider the reasons they
choose particular approaches and the rationale for their preferences.99
Because learning outcomes seek to provide information to students
and teachers about student learning, they should be specific, measurable,
achievable, relevant, and realistic.100 With that said, learning outcomes are
difficult to draft because all learning is part of a continuum101 and the level
and depth of learning depends upon context, teacher knowledge, and
understanding as well as student knowledge and understanding.102 Very
broad or general learning outcomes may provide learners little guidance and
be difficult to measure.103 On the other hand, overly precise learning
outcomes may too narrowly prescribe learning.104
96.
J.G. Simpson et al., The Scottish Doctor—Learning Outcomes for the
Medical Undergraduate in Scotland:
A Foundation for Competent and Reflective
Practitioners, 24 MED. TCHR. 136, 137 (2002).
97.
RICHARD JOHNSTONE & SUMITRA VIGNAENDRA, AUSTRALIAN UNIVS.
TEACHING COMM., LEARNING OUTCOMES AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT IN LAW 110–11
(2003), available at http://www.cald.asn.au/docs/AUTC_2003_Johnstone-Vignaendra.pdf
(discussing curricular based learning outcomes); Carolyn Grose, Outcomes-Based Education
One Course at a Time: My Experiment with Estates and Trusts, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 336, 343–
44 (2012) (discussing course-based learning outcomes).
98.
Grose, supra note 97, at 340 (noting that in determining learning
outcomes, educators identify their goals for the class, the desired outcomes and how those will
be assessed, and the teaching methods best suited to the achievement of those outcomes).
99.
Id. at 345.
100.
Declan Kennedy et al., Writing and Using Learning Outcomes: A
Practical Guide, in EUA BOLOGNA HANDBOOK: MAKING BOLOGNA WORK, 1, 18 available at
http://sss.dcu.ie/afi/docs/bologna/writing_and_using_learning_outcomes.pdf;
Jacob
M.
Carpenter, Unique Problems and Creative Solutions to Assessing Learning Outcomes in
Transactional Drafting Courses: Overcoming “The Form Book Problem,” 38 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 195, 203 (2012).
101.
Trevor Hussey & Patrick Smith, Learning Outcomes: A Conceptual
Analysis, 13 TEACHING HIGHER EDUC. 107, 109 (2008).
102.
Id.
103.
Ian Scott, The Learning Outcome in Higher Education: Time to Think
Again?, WORCESTER J. LEARNING & TEACHING, Jan. 2011, available at http://
www.worc.ac.uk/adpu/documents/WJLTIssue5PersonalperspectivesIScott.pdf.
104.
Id.
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Some have correctly noted that not all aspects of what law professors
teach can be reduced to an easily measurable learning outcome.105
Additionally, there is a danger that quantification of learning outcomes may
oversimplify the complexity of what students should learn.106 Although
raising valid points, these critiques should not lead to a wholesale rejection
of legal education learning outcomes. The danger is not in identifying
learning outcomes. Rather, the dangers lay in reliance upon one instrument
or one assessment method to quantify student learning,107 and in rigid
adherence to a set of pre-determined learning outcomes rather than use of
learning outcomes as part of an iterative process that guides, rather than
dictates, student learning and curriculum development.108
The process of identifying learning outcomes is relatively new to
most law professors. Therefore, to suggest cultural sensibility learning
outcomes in the legal education context, we use work done by medical
educators,109 clinical legal educators,110 and a group of legal education
105.
See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 3, at 986–90 (addressing concerns that a
move to learning outcomes will result in a diminution of intellectual and conceptual classroom
teaching and discussions).
106.
See Maranville et al., supra note 91, at 1035.
107.
See, e.g., Stefan H. Krieger & Serge A. Martinez, Performance Isn’t
Everything: The Importance of Conceptual Competence in Outcome Assessment of
Experiential Learning, 19 CLINICAL L. REV. 251 passim (2012) (arguing that outcomes
assessment in experiential legal education should go beyond a checklist approach and
encompass techniques designed to evaluate student reasoning as they engage with clients and
cases).
108.
Angela Maher, Learning Outcomes in Higher Education: Implications for
Curriculum Design and Student Learning, J. HOSPITALITY, LEISURE, SPORT & TOURISM EDUC.,
Nov. 2004, at 46, 50.
109.
The theoretical constructs from medical educators were based upon the
work of doctors Dogra, Karnik, and Karim. See generally Dogra & Karim, supra note 28;
Karnik & Dogra, supra note 37. We also reviewed learning outcomes drafted by a blue
ribbon commission of physicians and medical educators. ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., TOOL
FOR ASSESSING CULTURAL COMPETENCE TRAINING (TACCT) (2010), available at https://
www.aamc.org/download/54344/data/tacct_pdf.pdf [hereinafter ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS.,
TOOL FOR ASSESSING CULTURAL COMPETENCE TRAINING (TACCT)]. We also reviewed survey
instruments developed by numerous health care educators. Michael D’Andrea et al.,
Evaluating the Impact of Multicultural Counseling Training, 70 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 143,
145–48 (1991); Glenn Gamst et al., Cultural Competency Revised: The California Brief
Multicultural Competence Scale, 37 MEASUREMENT & EVALUATION COUNSELING & DEV. 163,
163–66 (2004); Gozu et al., supra note 41 passim (reviewing numerous health care educator
survey instruments); Sunil K. Khanna et al., Cultural Competency in Health Care: Evaluating
the Outcomes of a Cultural Competency Training Among Health Care Professionals, 101 J.
NAT’L MED. ASS’N. 886, 887–89 (2009).
110.
Although many legal educators have worked on these issues, we found
work done by the following clinical educators particularly informative as we designed the
survey: Bliss et al., supra note 46; Bryant, supra note 31; Miller et al., supra note 6; Sedillo
López, supra note 51; Weng, supra note 61.
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experts on cross-cultural learning.111 In designing these outcomes, we used
the cultural sensibility model112 and the knowledge–attitudes–skills
framework.113 We present these learning outcomes cognizant of the issues
discussed above and with the understanding that although they might form a
core curriculum of basic outcomes to help students understand the effect
cultural perspectives have on the lawyering process, they are not an
exhaustive or definitive list.114 Rather, they provide a starting place to
envision developing a curriculum that prepares students to practice law in
today’s multicultural society. As with all learning outcomes, cultural
sensibility learning outcomes will need to be revised and modified in
response to student feedback and changing contexts. We have categorized
learning outcomes into the knowledge, skills, and attitudes domains.
However, as mentioned above, there is often overlap within and between
domains, and therefore learning outcomes that we have identified may
appropriately fit within more than one domain.115
A.

Knowledge

Many legal educators, especially clinical legal educators, recognize
that competent lawyers must acknowledge the effect culture has upon the
lawyer-client encounter and the ways in which lawyer ignorance of cultural
perspectives can adversely impact clients.116 As discussed in Section I,
amongst medical educators who pioneered the concept of developing
culturally competent practitioners, competency originally was defined by
knowledge about specific cultures as if there was a homogeneity amongst
people who possessed a similar cultural background.117 Additionally, culture
was commonly conflated with race and ethnicity.118 Such an approach
111.
See generally Raquel Aldana & Leticia Saucedo, Learning in Mulukukú:
A Journey of Transformation, in VULNERABLE POPULATIONS AND TRANSFORMATIVE LAW
TEACHING 251 (Soc’y of Am. Law Teachers & Golden Gate Univ. Sch. of Law eds., 2011);
Gevurtz, supra note 36.
112.
Karnik & Dogra, supra note 37 passim.
113.
See supra text accompanying notes 94–96.
114.
For an example of a comprehensive list of cultural sensibility medical
school learning outcomes, see ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., TOOL FOR ASSESSING CULTURAL
COMPETENCE TRAINING (TACCT), supra note 109.
115.
See supra text accompanying note 96.
116.
We do not attempt to provide an exhaustive list of all legal educators who
have advocated for the integration of cultural sensibility education into law student clinical
training. Rather, we simply note that this issue is one that has long been considered by legal
educators, and especially clinicians. See, e.g., Bryant, supra note 31, at 35; Sedillo López,
supra note 51, at 40; Weng, supra note 61, at 372–74.
117.
Karnik & Dogra, supra note 37, at 721.
118.
Id.
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encourages stereotyping and fails to acknowledge that individuals have
multiple cultures and cultural experiences that shape their perceptions and
attitudes.119 This conceptualization of culture can also lead to teaching about
culture as if culture belongs to the Other rather than encouraging students’
understanding that we all have multiple cultural backgrounds that affect how
we perceive and interact.120
The issues inherent in this narrow approach have led legal educators
to reject a knowledge-based approach in which students learn about
particular cultures in favor of a more contextual approach in which learning
outcomes focus on students’ knowledge and understanding of the cultural
contexts in which information is presented and received.121 Additionally,
some legal educators suggest that students should understand that cultural
perspectives underlie legal decision-making in order to both effectively
develop legal strategies under existing laws and to argue for changes to the
law.122 Some argue that law students’ knowledge must extend to an
understanding of the subconscious cognitive categories, schemas, and the
susceptibility of schemas to unconscious biases and stereotyping in order to
uncover deeply embedded assumptions and attitudes that affect
interactions.123 Finally, some legal scholars postulate that students must
understand the historical role cultural perspectives of the dominant culture
119.
See TERRY CROSS ET AL., TOWARDS A CULTURALLY COMPETENT SYSTEM
A MONOGRAPH ON EFFECTIVE SERVICES FOR MINORITY CHILDREN WHO ARE
EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED 6 (1989); Mary E. Duffy, A Critique of Cultural
Education in Nursing, 36 J. ADVANCED NURSING 487, 489 (2001); Cynthia A. Savage, Culture
and Mediation: A Red Herring, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 269, 274 (1996).
120.
Piomelli, Cross-Cultural Lawyering by the Book, supra note 33, at 137–42
(critiquing clinical textbook’s focus on examining the client’s culture while ignoring the
student’s need to examine his or her own cultural experiences, beliefs and assumptions).
121.
See Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race,
Ethnicity, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1811–17 (1993) (arguing that understanding cultural contexts are critical
to teaching lawyering for social change, and suggesting ways to raise personal identification
issues in a wide range of classes); Alizabeth Newman, Bridging the Justice Gap: Building
Community by Responding to Individual Need, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 615, 664 (2011) (noting
the need for community members to help lawyers understand the cultural contexts of clients’
statements and actions). Clinical legal educators have adopted this contextualized approach as
they teach students to interact with clients. See, e.g., Bryant, supra note 3; Sedillo-López,
supra note 51.
122.
See Kahan, supra note 67, at 419–21 (arguing that judges view cases
through a cultural lens even when consciously trying to be objective); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et
al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1197
(2009) (finding that judges often have implicit biases that affect their judicial decisionmaking).
123.
See Weng, supra note 61, at 373, 391–93; see also Jerry Kang, Trojan
Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1504 (2005); Miller et al., supra note 6, at 121–22.
OF CARE:
SEVERELY
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have played and how these perspectives shaped the law in order to
understand power differentials124 and how these perspectives influence
relationships between individuals and the development of the law and legal
systems.125
We relay these last knowledge learning objectives with the caveat
that, while it may be important to build students’ knowledge about historical
perspectives, historical contexts vary among different communities and
groups.126 Faculty should carefully consider how much emphasis should be
placed upon the role the dominant culture has played in the development of
the law and legal systems. If students from the dominant culture feel that the
curriculum is saying that their world views are wrong, as opposed to asking
them to consider how their world views may color their thinking, the
students may be less open to exploring the role culture plays in the lawyering
process.127 A categorical view that certain views are acceptable and others
are not may produce a defensive reaction and inhibit students’ willingness to
engage in self-reflection and challenge their long-held beliefs.128 Thus, it is
generally more effective to talk about unacceptable behaviors rather than
unacceptable views.
The following list utilizes the conceptualizations of various aspects
of students’ cultural sensibility knowledge articulated above to identify some
cultural sensibility knowledge learning outcomes one might have for a course
or even a program of legal education—recognizing that many of these
outcomes could also be categorized as attitude or skill outcomes.
At the end of the course/law school you should be able to:


Define, in contemporary terms, race, ethnicity, and
culture;

124.
See O’DONNELL & JOHNSTONE, supra note 6, at 8; see also Anthony R.
Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to the Courtroom, 28 CONN.
L. REV. 1, 6 (1995).
125.
See O’DONNELL & JOHNSTONE, supra note 6, at 8; Roberta Rosenthal
Kwall, The Cultural Analysis Paradigm: Women and Synagogue Ritual as a Case Study, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 609, 619 (2012).
126.
See, e.g., Denise C. Morgan, The New School Finance Litigation:
Acknowledging That Race Discrimination in Public Education is More than Just a Tort, 96
NW. U. L. REV. 99, 146–47 (2001–2002) (noting that race is a social construct based upon the
historical and social context of a given community).
127.
See Aldana & Saucedo, supra note 111, at 255–56 (discussing the role
reflective thinking plays in transformative educational experiences).
128.
See Camille Gear Rich, Marginal Whiteness, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1497,
1563–65 (2010) (discussing psychologists’ findings that discussions of white privilege can
have deleterious effects and ignite hostility in marginalized whites who may otherwise be
allies in attempts to disrupt effect of that privilege).
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Identify your own cultural experiences and how those
experiences may affect your perceptions of the law and
legal systems;
Explain why cultural biases are not unique to one
particular race or ethnicity or cultural background;
In a particular case or factual scenario, identify cultural
experiences of the parties and the lawyers that may affect
the legal and factual analysis;
Discuss the ways in which social determinants such as
culture, education, income, housing, employment, access
to transportation, and socio-economic status may affect
access to justice;
Describe the influence of culture on the historical
development of laws and legal systems;
Describe how stereotyping and biases may affect a
lawyer’s interpretation of the facts and application of a
legal rule to the facts;
Identify examples of culturally biased assumptions that
lawyers and clients may bring into the lawyer-client
relationship;
Explain your own cultural biases and how those may
impact legal representation generally as well as in the
context of a particular case or factual scenario;
Explain how subconscious schemas and categories make
it difficult to identify when your reactions to other people
are based upon culturally biased assumptions or
stereotypes;
Recognize that bias and stereotyping (conscious and
unconscious) affect your factual and legal analysis;
Describe challenges in cross-cultural communications.

Attitudes

Because our perspectives influence the decisions we make and how
we view interactions,129 legal educators have discussed the need to develop
students’ receptiveness to exploring the effect of socio-cultural beliefs and
behaviors on the provision of legal services and the lawyer-client
relationship.130 Clients may receive inadequate representation if law students
and lawyers are not aware of their own potential bias and how their cultural
129.
See John B. Mitchell, Narrative and Client-Centered Representation:
What is a True Believer to Do When His Two Favorite Theories Collide?, 6 CLINICAL L. REV.
85, 90–91 (1999).
130.
See generally Bryant, supra note 31; Miller et al., supra note 6; Sedillo
López, supra note 51.
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backgrounds affect their perceptions. For example, Professor John B.
Mitchell relates the story of a clinic case in which a recent émigré from an
Asian country was accused of trying to sexually assault a man at a restroom
urinal.131 The client’s story was that he thought he knew the alleged victim,
and the client was simply trying to shake the man’s hand.132 For many
Americans, the story would not be believable because of cultural attitudes
about appropriate behavior at urinals.133 Understanding that in the client’s
culture there was no self-consciousness about displaying what many
Americans consider private body parts helped student lawyers develop the
man’s defense.134 Understanding the effect of one’s socio-cultural belief
systems is not just important in social justice lawyering. It also important to
lawyers engaged in representing business clients. For example, in Western
cultures, a signed contract represents a final business deal that the parties
should honor and follow. In other cultures, the fulfillment of a deal may be
based upon trust between the parties rather than what is written in the
contract.135 If lawyers do not understand that their attitudes toward a
transaction stem from their own cultural practices and traditions, and that
they should not view other cultural practices as wrong, the transaction may
fail.
A critical component of cultural sensibility education involves
helping students understand how their own and others’ cultural practices and
perceptions affect how they view clients and transactions.136 Students must
understand that there is no single correct attitude or viewpoint, and faculty
should not attempt to impose specific attitudes or values upon students.137
Rather, faculty should seek to develop students’ curiosity, empathy, respect,
and humility with regard to their own and others’ cultural beliefs and
perspectives.138 These attitudes are important because they acknowledge that
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Mitchell, supra note 129, at 104–05.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 116–17.
Id. at 121.
Catherine Sun, Negotiating Business Transactions in China, in BEST
PRACTICES FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN CHINA: LEADING LAWYERS ON
STRUCTURING AND NEGOTIATING TRADE TRANSACTIONS, UNDERSTANDING THE IMPORTANCE OF
DUE DILIGENCE, AND WORKING AS A LEGAL PROFESSIONAL IN THE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
COMMUNITY 76 (Aspatore, 2009).
136.
See Miller et al., supra note 6, at 105–06; Sedillo López, supra note 51, at
45–49.
137.
Charles R. Calleros, Training a Diverse Student Body for a Multicultural
Society, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 140, 160 (1995); F. Patrick Hubbard, Justice, Creativity, and Popular
Culture: The “Jurisprudence” of Mary Chapin Carpenter, 27 PAC. L.J. 1139, 1146–47
(1996).
138.
Miller et al., supra note 6, at 113; Piomelli, Cross-Cultural Lawyering by
the Book, supra note 33, at 153, 166; see also Weng, supra note 61, at 372.
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our world view is not an absolute truth. In cultural sensibility education,
perhaps the most important attitudes to cultivate are openness to learning
about how culture affects the lawyering process and open-mindedness about
the assumptions students have about their own and others’ cultures.139
Students should learn not to make judgments based upon their own cultural
background and perceptions and should not assume that others share their
perspective.140 They should also be open to discovering that their initial
assumptions about another’s legal system or culture may be incorrect.141
Faculty should also help students develop their self-awareness about their
own system and culture, teaching students about how their own cultural
backgrounds affect their perceptions and actions.142 Finally, students should
be aware of differences in communication styles and value systems without
attributing positive or negative connotations to those differences.143
With these principles in mind, the following list identifies some
cultural sensibility attitude learning outcomes one might have for a course or
even a program of legal education (recognizing that many of these outcomes
could also be categorized as knowledge or skill outcomes).
At the end of the course/law school you should be able to:








Explain the challenges inherent in exploration of one’s
own cultural biases and stereotypes;
Identify impediments that affect your openness to
learning about your own cultural biases and stereotypes;
Explain why lawyers are as likely as clients to see the
world through their own cultural lenses;
Reflect on how different values systems and
communications
styles
may
affect
lawyers’
interpretations of client reactions and behaviors;
Reflect upon how your own varied cultural experiences
affect your perceptions and interactions with clients,
colleagues, and staff;
Evaluate why people are resistant to admitting that they
make judgments based upon cultural biases and
stereotypes;
Evaluate the role your own cultural experiences have had
in shaping your views about the law and legal systems;

139.
The attitude learning outcomes for a culturally sensible lawyer are built
upon the work done by clinical legal educators. For example, over a decade ago, Professor
Bryant suggested that open-mindedness was a critical component of building students’
abilities to work effectively across cultures. Bryant, supra note 31, at 41–42.
140.
Weng, supra note 61, at 385–86.
141.
See Gevurtz, supra note 36, at 84–85.
142.
Miller et al., supra note 6, at 105–06, 114; Silver, supra note 67, at 230.
143.
See Gevurtz, supra note 36, at 83–84.
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Recognize the need to suspend judgment when
encountering unfamiliar conduct or views;
Demonstrate curiosity about the ways in which your
cultural beliefs and practices influence your perceptions
and interactions;
Demonstrate curiosity about clients’ cultural beliefs and
practices.

Skills

Legal educators have identified the need for students to account for
cultural perspectives, motivations, backgrounds, and understandings of the
lawyer and the person with whom he or she interacts, and to apply these
same understandings to their legal analysis.144 Students should be taught to
assess whether their own assumptions and biases affect their understandings
of information or the overall case,145 to identify red flags that indicate
miscommunication may have occurred, and to develop strategies for
correcting miscommunications caused by cultural misunderstandings.146 All
of these skills enhance students’ abilities to effectively represent clients from
a wide range of cultural backgrounds and perspectives. Although some
cultural sensibility skills are probably best developed via experiential
learning, others can be developed in doctrinal courses through analysis of the
cultural perspectives and beliefs underlying legal arguments, legal rules and
judicial reasoning.
The list below suggests some cultural sensibility skills learning
outcomes one might have for a course or program of legal education
(recognizing that many of these outcomes could also be categorized as
knowledge or skill outcomes).
At the end of this course/law school you should be able to:





144.
145.
146.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss2/1

Identify the cultural factors that may have affected the
judge’s or jury’s decision-making process in a given case;
Identify the cultural factors that may have affected how
the lawyer presented his or her client’s case;
Identify methods that may be utilized to ensure awareness
of your own cultural traditions, perspectives, and beliefs;
Identify methods that may be utilized to ensure awareness
of others’ cultural traditions, perspectives, and beliefs and
how those may be the same or different than your own;

Bryant, supra note 31, at 40–41.
Id. at 48–50; Sedillo López, supra note 51, at 46–48.
Bryant, supra note 31, at 73, 76.

42

: Nova Law Review 38, #2

2014]

INSTRUMENT TO DEVELOP AND TAILOR LAW STUDENT
CULTURAL DIVERSITY EDUCATION LEARNING OUTCOMES











III.

203

Incorporate cultural considerations into your discussion of
a hypothetical legal problem and the appropriate solution;
Provide examples of how your own cultural assumptions
and biases affected your understanding of the factual and
legal issues in a given case or transaction;
Identify situations in which your cultural biases or
stereotypes impeded successful legal representation;
Ask appropriate questions to elicit client information
about cultural beliefs or practices that may affect
representation;
Communicate effectively using a wide range of strategies
to engage with clients;
Respond appropriately to client feedback about key crosscultural issues;
Demonstrate strategies to assess, manage, and reduce bias
in encounters with clients and witnesses;
Explain techniques and tools that can help identify red
flags that there has been a cross-cultural
miscommunication;
Use reflective practices when working on legal cases or
transactions;
Use reflective practices when considering cultural
contexts and cultural norms and whether particular
cultural norms and practices create injustices which
should be challenged.

THE CULTURAL SENSIBILITY LEARNING CONTINUUM

Identification of learning outcomes helps clarify what students
should learn. However, assessment of learning outcomes has to occur with
the recognition that cultural sensibility develops on a continuum and that
individual students within a given cohort may be in different places on that
continuum. Educators in other disciplines have developed various models to
explain the progression students go through as they develop their abilities to
work effectively across cultures. One seminal early model was developed by
Milton J. Bennett, M.D.147 Dr. Bennett’s model “provides a theory-based
explanation for the varying degrees of individual and organizational
effectiveness one observes in intercultural endeavours.”148 Bennett’s
theoretical model describes the progression through various phases of what
147.
Milton J. Bennett, A Developmental Approach to Training for
Intercultural Sensitivity, 10 INT’L J. INTERCULTURAL REL. 179, 179 (1986).
148.
Joe Greenholtz, Assessing Cross-Cultural Competence in Transnational
Education: The Intercultural Development Inventory, 25 HIGHER EDUC. EUR. 411, 412
(2000); see also Bennett, supra note 147, at 180.
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he calls intercultural sensitivity.149 He suggests that learners move from
being ethnocentric, using their own culture as the yardstick by which other
cultures are measured, to becoming ethnorelative, realizing that their own
culture is “one of many equally valid worldviews.”150
Bennett labels the first level of this development as Denial of
Difference.151 In this phase, students do not understand or accept cultural
differences. People in this category either do not notice differences or
construct broad, undifferentiated categories of cultural difference, such as
Asian.152 Students at this stage must learn to recognize the existence of
cultural differences.153 Bennett identifies the second level as Defense
Against Difference, a stage in which one views differences as a “threat to the
centrality of one’s world view.”154 In this phase, learners recognize cultural
differences but negatively evaluate those differences.155 People at this level
tend to either denigrate other cultures, exaggerate the positive characteristics
of their own culture, or in some cases see another culture as superior to their
own.156 At this stage, students need to work on developing less polarized
views about cultural differences.157 Bennett describes the third level,
Minimization of Difference, as a “last-ditch attempt to preserve the centrality
of one’s own world view”158 by trivializing differences.159 Learners
recognize and accept superficial cultural differences but insist that all human
beings are essentially the same, with the same basic values.160 At this stage,
students need to work on development of cultural self-awareness, including
understanding their own values and beliefs and exploring issues of dominant
group privilege.161 The goal is to help students at this stage develop openmindedness, the ability to perceive others accurately, and the capacity to
maintain a nonjudgmental interaction posture.162

149.
150.

Bennett, supra note 147, at 180.
Greenholtz, supra note 148, at 413; see also Bennett, supra note 147, at

190–91.
151.
Bennett, supra note 147, at 182.
152.
Id. at 182–83, 187.
153.
Id. at 187–88.
154.
Id. at 183.
155.
Id. at 183, 188.
156.
Bennett, supra note 147, at 183, 188.
157.
Id. at 189.
158.
Id. at 183.
159.
Id. at 184.
160.
Id.
161.
See Bennett, supra note 147, at 190–91.
162.
See id.; Bryant, supra note 31, at 56 (noting that “non-judgmental
[thinking] is a core cross-cultural skill and one that is particularly difficult for lawyers”). For
an insightful discussion of why it is important to help law students move from an ethnocentric
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At the fourth level, Acceptance of Difference, learners recognize and
appreciate cultural differences in behavior and values.163 Learners are able to
differentiate and elaborate various cultural categories and develop a metalevel view of cultural difference, including knowledge about the multifaceted aspects of their own culture.164 At this stage, educators should work
with students to help them refine their analysis of cultural contrasts and
deepen cultural self-awareness.165 Students should begin to learn how to
shift their frame of reference to incorporate willingness to learn about other
cultures without judgment.166 Bennett’s fifth level, Adaptation to Difference,
is the stage at which students are aware of the role culture plays in
interactions and have developed the communication skills that enable
effective intercultural communication.167 Students at this level consciously
understand the need to shift their frame of reference in intercultural situations
so that they are not looking at the situation only through their own cultural
lens.168 At this stage, students are working at problem solving and
interaction skills from the perspective of one who understands that culture is
multi-faceted and relative, and that there is no one good or bad cultural
perspective.169 Bennett’s final level, Integration of Difference, is when
learners have internalized multicultural frames of reference and do not selfidentify with any one particular culture, but rather look at themselves as
having a multicultural identity and having the ability to unconsciously adjust
to a wide range of cultural beliefs and practices.170 At this stage, educators
help students understand their multicultural identity and how that identity is a
work-in-progress based upon continuing experiences and interactions.171
As learners progress through these stages, they move from a lack of
recognition of the role culture plays in their own interactions to fully
understanding and integrating cultural sensibility into their lives by
accounting for, and adjusting to, differing cultural perspectives. Underlying
Bennett’s model is the need to help students develop self-awareness in order
to progress from ethnocentrism—the first three stages—to ethnorelativism—
the latter three stages.172
to an ethnorelative perspective, see Shiv Narayan Persaud, Is Color Blind Justice Also
Culturally Blind, 14 BERKELEY J. AFR. AM. L. & POL’Y 23, 63–64 (2012).
163.
Bennett, supra note 147, at 184–85.
164.
Id.
165.
See id. at 191–92.
166.
Id.
167.
Id. at 185–86.
168.
Bennett, supra note 147, at 185–86.
169.
Id. at 192–93.
170.
Id. at 186.
171.
See id. at 193–94.
172.
Greenholtz, supra note 148, at 412–13.
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William Howell designed a slightly different model173 that
Professors Bryant and Koh adapted to describe the stages of law student
cultural competence. Using Howell’s model, they identify the first stage as
unconscious incompetence, one that involves a total lack of awareness of the
role culture plays in the lawyering process.174 Students at this stage do not
recognize cultural differences and are unaware of cross-cultural
miscommunications. In Howell’s second stage, conscious incompetence,
students recognize that culture plays a role in how they understand and
perceive communications and interactions, but they do not have the skills
necessary to engage in effective cross-cultural interactions.175 In this stage,
students
recognize
cross-cultural
miscommunications
and
misunderstandings, but they do not know how to avoid them or how to build
positive and trusting relationships with clients.176 The third stage is one of
conscious competence, in which students understand how to effectively
communicate across cultures, and are aware of the need to use cross-cultural
lawyering skills that they consciously apply to their interactions with
clients.177 Finally, students reach Howell’s fourth stage: The level of
unconscious competence.178 At this stage, the understanding of the role
culture plays in the lawyering process, and the skills necessary to deal
effectively across cultures, has become so ingrained that students
unconsciously incorporate cross-cultural skills and perspectives into their
interactions with others.179
For cultural sensibility, the learning continuum is slightly different
than the continua described above in that the best practice or highest level in
cultural sensibility education is achieved when the individual incorporates
the principles regarding culture and diversity as an integral part of their daily
practice.180 That is, practitioners reflect on their communications and
interpretations as they are happening—reflection in action—and modify
them as they receive cues that clients are disengaging or that client and
practitioner perspectives are too far apart.181 In recognizing potential
differences at an individual level, practitioners avoid falling into the trap of
using stereotypes.182 Practitioners are also skilled at making subtle changes
173.
174.
law students).
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss2/1

See WILLIAM S. HOWELL, THE EMPATHIC COMMUNICATOR 29–33 (1982).
Bryant, supra note 31, at 62–63 (describing how Howell’s work applies to
Id. at 62.
Id.
Id. at 62–63.
Id. at 63.
Bryant, supra note 31, at 63.
See Karnik & Dogra, supra note 37, at 724–25.
See id. at 725.
Sternlight & Robbennolt, supra note 80, at 511–12.
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to accommodate different perspectives and bring them closer together if
needed to avoid miscommunication.183 The cultural sensibility model also
recognizes that students may need to be aware of the fact that our emotional
contexts can influence how comfortably we are able to challenge our
perspectives and understandings. For example, when we are anxious or
afraid, we are less likely to feel comfortable challenging our perspective or
even questioning our perspectives.184
However, it is important not to view stages along learning
continuums as linear and unidirectional. Individuals will move between
stages at different times and in different contexts. The stages in these
theoretical models are fluid and should not be viewed in absolute terms.
Also, as with all theoretical models, they do not operate as neatly in practice
as they do on paper. Nonetheless, the models are useful because they may
help faculty set realistic cultural sensibility learning outcome goals.185
Although it may not be realistic to hope law graduates all attain the highest
level of cultural sensibility, a reasonable goal might be that all law graduates
reach recognize and appreciate that everyone approaches issues through their
own cultural lens, which varies based upon each person’s cultural
experiences—Bennett level 4/Howell level 2.186 It may be that the goal is
simply to get students to the point where they accept the roles of cultural
beliefs, values, and behaviors in the lawyering process, understand that all
behavior, including their own, exists in a cultural context187 and understand
that good and bad ways of being in the world exist in cultural context.188
This does not mean students should be taught to blindly accept the status
quo. For example, attitudes towards sexual orientation, gender, and race
have changed significantly over the last century. These changes would not

183.
See Karnik & Dogra, supra note 37, at 728 tbl.1.
184.
“Research indicates that we are more likely to fall prey to stereotype when
we are feeling stress and unable to monitor ourselves for bias.” Bryant, supra note 31, at 78.
“Stress inhibits students from receiving and processing information when anxiety distracts
them from the learning task.” Nancy L. Schultz, Lessons from Positive Psychology for
Developing Advocacy Skills, 6 JOHN MARSHALL L.J. 103, 134 (2012). See also Jacobs, supra
note 39, at 400–01 (noting that learning more about clients’ cultural backgrounds will help
reduce student anxiety when working with clients and enable the students to recognize that a
client may have a perspective which differs from the student’s).
185.
See, e.g., Sonia J. Crandall et al., Applying Theory to the Design of
Cultural Competency Training for Medical Students: A Case Study, 78 ACAD. MED. 588,
588–89 (2003) (using the theoretical models described above to shape course and curricular
learning outcomes).
186.
See supra text accompanying notes 163–66, 175–76.
187.
See supra text accompanying notes 163–66, 175–76.
188.
John Alan Cohan, Honor Killings and the Cultural Defense, 40 CAL. W.
INT’L L.J. 177, 225 (2010) (discussing cultural relativism).
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have happened if accepted norms had not been challenged.189 Thus, when
developing learning outcomes for cultural sensibility, educators should
consider including, as an outcome, preparing students to become reflective
practitioners willing to examine, and potentially challenge, social norms.
They should also consider where on the cultural sensibility continuum they
hope their students will be at the completion of a given course or curriculum.
IV.

DEVELOPING A BASELINE MEASURE OF STUDENTS’ CULTURAL
SENSIBILITY

In light of the move to incorporate learning outcomes into legal
education and mindful of the theoretical underpinnings of cultural sensibility
education, we developed a measure to assess some aspects of law students’
cultural sensibility knowledge, attitudes, and skills. The initial development
work has been detailed elsewhere.190 As described below, the initial
instrument has since been revised.
The revised instrument described herein is a starting point in
measuring some law student cultural sensibility learning outcomes and we
share it with many caveats in the hope that it can continue to be further
refined and improved. First, we note that cultural sensibility cannot be
measured by a single instrument. We also acknowledge that despite the
efforts described below to develop a valid and reliable instrument, some may
disagree with the questions we asked or the language we used. Our goal with
this work is not to develop the definitive cultural sensibility learning
outcome instrument. Rather, it is to present a tool legal educators can use to:
Assess the need for cultural sensibility education, develop cultural sensibility
learning outcomes, design courses and curriculum that meet students’
educational needs, and track changes in students’ cultural sensibility
knowledge, attitudes, and skills.191 The completion of the tool can also serve
as an educational intervention in itself because it enables students to consider
their responses and prompts them to think about the role culture plays in the
lawyering process. Finally, we hope the instrument will be further tested as a
tool for measuring student learning outcomes.
189.
For examples of these changes and other efforts to challenge accepted
norms, see Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Directions of Critical Race
Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 330–40 (2006) (discussing legal
scholars’ challenges to race and class based legal norms).
190.
Curcio et al., Educating Culturally Sensible Lawyers, supra note 9,
passim.
191.
These goals are similar to those identified by pharmacy school educators
who performed a factor analysis on a pharmacy education cultural competence tool. See
Margarita Echeverri et al., Nine Constructs of Cultural Competence for Curriculum
Development, AM. J. PHARMACEUTICAL EDUC. Dec. 15, 2010, at 1, 1.
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Health care educators,192 as well as educators in other disciplines,193
have developed numerous instruments to measure what they identify as
students’ cultural competence learning outcomes. We used those survey
instruments194 and the scholarship of clinical legal educators who have
incorporated cultural sensibility into their teaching,195 to develop an initial
twenty-nine-question, anonymous electronic survey using a five-point
semantic differential response scale—one equals strongly disagree and five
equals strongly agree—that sought information about students’ knowledge of
how culture affects the lawyering process, their attitudes toward cultural
diversity education, and their awareness of how their cultural background
affects the ways in which they, and others, communicate and interact. The
survey also asked demographic questions and contained a series of openended questions seeking information about the survey design as well as
students’ thoughts about the role culture plays in their world-view and
interactions. After obtaining Institutional Review Board (“IRB”) approval,
we conducted an initial study. The survey was distributed to incoming law
students during their orientation week at a second-tier, southern, urban state
law school that has both a full and part-time program. The survey was also
distributed to a small number of upper level students enrolled in one of the
school’s clinics. A total of 138 students participated in the initial study. The
initial study provided valuable insights into students’ knowledge and
attitudes.
192.
See, e.g., Gozu et al., supra note 41, at 182–83 (reviewing forty-five
instruments used to measure nurses, physicians, and other health care professionals’ cultural
competence).
193.
Alvino E. Fantini, Assessing Intercultural Competence: Issues and Tools,
in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF INTERCULTURAL COMPETENCE 456, 466–75 (Darla K. Deardorff
ed., 2009) (listing various assessment tools used in a wide range of disciplines to measure
ability to communicate effectively across cultures).
194.
Instruments that helped us develop this survey include those set out in the
following articles: Jesse C. Crosson et al., Evaluating the Effect of Cultural Competency
Training on Medical Student Attitudes, 36 FAM. MED. 199, 201 (2004) (medical students);
D’Andrea et al., supra note 109, at 145 (counselors); Nisha Dogra & David Stretch,
Developing a Questionnaire to Assess Student Awareness of the Need to be Culturally Aware
in Clinical Practice, 23 MED. TCHR. 59, 60 (2001) (medical students); Gamst et al., supra note
109, at 164–65 (counselors); Gozu et al., supra note 41, at 181–82 (assorted health care
professions); Khanna et al., supra note 109, at 887–89 (assorted health care professionals);
Stephanie Myers Schim et al., Development of a Cultural Competence Assessment Instrument,
11 J. NURSING MEASUREMENT 29, 34–35 (2003) (nurses).
195.
See Bliss et al., supra note 46, at 126–27; Bryant, supra note 31, at 38–48;
Helen Y. Kim, Note, Do I Really Understand? Cultural Concerns in Determining Diminished
Competency, 15 ELDER L.J. 265, 286–88 (2007); Sedillo López, supra note 51, at 42–45.
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Although the survey instrument used in the initial study reached an
acceptable level of statistical reliability (α = 0.713) and provided useful
information,196 we decided to further refine the instrument. To do this, we
used the data collected from the open-ended questions in the initial study.
We also asked two faculty members of divergent political and cultural
perspectives, to review the survey. Finally, after obtaining IRB approval to
do so, we conducted three student focus groups. Based upon information
gathered in these processes, we made some significant changes to the
original instrument. We included a definition of culture197 and drafted
survey questions that encompassed a wider range of cultural factors. These
changes were made to both ensure students approached the questions with
the same understanding of the term culture and to educate them that culture
is multi-faceted. We also added an initial set of questions that alerted
students to the fact that because not all individuals in a given cultural group
hold the same views or have the same experiences,198 it is our cultural
experiences, rather than our culture, that impacts our perspective. In addition
to these structural changes, we re-worded questions that students found
confusing and re-worded or eliminated questions students and expert
reviewers identified as seeming to call for a correct answer. We also added
the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale199 to determine whether the
survey answers were tainted by the desire to answer in a socially desirable
manner. Finally, we expanded the response scale to a 6-point semantic
differential scale. This change controlled for a perceived neutral point.
Our goal was to produce an instrument that could be used to provide
law faculty with information about their students’ views and where their
students were on the cultural sensibility education continuum to help faculty
develop tailored learning outcomes. We also hoped to develop an instrument
that ultimately could be used to measure whether some cultural sensibility
learning outcomes were achieved. In the survey design, we focused on
196.
For a discussion of our initial findings, see Curcio et al., Using Existing
Frameworks to Develop Ways to Teach and Measure Law Students’ Cultural Competence,
supra note 9, at 25–27.
197.
The survey began with the following statements:
There are many different definitions of culture, race, and ethnicity and
these terms are sometimes used interchangeably. In this questionnaire by the term
culture we mean: Culture is a historically transmitted pattern of shared meaning by
which people communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge and attitudes
about life. An individual’s cultural identity may be affected by such factors as race,
ethnicity, age, language, country of origin, acculturation, sexual orientation, gender,
socioeconomic status, religious/spiritual beliefs, physical abilities, occupation,
among others.

198.
Bergey & Kaplan, supra note 32, at 1; Steven A Ramirez, A General
Theory of Cultural Diversity, 7 MICH. J. RACE & LAW 33, 51–52 (2001).
199.
See infra text accompanying notes 200–08.
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broad-based learning outcomes built upon a structural framework that
provides a starting point from which to develop and evaluate courses. Using
this framework, the final version of the re-designed survey consisted of
twenty-four questions relating to cultural sensibility. The first six questions
asked students to identify which of their cultural experiences has influenced
their views of the U.S. legal system using a scale of 1 to 6—no influence at
all to very strong influence—(Appendix A). The remaining eighteen
questions sought students’ views on a variety of questions related to the role
culture plays in the lawyering process. Students were asked to respond on a
scale of 1 to 6—strongly disagree to strongly agree—(Appendix A). The
reliability alpha for the new survey instrument was .842, indicating a high
degree of internal consistency in the instrument.
B.

Survey Methodology

One issue with any self-assessment instrument is whether
respondents are answering in a socially desirable manner—i.e., choosing
answers that they believe “conform to socially acceptable values, avoid
criticism, or gain social approval.”200 We took the opportunity to measure
whether social desirability would be an issue since such bias is “most likely
to occur in response[] to socially sensitive questions.”201 Although there is
no absolute way to determine if the answers are based upon a desire to
answer correctly, social scientists often use the social desirability scale
developed by Marlowe and Crowne.202 This scale serves as a test for
whether surveyors are getting accurate or tainted responses.203 We used the
thirteen-question Marlowe-Crowne short form204 with the 191 incoming
student cohort at the Southern Urban School. Although there is some debate
about whether the Marlowe-Crowne test is a valid measure of social
desirability bias,205 it continues to be the instrument most frequently used to
assess whether respondents were answering in what they believe was the
200.
Thea F van de Mortel, Faking It: Social Desirability Response Bias in
Self-Report Research, AUSTRALIAN J. ADVANCED NURSING, June–Aug. 2008, at 40, 41.
201.
Id.
202.
Id.; see Douglas P. Crowne & David Marlowe, A New Scale of Social
Desirability Independent of Psychopathology, 24 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 349, 351 (1960).
203.
Van de Mortel, supra note 200, at 40.
204.
See William M. Reynolds, Development of Reliable and Valid Short
Forms of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, 38 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 119, 124
(1982).
205.
See Steven D. Barger, The Marlowe-Crowne Affair: Short Forms,
Psychometric Structure, and Social Desirability, 79 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 286, 289
(2002) (critiquing the use of the Marlowe-Crowne instrument to determine social desirability
responses).
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correct socially desirable manner.206 An analysis of the social desirability
scale compared favorably with the literature standards.207 Results indicated
that 17% of our respondents were low scorers (e.g., answering in a socially
undesirable direction), 60.2% were average scorers (showing an average
degree of concern for social desirability), and 22.5% scored high (indicating
a high degree of concern for social approval).208 These percentages suggest
that general survey responses were not due to a social desirability bias.
Having checked the instrument for social desirability responses, we then
eliminated the Marlowe-Crowne questions from the remaining survey
administrations to shorten the instrument.
After receiving IRB approval, the revised survey was initially
administered to incoming students at a second-tier, southern, urban state law
school. Time was set aside during orientation week for completion of the
revised survey; thus, the response rate was very high (n = 191, 94% response
rate). The revised survey also was administered to incoming law students at
a top-tier, northern, metropolitan state law school that purposefully seeks to
promote diversity in viewpoint, experience, and background among its
faculty and students. At that school, during orientation week, students were
asked to complete the survey via an email solicitation. A total of 118
incoming students (response rate of 58%) chose to complete the survey.
In the spring semester, upper level students at both the Southern
Urban and the Northern School were asked, via email, to complete the
revised survey. The response rate for upper level students at the Northern
School was 32% (n = 127). At the Southern Urban School, 27% (n = 155) of
the upper level students completed the survey. The total response rate for
upper level students was 30% (n = 282). The combined total response rate
for the survey was 591 with an average response rate of 43%. The
overwhelming majority of respondents self-identified as white, while gender
distribution was virtually equal (see Table 1).

206.
See Van de Mortel, supra note 200, at 42–45 tbl.1 (listing thirty-one
studies in 2004–2005 that used Marlowe-Crowne instrument to check for social desirability
response); Shana L. Lassiter, Cultural Competency Training in Dental Education and
Implications for the Elimination of Oral Heath Disparities: Results from a Quantitative and
Qualitative Investigation (May 16, 2009) (unpublished E.d. dissertation, Columbia University)
(microformed on UMI 3368358); see also Maria Antonia Marzan, Incoming Medical
Students’ Perceptions of Knowledge, Attitudes and Skills Regarding Cross-Cultural Medical
Education (May 16, 2008) (unpublished E.d. D. dissertation, Columbia University)
(microformed on UMI 3327063).
207.
The scoring key is available at Self-Assessment: Dare You Say What You
Think? The Social–Desirability Scale, CENGAGE LEARNING, http://www.cengage.com/
resource_uploads/downloads/0495092746_63626.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
208.
These results are based upon the scoring key, see id.
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Table 1: Respondent Demographics.

Gender

Female
Male

N
287
291

%
48.6
49.2

Ethnicity/Race

Asian
Black
Hispanic/Latino(a)
White
Two or More

46
37
17
435
32

8.1
6.5
3.0
76.7
5.6

Age

20–25 years
26–30 years
31–35 years
36–40 years
41–45 years
46–50 years
Over 50 years

323
181
43
11
15
3
2

55.9
31.3
7.4
1.9
2.6
.5
.3

Student Type

Entering Law Students
2L or 3L

309
282

52.3
47.7

School Type

Northern
Southern Urban

273
318

46.2
53.8

An exploratory factor analysis (“EFA”) was performed on the data to
identify, through statistical exploration, inter-relationships between items
that are part of a unified concept or underlying structure.209 Social scientists
use exploratory factor analysis to reduce a number of interrelated items (e.g.,
items on a survey) into factors that can be conceptually grouped together.210
The Kaiser-Meyer Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy was .843
(excellent) and the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was p < .000 (the strength of
the relationship among the survey items is strong), indicating that a factor
analysis was appropriate. Using Principal Component Analysis (“PCA”) as
209.
See DENISE F. POLIT & CHERYL TATANO BECK, RESOURCE MANUAL FOR
NURSING RESEARCH: GENERATING AND ASSESSING EVIDENCE FOR NURSING PRACTICE 255 (9th
ed. 2012).
210.
DENNIS CHILD, THE ESSENTIALS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS 12 (3d ed. 2006);
see Anna B. Costello & Jason W. Osborne, Best Practices in Exploratory Factor Analysis:
Four Recommendations for Getting the Most from Your Analysis, PRAC. ASSESSMENT RES. &
EVALUATION, July 2005 at 1, 8.
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our extraction method and Varimax with Kaiser Normalization as our
rotation method, we retained five factors (Table 2).
Table 2: Factor Descriptives.

No. of Items

Mean (SD)

Alpha

Factor 1

9

4.25 (0.81)

.827

Factor 2

6

3.17 (1.16)

.827

Factor 3

3

4.57 (1.08)

.778

Factor 4

3

4.88 (0.79)

.588

Factor 5

2

4.40 (0.87)

.726

The five identified factors group the survey findings into conceptual
constructs that correspond to various aspects of cultural sensibility learning.
The first factor examines students’ understanding of how culture influences
lawyers, judges, and clients in the context of legal decision-making and
representation. The second factor assesses students’ self-awareness about
the role their cultural experiences play in their own perceptions of the legal
system. The third factor looks at students’ desires to learn how culture
affects the lawyering process. The fourth factor examines students’
understanding of client behaviors that may be based upon cultural practices
different from their own. The fifth factor looks at how students self-assess
their ability to identify their own unconscious biases and stereotypes. These
factors help educators assess students’ openness to learning about the role
culture plays in the lawyering process, students’ understanding of how
culture may influence others, and their understanding of how their own
cultural experiences affect their perceptions and actions. This information
can be useful in designing courses, curricula, and teaching methods that are
best suited to a given group of students’ educational needs. It also can be
useful to those who want to assessin a big picture waythe effectiveness
of education geared toward developing certain aspects of cultural sensibility,
such as developing students’ awareness that cultural experiences affect
everyone, not just clients or those belonging to specific racial or ethnic
groups. Below, we set forth each factor and the survey questions that
grouped with that factor.
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Table 3: Cultural Sensibility Survey Structure.

Factor
Factor 1
Cultural
Influences

Factor 2
SelfAwareness

Factor 3
Desire to
Learn

Published by NSUWorks, 2014

Survey Item
2.16. White lawyers bring culturally biased assumptions
into the lawyer/client relationship.
2.2. Lawyers look at legal problems through their own
cultural lens.
2.6. A lawyer’s socioeconomic background influences how
the lawyer perceives a client’s behavior.
2.11. How a lawyer communicates with his or her client is
not influenced by the lawyer’s cultural background.
2.9. Judges do not look at legal problems through their
own cultural lenses.
2.14. Lawyers belonging to racial and ethnic minorities
bring culturally biased assumptions into the lawyer/client
relationship.
2.4. I do not view the legal system through a culturally
biased lens.
2.1. Clients look at legal problems through their own
cultural lenses.
2.3. How a client communicates with his or her lawyer is
not influenced by the client’s cultural background.
(Influences views about the U.S. legal system)
1.1. Experiences arising from your racial identity.
1.2. Experiences arising from your ethnic identity.
1.4. Experiences arising from your socioeconomic
background.
1.3. Experiences arising from your religious identity.
1.5. Experiences arising from your gender.
1.6. Experiences arising from your sexual identity.
2.17. Law professors should discuss with their students the
cultural assumptions embedded in appellate legal opinions.
2.18. A law student’s ability to recognize cultural diversity
issues as they relate to the lawyering process should be
assessed during law school.
2.7. Legal education should not include education about
cultural issues that may arise when providing legal services
to people from different cultural backgrounds than my own.
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Factor 4
Client
Behaviors

Factor 5
Selfassessment

Excluded
Item

C.

[Vol. 38

2.8. A lawyer should assume that a client’s visible lack of
emotion means that the client does not feel strongly about
what is being discussed.
2.12. When a client refuses to look his or her lawyer in the
eyes, the lawyer should assume the client is not being
truthful.
2.15. When a client shakes hands with a male attorney, but
refuses to shake hands with a female attorney, the lawyers
should assume the client will not respect advice given by
the female attorney.
2.13. In general, I can accurately identify my culturally
biased assumptions about others who are from cultures
different from my own.
2.10. In general, I am able to recognize when my reactions
to others are based on stereotypical beliefs.
2.5. If a client’s cultural practice is to defer decision
making to others in the client’s family, a lawyer should
help the client understand why he or she should make his or
her own decisions about the case.

Survey Results

Below we explain the factors in greater detail and identify key
findings from the data. Throughout our descriptions, we note when there are
significant differences between incoming and upper level students, between
students at the two schools, and differences in survey responses, by gender
and race or ethnicity. It should be noted that for analytical purposes we
collapsed all Asians, Blacks, Latinos, and Two or More races into one group
to ameliorate the differences in numbers between those groups and Whites.
We are, however, mindful that collapsing these groups is a study limitation.
Factor 1: Understanding How Culture Influences Lawyers, Judges, and
Clients in Context of the Legal Decision-Making and Legal
Representation.
The first factor includes nine items that can be grouped under the
construct of understanding how culture influences lawyers, judges, and
clients in the context of legal decision-making and legal representation
(Table 3). This factor relates to students’ understanding that lawyers, judges,
and clients look at legal problems through their own cultural lenses and that
lawyer-client communications are influenced by both the lawyer’s and the
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client’s cultural backgrounds.211
Factor 1 also looks at students’
understanding that all lawyers, regardless of racial or ethnic background,
bring culturally biased assumptions into the lawyer-client relationship212 and
their self-assessment about whether, as future lawyers, they bring culturally
biased assumptions into the lawyering process (Table 3).213 The items in this
factor all deal with students’ perceptions of the role culture plays in others’
perceptions of legal problems and interactions, with the exception of item
2.4I do not view the legal system through a culturally biased lens. That
item was grouped with this factor because it sought information about how,
as future lawyers, students believed their cultural biases would affect their
assessment of legal problems.
Findings showed that there was a statistically significant difference
(p<.000) in the mean scores for this factor between incoming and upper level
students, with upper level students more likely to recognize that cultural
experiences and perspectives affect lawyer-client communications and the
lawyering process (Table 4). Women were significantly more likely than
men to recognize the affect culture has on various aspects of the lawyering
process (Table 4). There was also a statistically significant difference
between students at the two schools, with the Northern School’s students
more likely to recognize that lawyers’, clients’, and judges’ cultural
backgrounds and experiences influence legal decision-making and
representation (Table 4).

211.
Miller et al., supra note 6, at 104–07.
212.
See id. at 104–05.
213.
For a discussion of the implications of students’ awareness of their
culturally biased assumptions and the impact of those assumptions on the lawyering process,
see infra text accompanying notes 252–256.

Published by NSUWorks, 2014

57

Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1

218

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

Table 4: Comparisons for Factor 1 (Understanding how culture
influences lawyers, judges, and clients).

Comparison Variables
Incoming Law Students
Upper Level Law Students
Female
Male
Asian
Black
Latino/a
White
Two or More
Southern Urban School
Northern School

N
309
282
287
291
46
37
17
435
32
318
273

M(SD)
4.04 (0.78)
4.48 (0.80)
4.39 (0.82)
4.11 (0.79)
4.29 (0.81)
4.37 (0.97)
4.31 (0.76)
4.22 (0.81)
4.29 (0.81)
4.05 (0.79)
4.49 (0.78)

Sig.
p<.000
p<.000

p<.000

Note. Mean range = 1–6 with the higher mean score representing higher level of
cultural sensibility.

Factor 2: Self-Awareness About the Role Culture Plays in Students’ Own
Perceptions of the Legal System
The second factor groups six items that ask students to self-assess
whether experiences arising from their own cultural backgrounds have
influenced how they view the U.S. legal system.214 Students of color were
more likely than white students to identify experiences arising from their
racial identity, ethnic identity, and gender, as influencing their view about
the U.S. legal system (Table 5). Women were also more likely than men to
indicate that their cultural experiences influenced how they view the legal
system (Table 5).

214.
Scholars have discussed how individuals’ culturally based experiences
affect their views and understandings of the legal system. See Marjorie Florestal, Is a Burrito
a Sandwich? Exploring Race, Class, and Culture in Contracts, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 7–8
(2008) (discussing how cultural experiences permeate one’s understanding of contracts and
contract law); Carolyna Smiley-Marquez, Bias in the Legal System, COLO. LAW., Mar. 1996,
at 19, 19 (noting that various state task forces on gender and racial bias in the justice system
found women’s and minorities’ experiences led them to view the justice system from a
different perspective than their white male counterparts).
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Table 5: Comparison for Factor 2 (Self-awareness about the role
culture plays in students’ own perceptions of the legal
system).

Comparison Variables
Incoming Law Students
Upper Level Law Students
Female
Male
Asian
Black
Latino/a
White
Two or More
Southern Urban School
Northern School

N
309
282
287
291
46
37
17
435
32
318
273

M(SD)
3.14 (1.13)
3.21 (1.19)
3.52 (1.05)
2.83 (1.15)
3.52 (1.09)
3.95 (1.07)
3.44 (1.05)
3.03 (1.11)
3.50 (1.33)
3.10 (1.15)
3.25 (1.16)

Sig.
p<.000

p<.000*

Note.

Mean range = 1–6 with higher mean score representing higher level of
cultural sensibility.
*Significance test performed on categories White and Non-White (Asian, Black,
Latino/a, Two or More).

Factor 3: Openness to Learning About the Role Culture Plays in the
Lawyering Process
Factor 3 contains three items related to the importance of learning
about how culture affects legal rule-making and the provision of legal
services. Overall, students expressed a high degree of interest in learning
about the role culture plays in the lawyering process. There was a
statistically significant difference in responses between women and men and
between white and non-white students’ responses to the questions in this
factor (Table 6). Women and non-white students expressed a greater
openness to learning how culture affects legal rule-making and lawyer-client
interactions (Table 6). There also was a difference in attitudes between
upper level and incoming students, with incoming students being more
receptive to this kind of education (Table 6).
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Table 6: Comparison for Factor 3 (Openness to learning about the
role culture plays in the lawyering process).

Comparison Variables
Incoming Law Students
Upper Level Law Students
Female
Male
Asian
Black
Latino/a
White
Two or More
Southern Urban School
Northern School

N
309
281
287
290
46
37
17
434
32
317
273

M(SD)
4.66 (0.96)
4.46 (1.19)
4.83 (0.95)
4.34 (1.12)
4.76 (0.81)
5.03 (1.16)
4.92 (0.98)
4.50 (1.05)
4.91 (0.89)
4.53 (1.04)
4.61 (1.13)

Sig.
p<.05
p<.000

p<.000*

Note.

Mean range = 1–6 with higher mean score representing higher level of
cultural sensibility.
*Significance test performed on categories White and Non-White (Asian, Black,
Latino/a, Two or More).

Factor 4: Understanding Differing Cultural Backgrounds and Lawyers’
Perceptions About Client Behaviors
This factor groups three items that deal with students’ awareness of
the assumptions that lawyers may make if they do not understand that some
behaviors may be based upon clients’ cultural beliefs and practices.215 The
behaviors chosen were just a small sampling of conduct that may vary
between cultures. This factor measures students’ understanding that lawyers
should examine their own cultural assumptions when assessing client
behaviors so as not to misinterpret particular behaviors. Students at the
Northern School had a greater level of awareness of the need to assess
underlying cultural assumptions in context of lawyer-client relationships
(Table 7).

215.
The behaviors chosen included: Lack of eye contact, displays of emotion,
and refusal to shake hands with a woman. Each of these behaviors may be affected by
cultural factors. See Jacobs, supra note 39, at app., tbl.1, at 414 (shaking hands with member
of opposite sex); Joseph W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and the Jury, 33
CONN. L. REV. 1, 23–25 (2000) (displays of emotion); Tremblay, supra note 51, at 393–94
(eye contact).
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Comparison for Factor 4 (Understanding differing
cultural backgrounds and lawyers’ perceptions about
client behaviors).

Comparison Variables
Incoming Law Students
Upper Level Law Students
Female
Male
Asian
Black
Latino/a
White
Two or More
Southern Urban School
Northern School

N
309
281
287
290
46
37
17
434
32
317
273

M(SD)
4.89 (0.77)
4.88 (0.83)
4.89 (0.82)
4.87 (0.77)
4.87 (0.79)
4.86 (0.96)
4.73 (0.66)
4.87 (0.78)
4.98 (0.82)
4.79 (0.83)
5.00 (0.74)

Sig.

p<.01

Note.

Mean range = 1–6 with higher mean score representing higher level of
cultural sensibility.
*Significance test performed on categories White and Non-White (Asian, Black,
Latino/a, Two or More).

Factor 5: Identifying Own Unconscious Biases and Stereotypes
Factor 5 has two items that assess students’ openness and
willingness to admit the difficulty of accurately identifying when reactions
are based upon stereotypes and cultural biases.216 While factors are generally
composed of three or more items, we felt that the loading and Eigenvalues,217
as well as the construct itself, warranted including these two survey items as
a factor. Students rated themselves moderately high in terms of their ability
to identify both their culturally biased assumptions and when they were
reacting based upon stereotypical beliefs (Table 8).218 For this factor,

216.
For a discussion of the implicit bias literature and the potential
relationship between the social cognition implicit bias theories and self-perceptions as they
relate to students’ survey responses, see Curcio et al., Educating Culturally Sensible Lawyers,
supra note 9, at 114–19.
217.
In factor analysis, an Eigenvalue represents how much variance is
accounted for in a correlation matrix. See BARBARA G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, CAL.
STATE UNIV., USING MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS 398 (5th ed. 2007). It is one of several
methods used to determine the number of factors or constructs that can be selected from the
data. See RICHARD L. GORSUCH, FACTOR ANALYSIS 97 (2d ed. 1983); TABACHNICK & FIDELL,
supra note 217, at 398.
218.
This result parallels findings from the pilot study. See Curcio et al.,
Educating Culturally Sensible Lawyers, supra note 9, at 112.
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southern students were statistically more likely to think that they could
identify their own unconscious biases and stereotypes (Table 8).
Table 8: Comparison for Factor 5 (Identifying Own Unconscious
Biases and Stereotypes).

Comparison Variables
Incoming Law Students
Upper Level Law Students
Female
Male
Asian
Black
Latino/a
White
Two or More
Southern Urban School
Northern School

N
309
280
287
290
46
37
17
434
32
316
273

M(SD)
4.47 (0.84)
4.33 (0.89)
4.46 (0.87)
4.36 (0.87)
4.43 (0.85)
4.69 (0.95)
4.50 (1.10)
4.37 (0.83)
4.48 (1.10)
4.46 (0.87)
4.34 (0.88)

Sig.

p<.01

Note. Mean range = 1-6 with higher mean score representing higher level of cultural
sensibility.
*Significance test performed on categories White and Non-White (Asian, Black,
Latino/a, Two or More).

Discarded Item
A factor analysis groups different items that form patterns. There
was one item that was not associated with any other group of items that made
up the factors. That item asked students to agree or disagree with the
following statement: “If a client’s cultural practice is to defer decision
making to others in the client’s family, a lawyer should help the client
understand why he or she should make his or her own decisions about the
case.” This item was designed to inferentially test whether students believe
that a lawyer should impose his or her cultural beliefs upon a client. In
retrospect, the question does not lead to a clear answer because it is so
context-based. Thus, it is not surprising that it did not load with any factor.
We discarded this item in the factor analysis discussion and the question
should be eliminated from future surveys.
V.

USING THE SURVEY TO INFORM TEACHING AND DEVELOP
LEARNING OUTCOMES

The survey provides information about students’ openness to
learning about the role culture plays in the lawyering process, awareness of
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how culture affects others, and awareness of how culture affects them. The
survey provides useful information to legal educators considering developing
course and institutional learning outcomes.219 It is also helpful as educators
try to get a sense of where their students are on the cultural sensibility
continuum.220 This tool can be used as students enter and leave law school to
assess students’ progress towards cultural sensibility over the course of their
legal education. It can also potentially be used as a pre- and post-course
assessment to inform educators about the effect of their teaching on students’
cultural sensibility development. Thus, the survey may help educators refine
teaching methodologies and materials in light of students’ learning.
In context of the learning outcome domains, the survey instrument
encompasses students’ self-assessments of their knowledge about how
culture affects lawyers’, judges’, and clients’ perceptions and reactions, as
well as students’ understandings of how different value systems and
communications styles may affect lawyers’ interpretation of clients’
reactions and behaviors (knowledge domain).221 The survey looks at
students’ awareness of the affect that their own cultural beliefs, experiences,
biases, and prejudices have upon their perceptions, and their openness to
learning about the role culture plays in the lawyering process (attitudes
domain).222 Finally, this survey assesses students’ abilities to apply their
understandings of how culture affects the lawyering process to situations in
which lawyers’ perspectives may be affected by cultural misunderstandings
(skills domain).223 Because learning outcome domains overlap,224 some
factors apply to more than one learning outcome domain.
A.

Students Want to Learn About the Role of Culture in the Lawyering
Process

Factor 3 relates to students’ attitudes about the inclusion of cultural
sensibility teaching into the law school curriculum. Our findings indicate
that law students are generally receptive to learning about the role culture
plays in the lawyering process (Table 6) although somewhat more
ambivalent about being assessed on the issues (Appendix B). Openness to
learning about how one’s own and others’ socio-cultural beliefs and
behaviors affect the lawyering process is one of the key attitude learning

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Published by NSUWorks, 2014

See supra text accompanying notes 97–98.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra text accompanying note 96.

63

Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1

224

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

outcomes.225 The data indicates that in this survey cohort, women were
statistically significantly more open to learning about how culture affects the
lawyering process than men, and those self-identifying as non-white were
more receptive to cultural diversity education than those self-identifying as
white (Table 6). We do not know why the differences exist, although we
suspect that the real world may present more everyday challenges for
females and non-white students both within and outside the law school
classroom226 so that the teaching may be less threatening to them, or they
have greater interest in raising others’ awareness about these issues.227
White male students may feel more defensive about learning about the role
culture plays in the lawyering process as there can be an actual or perceived
tendency for cultural and diversity education to dismiss and denigrate their
perspective.228 In discussing culture and diversity, white males may feel that
they have the most to lose and may feel uncomfortable, especially if the
blame for historical wrongs is laid at their door.229
Interestingly, incoming students expressed a greater interest than
upper level students in learning about how culture affects the lawyering
process (Table 6). It is unclear why this difference exists. Some upper level
students may have experienced cultural diversity education in some law
school classes that they found alienating. Or, incoming students may be
eager to learn about everything while upper level students are more jaded.
Or, some other reason altogether could explain this difference. Again, this
225.
Bryant, supra note 31, at 50–51.
226.
See Celestial S.D. Cassman & Lisa R. Pruitt, A Kinder, Gentler Law
School? Race, Ethnicity, Gender and Legal Education at King Hall, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1209, 1251 (2005) (discussing women’s experiences in law school classrooms); Charles E.
Daye et al., Does Race Matter in Educational Diversity? A Legal and Empirical Analysis,
RUTGERS RACE & L. REV., 2012, at 75S, 124S (reporting results of large national survey of
law students in which Black students reported experiencing discrimination at much higher
rates than their white counterparts).
227.
These results are consistent with findings in a study of medical students.
See Carol L. Elam et al., Diversity in Medical School: Perceptions of First-Year Students at
Four Southeastern U.S. Medical Schools, 76 ACAD. MED. 60, 64–65 (2001) (finding that
students with the most diverse first year class placed the greatest value on the contributions of
diversity to the learning environment. Female students placed more value on the inclusion of
diversity issues in the curriculum than did male students and also placed greater value on
understanding diversity issues in their future medical practices. In this survey, AfricanAmerican students were the least likely to think that the curriculum contained adequate
information about diversity).
228.
David Barnhizer, A Chilling of Discourse, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 361, 378–
79 n.40 (2006) (recounting an anecdotal story of the denigration of a white male for
expressing opposition to homosexuality).
229.
Sharon E. Rush, Emotional Segregation: Huckleberry Finn in the Modern
Classroom, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 305, 358 (2003) (noting that white students often are
uncomfortable talking about race and often feel defensive about being white).
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question merits further study. Future survey administrations should provide
room for student comments that might provide insights into the reasons for
these differences.
The survey data provides useful information both in terms of
students’ general receptivity and desire to learn about the role culture plays
in the lawyering process and in terms of potential approaches to teaching.
For example, the data indicates varying levels of openness—with women and
students of color indicating a higher degree of receptivity to cultural
sensibility education.230 These survey results suggest that educators need to
be careful not to alienate students by presenting cultural sensibility education
as political correctness231 or give some groups more validity than others.
Varying levels of openness to such education also means that educators need
to carefully think of how to engage male and white students. When
developing teaching modules and methods, educators should focus on how
cultural sensibility relates to becoming an effective lawyer.232 Any teaching
needs to engage students and while effective teaching may be—and probably
should be—challenging, educators must be wary of presenting the material in
a way that creates a defensiveness in students rather than fostering
curiosity.233 Educators must be cautious not to focus on teaching culture as
belonging to the Other.234 Rather, educators should help students recognize
that everyone comes to the table with multiple cultural experiences that
affect perceptions, legal analysis, and interactions.235
The survey instrument itself may also serve as a teaching tool. In the
open-ended question section of the initial survey, many incoming students
noted that simply taking the survey prompted them to begin thinking about
how culture may affect the lawyering process.236 Administering the survey
to incoming students sets the stage for discussions during orientation and
first year courses about cultural perspectives that influence legal decisionmaking and individuals’ perceptions and actions. Thus, the instrument can
be a valuable educational tool, as well as a tool that provides faculty with
230.
See supra Table 6; infra Appendices D, E.
231.
See Sedillo López, supra note 51, at 43.
232.
Miller et al., supra note 6, at 105–08.
233.
Sara Gronningstarter, A Patient’s Right to Choose is Not Always Black
and White: Long Term Care Facility Discrimination and the Color of Care, 26 J. CIV. RTS. &
ECON. DEV. 329, 353–54 (2012) (noting “Cultural competency teachings are not meant to
make care providers feel as if they are incompetent or racist, they are meant to enhance
professional development and facilitate the education of care providers on the latest science in
communications and communicating effectively across cultures).
234.
Kumas-Tan et al., supra note 42, at 551–52; see also Weng, supra note
61, at 373.
235.
See supra text accompanying notes 27–33.
236.
Curcio et al., Educating Culturally Sensible Lawyers, supra note 9, at 113.
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information. Administering the survey may also communicate to students
that the law school considers cultural sensibility an important lawyering skill.
B.

Understanding How Culture Influences Lawyers, Judges, and
Clients

Factors 1 and 4 relate to students’ understanding of how culture may
influence lawyers’, clients’, and judges’ perceptions and behaviors. On a
scale of 1 to 6, a mean of 4.04 for incoming students and 4.48 for upper level
students for Factor 1 suggests that, although incoming students may have a
basic understanding that culture plays a role in how lawyers, clients, and
judges understand, react to, and communicate about legal problems, students
may not fully recognize the extent to which people’s cultural experiences
affect their perceptions and behaviors.
The difference between upper level and incoming students indicates
that upper level students have a greater awareness of the role culture plays in
how judges, lawyers, and clients view legal problems and communicate
about legal issues. It may be that exposure to the law and legal processes
raised students’ awareness of how cultural experiences influence legal
decision-making and interactions. However, we cannot say for certain that
legal education made a difference in students’ perceptions because the
survey did not track a group of students from law school orientation through
their upper level legal education. However, the results do suggest that
something may happen to students during law school to increase their
awareness of the role culture plays in the lawyering process. Increased
awareness may be attributed to exposure to probing questions in doctrinal
courses, experiences in clinics or externships, or simply a maturation
process. Or, the survey results could be a variation caused by self-selection
on the part of upper level students where the response rate was much smaller
than for incoming students.237 Whatever the reason, we found it interesting
that at both schools there was a statistically significant difference between
incoming and upper level students with regard to this factor. The results also
suggest that this instrument is a viable tool for those schools that want to
track changes in students’ cultural sensibility attitudes from when students
enter school to when they graduate.
The responses to individual items provide some insights to educators
wishing to use the survey responses to develop cultural sensibility learning
outcomes. Students believed white lawyers were more likely than lawyers of
color to bring culturally biased assumptions into the lawyer-client
relationship (Appendices B–E). This suggests the need to educate students
237.
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that everyone has cultural biases and brings those biases and perspectives to
the table.238 Students also thought that clients were much more likely than
lawyers to be influenced by their cultural backgrounds (Appendices B–E).
Students may believe that, as professionals, lawyers are more able to be
objective and to put aside their cultural biases and perspectives. These
findings suggest that one learning outcome should be to build students’
understanding that cultural experiences affect all people and that a particular
racial background or profession does not make one more or less likely to be
influenced by his or her cultural experiences.
The survey also identified whether students recognized that some
behaviors might be based upon cultural practices. In the consent forms and
introduction of the survey, students understood they were being asked about
the role culture plays in the lawyering process. In this context, there was
generally a high level of awareness that some client behaviors may be based
upon cultural practices and that lawyers should not make assumptions about
those behaviors.239 Whether that awareness carries over to actual lawyerclient situations was not measured. Also, although students seemed able to
easily identify some commonly understood culturally based behaviors, such
as refusal to look a lawyer in the eye or lack of visible emotion (Appendices
B–E),240 they were less aware that other behaviors, such as refusal to shake
hands with a woman, might also be a cultural practice (Appendices B–E).241
The inability to recognize potentially lesser-known cultural practices
suggests the need for learning outcomes that focus on developing students’
abilities to identify situations in which differing cultural perspectives and
practices may arise and may influence their perceptions about a client’s
behavior.242 We do not suggest that the survey results indicate a need to
teach more about a litany of cultural practices. Rather, the survey results
suggest a need to develop students’ curiosity about client behaviors that may
be different than their own and indicate a need to work with students to help
them suspend judgment. Students should develop a level of comfort that
238.
See Miller et al., supra note 6, at 105–08; Silver, supra note 67, at 238–
39; Weng, supra note 61, at 369, 372–73.
239.
See supra Table 7. The students’ responses to individual questions aimed
at assessing their awareness of the need to avoid assumptions about clients’ behaviors can be
found in, infra Appendices B–E.
240.
See sources cited supra note 215.
241.
Sayedeh Kasmai-Nazeran, Between Gender Equality and Religious
Freedom, ISLAMIC INSIGHTS (Nov. 23, 2008), http://www.islamicinsights.com/news/
community-affairs/between-gender-equality-and-religious-freedom.html (noting that some
Muslims’ and Orthodox Jews’ religious beliefs prohibit them from shaking hands with
someone of the opposite sex).
242.
For examples of a wide array of conduct that may be based upon cultural
practices, see Jacobs, supra note 39, app. at 413–14 tbl.1.
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allows them to ask questions and explore potential cultural practices that
might be unfamiliar.243
C.

Understanding How Cultural Experiences Affect Perceptions and
Actions

A culturally sensible lawyer understands culture is multi-faceted, and
that everyone’s worldviews, conduct, perceptions, and actions are based
upon a complex compilation of numerous cultural factors and experiences.244
A culturally sensible lawyer is aware of the need to be self-reflective about
the role culture plays in our interactions.245 Being self-aware and reflective
about our own socio-cultural beliefs, and how those beliefs affect our
perceptions and actions, is a critical attitude learning outcome. Factors 2 and
5 address these concepts.
Factor 2 assesses students’ self-awareness about the role culture
plays in students’ perceptions about the legal system.246 The mean scores for
this factor were 3.14 for incoming students and 3.21 for upper level students
(Table 5). These scores suggest that many students do not believe their
views about the U.S. legal system are influenced by experiences arising from
various cultural factors such as their race, ethnicity, religious identity, socioeconomic background, gender, or sexual orientation.247 The responses to
individual items in this factor suggest that although students generally
understood that their view of the U.S. legal system was probably influenced
by their socio-economic experiences, they were much less likely to recognize
that their views about the legal system were affected by their racial identity
243.
This skill was originally identified by Professors Bryant and Koh as a
critical one for clinical students to develop. Bryant, supra note 31, at 64–78.
244.
See Karnik & Dogra, supra note 37, at 724, 726–28 tbl.1.
245.
Id. at 724, 728 tbl.1.
246.
See supra text accompanying note 214.
247.
One way to begin educating students about how experiences based upon
race, ethnicity and gender affect people’s perceptions of the legal system would be to expose
them to the various state and federal court studies on race and gender within the courts.
Throughout those studies, women and people of color discuss how their experiences affected
their views of the legal system. See generally REPORT OF THE WORKING COMMITTEES TO THE
SECOND CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON GENDER, RACIAL AND ETHNIC FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS
(1997), reprinted in 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 117 (1997); THE EFFECTS OF GENDER IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE (July
1993), reprinted in 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 745 (1994). For an excellent discussion of a survey
that looked at how racial experiences affect individuals’ perceptions of the justice system, see
MARK PEFFLEY & JON HURWITZ, JUSTICE IN AMERICA: THE SEPARATE REALITIES OF BLACKS
AND WHITES 28–67 (2010). For a discussion of how religious identity affects one’s view of
the law and legal systems, see Amy Porter, Representing the Reprehensible and Identity
Conflicts in Legal Representation, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 143, 155–61 (2004).
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or sexual orientation (Appendices B–E). Perhaps, not surprisingly, nonwhite students were more likely to believe that experiences arising from their
racial identity influenced their views of the U.S. legal system248 (mean score
for non-white students: 4.11; mean score for white students: 2.83)
(Appendix D). Students were least likely to believe that experiences arising
from their sexual orientation influenced their views (mean score for entering
students: 2.31; mean score for upper level students: 2.60) (Appendix B).249
The responses to this question suggest a need to identify attitude learning
outcomes that seek to develop students’ abilities to identify and be more
reflective about their own varied cultural experiences, and how those
experiences affect their perceptions and interactions.250 They also suggest
that many students may be in the ethnocentric stages of Bennett’s
intercultural competence continuum in that they are not aware of how their
own values and beliefs have shaped their perceptions.251
Factor 5 also relates to students’ awareness of the role that their own
cultural experiences, biases, and stereotypes play in their perceptions and
interactions.252 A mean of 4.40 (Table 2) suggests that many students felt
they were able to identify their culturally biased assumptions and were able
to identify when they were reacting based upon stereotypical beliefs. This
finding is consistent with the findings in our initial study.253 This selfassessment could mean that students already understand when and how their
unconscious biases and stereotypes affect their perceptions and actions.
However, this result may indicate that students do not fully grasp how
subconscious cognitive categories and schemas are susceptible to
unconscious biases and stereotyping.254 These results may demonstrate that
students do not understand how difficult it is to recognize our embedded

248.
Whites tend not to think about themselves or experiences in terms of race.
“‘Whites’ consciousness of whiteness is predominantly unconsciousness of whiteness.”
Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, but Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 970 (1993).
249.
Some courts have formed task forces on how sexual orientation affects
fairness within the judicial system document how sexual orientation plays a role in how
straight and LGBT people experience the justice system. For a discussion of the findings of
some court task forces, see Pamela D. Bridgewater & Brenda V. Smith, Introduction to
Symposium: Homophobia in the Halls of Justice: Sexual Orientation Bias and its
Implications Within the Legal System, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 3–8 (2002–
2003).
250.
See supra Part II.B.
251.
See supra text accompanying notes 147–62.
252.
See supra text accompanying notes 216–18.
253.
Curcio et al., Educating Culturally Sensible Lawyers, supra note 9, at app.
B at 127–28.
254.
See Kang, supra note 123, at 1508; Weng, supra note 61, at 394.
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assumptions and how those attitudes and assumptions affect our perceptions
and interactions.255
In self-assessments, people tend to overestimate their abilities.256
Factor 5 suggests the need for knowledge learning outcomes that build
students’ understandings of subconscious and implicit biases and stereotypes.
This data suggests that useful attitude learning outcomes might focus on
helping students accept that both conscious and unconscious bias and
stereotyping affect our perceptions and behaviors. Learning outcomes
should emphasize understanding the insidious nature of subconscious and
implicit bias, acknowledging the challenges inherent in recognition of
subconscious and implicit biases, and realizing the power of subconscious
and implicit biases to affect our conduct, communications, and reactions,
even if we wish it were otherwise. The associated skill learning outcome
could be recognition of the drivers and biases behind our own behaviors.
Students need to understand that we all have cultural biases. Rather than
denying biases, we need to acknowledge they exist and become aware of
how they affect our interactions and decision-making processes.257 If
students will not acknowledge they have biases, they cannot develop
methods to help avoid being adversely influenced by them in their dealing
with others.258
The survey results suggest that an important aspect of cultural
sensibility teaching is developing students’ understanding that we all bring
our cultural biases into the legal profession.259 Without this understanding,
students may be unable to move toward an ethnorelative view of the world,
255.
Kang, supra note 123, at 1528–29. Recognition of the role played by
unconscious biases is critical both in terms of lawyer-client relationships and in terms of
adequately representing clients.
Professor Justin Levinson conducted two studies
demonstrating the impact of biases on jurors’ decision making. See generally Justin Levinson,
Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decision Making, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE
L.J. 345 (2007) (discussing the role of implicit bias on jurors’ memories of facts presented);
Justin Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Implicit Racial Bias
and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307 (2010) (discussing the role
implicit bias plays in jurors’ interpretation of ambiguous evidence).
256.
Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias:
Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 955 (2006) (discussing how people are
generally unaware of their biases and over-estimate their abilities to identify their biases);
Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in
Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self Assessments, 77 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 1121, 1121 (1999) (discussing how self-assessments are often inaccurate
with those least skilled most likely to over-estimate their abilities).
257.
Weng, supra note 61, at 396–97; see also Silver, supra note 67, at 237–
39.
258.
Kang, supra note 123, at 1528–29.
259.
See Miller et al., supra note 6, at 105–07.
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in which they understand that everyone has a multi-faceted cultural
perspective and that there is no single good or bad cultural perspective.260
However, cultural sensibility is not a model that accepts that anything goes.
While students need to understand that there is no single good or bad cultural
perspective, they also need to develop the skills to challenge perceived unjust
cultural norms, but should do so sensitively and after exploring all
perspectives.
D.

Study Limitations

This study has several limitations, some of which we discussed
above. Additional limitations are discussed below.
First, we acknowledge that there are a wide range of cultural
sensibility learning outcomes that are not assessed by this instrument and
may not lend themselves to a quantitative self-assessment instrument.261
This instrument does not address, and is not meant to address, the full range
of cultural sensibility learning outcomes necessary to assess whether students
are able to effectively work across cultures.
Second, despite efforts to assess the role of social desirability
response bias in the data,262 all self-assessments, including this one, remain
vulnerable to self-evaluations based upon students’ perceptions of the correct
response rather than students’ actual beliefs and perceptions.
Third, in Factor 4, which assesses students’ understanding of the
need to be curious about what may be culturally based behaviors, there were
likely an insufficient number of examples of various types of behaviors that
may be based upon cultural practices.263 Also, it is difficult to write
statements that describe what may be culturally based behaviors outside of
any particular context. This factor may thus be inadequately explored via
this instrument. This limitation was based upon the necessity of limiting the
survey length in order to increase response rate.
Fourth, students’ self-assessment of their ability to identify their
culturally biased assumptions and when they are acting based upon
260.
See supra Part III (discussing Bennett’s stages of intercultural
competence).
261.
Others have attempted to measure additional learning outcomes via
various self-assessment instruments. See sources cited supra note 194. However, selfassessment instruments are not, and should not be, the only way students’ cultural sensibility
learning is assessed. For example, in doctrinal courses, students could be assessed via essay
or short answer questions asking them to incorporate cultural perspectives into their analysis.
In experiential learning classes students could be assessed via journal entries, simulation
exercises and actual interactions with clients and court personnel.
262.
See supra text accompanying notes 201–07.
263.
See supra Table 3.
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stereotypes (Factor 5) presents a difficult dilemma. The data indicates that
students, on average, rate themselves moderately highly when it comes to the
ability to self-identify when they are acting based upon stereotypes or biases.
However, the literature suggests most people underestimate the effect of
biases on their behaviors, often because they are unaware of the impact of
implicit biases on decision making.264 Thus, we cannot make the assumption
that those who scored highly on this factor are able to accurately self-assess
when they are acting based upon stereotypes and biases.
Finally, as stated earlier, there may be a possible effect of
nonresponse bias with the Northern School data and upper level student
response data in general.265 It may be that non-responders were not as
interested in participating in a survey on the role culture plays in the
lawyering process, or conversely, those responding were more interested in
the topic.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Whatever the individual views of legal educators might be, learning
outcomes will soon become part of the legal education accreditation
process.266 The decision about whether the outcomes include teaching our
students to work effectively across cultures will be left to law schools.267 We
believe that in today’s multicultural world, students must develop into
culturally sensible lawyers who understand how their own cultural
experiences affect their legal analysis, behaviors, and perceptions; who do
not make assumptions about other cultures or legal systems; and who avoid
behaviors based upon cultural domination or superiority of their own
perspectives.
The cultural sensibility framework helps legal educators begin to
conceptualize learning outcomes related to students’ abilities to work
effectively across cultures. It also serves as the basis for a statistically
reliable survey instrument we developed to help law faculties better
264.
For a summary of various studies demonstrating the impact of implicit
bias on the behavior of various actors within the legal system, see Jerry Kang et al., Implicit
Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012). For a review of the literature on
implicit bias and how it potentially relates to the survey results, see Curcio et al., Educating
Culturally Sensible Lawyers, supra note 9, at 117–19.
265.
See supra Part IV.B. Incoming students at the Southern Urban School
took the survey as part of the scheduled orientation process. The other survey cohorts were
asked, via email, to complete the survey.
266.
See supra notes 4, 19–20.
267.
See Proposed Standards for Approval of Law Schools, Am. Bar Ass’n,
Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, on Chapter 3: Program of Legal Education
(Mar. 2014), supra note 4.
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understand some aspects of their students’ cultural sensibility knowledge,
attitudes, and skills. The survey described herein can help faculties gauge
their students’ receptivity to learning about the role culture plays in the
lawyering process and assist educators in identifying where to devote
educational time and effort. Additionally, the survey can help faculties
identify potential learning outcomes and track students’ cultural sensibility
development over the course of their legal education. Specifically the
instrument can help assess: 1) students’ understanding of how culture
influences judges, lawyers and clients; 2) students’ self-awareness of the
influence their cultural experiences have on how they view the legal system;
3) students’ desire to learn about the role culture plays in the lawyering
process; 4) students’ awareness of the need to evaluate whether unfamiliar
behaviors may be based upon cultural beliefs and practices; and 5) students’
understanding of the difficulty inherent in identifying when we are acting
based upon our biases and stereotypes.
Although we do not suggest that the survey instrument discussed
herein can, or should, be the sole measure of student cultural sensibility
learning outcomes, its statistical reliability and validity and its demonstrated
ability to identify differences amongst incoming and upper level students
indicates that it may be a useful learning outcome measurement tool for
some aspects of cultural sensibility learning.268 While more work needs to
be done to develop a wide range of cultural sensibility learning outcome
assessments, the research provided in this paper provides legal educators a
starting point as they begin to consider the need for cultural sensibility
education, what that education should entail, and whether that education is
effective.

268.
This survey may be useful as a pre- and post-course survey. However,
faculty must be cognizant of the fact that cultural sensibility learning may not click
immediately after a course has been completed. Thus, immediate post-course survey results
may not indicate the full extent of student learning. Additionally, faculty members must be
cautious in how they present the survey to avoid students trying to answer in a way that
pleases the faculty member rather than truly reflects the students’ own views.
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APPENDIX A
Survey Instrument
1. Please indicate the degree to which the following influences your views
about the U.S. legal system.
Scale: 1=No influence at all to 6=Very strong influence
1.1 Experiences arising from your racial identity
1.2 Experiences arising from your ethnic identity
1.3 Experiences arising from your religious identity
1.4 Experiences arising from your socio-economic background
1.5 Experiences arising from your gender
1.6 Experiences arising from your sexual orientation
2. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following
statements:
Scale: 1=Strongly disagree to 6=Strongly agree
2.1 Clients look at legal problems through their own cultural lens.
2.2 Lawyers look at legal problems through their own cultural lens.
2.3 How a client communicates with his or her lawyer is not influenced by
the client’s cultural background.
2.4 I do not view the legal system through a culturally-biased lens.
2.5 If a client’s cultural practice is to defer decision making to others in the
client’s family, a lawyer should help the client understand why he or she
should make his or her own decisions about the case.
2.6 A lawyer’s socioeconomic background influences how the lawyer
perceives a client’s behavior.
2.7 Legal education should not include education about cultural issues that
may arise when providing legal services to people from different cultural
backgrounds.
2.8 A lawyer should assume that a client’s visible lack of emotion means that
the client does not feel strongly about what is being discussed.
2.9 Judges do not look at legal problems through their own cultural lens.
2.10 In general, I am able to recognize when my reactions to others are based
on stereotypical beliefs.
2.11 How a lawyer communicates with his or her client is not influenced by
the lawyer’s cultural background.
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2.12 When a client refuses to look his or her lawyer in the eyes, the lawyer
should assume the client is not being truthful.
2.13 In general, I can accurately identify my culturally-biased assumptions
about others who are from cultures different from my own.
2.14 Lawyers belonging to racial and ethnic minorities bring culturallybiased assumptions into the lawyer/client relationship.
2.15 When a client shakes hands with a male attorney but refused to shake
hands with a female attorney, the lawyers should assume the client will not
respect advice given by the female attorney.
2.16 White lawyers bring culturally-biased assumptions into the
lawyer/client relationship.
2.17 Law professors should discuss with their students the cultural
assumptions embedded in appellate legal opinions.
2.18 A law student’s ability to recognize cultural diversity issues as they
relate to the lawyering process should be assessed during law school.
3. Law School Classes
3.1 Have you taken any clinics in law school?
3.2 Please tell us which clinic(s) you have taken.
3.3 Have you taken any law school classes in which the role of culture in the
lawyering process was discussed?
3.4 Please tell us which course(s) or professor(s).
3.5 What have you encountered in your classes that has helped to foster, or to
inhibit, discussion of the role of culture in the lawyering process?
4. Demographics
4.1 Please indicate your current year in law school. [I am a 2L (have
completed 29 to 57 law school credit hours]
[I am a 3L (have completed in excess of 57 law school credit hours]
Gender [Female] [Male] [Transgender]
Ethnicity/Race (Choose all that apply.) [American Indian or Alaska Native]
[Asian] [Black] [Hispanic/Latino(a)] [Hawaiian or Pacific Islander] [White]
Age [20-25] [26-30] [31-35] [36-40] [41-45] [46-50] [over 50]
We would appreciate any comments or suggestions you may have regarding
the questionnaire or the topic.
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY ITEM MEANS BY STUDENT LEVEL
Survey Items
Experiences arising from
your racial identity

Entering law students
2L or 3L
Total
Experiences arising from Entering law students
your ethnic identity
2L or 3L
Total
Experiences arising from Entering law students
your religious identity
2L or 3L
Total
Experiences arising from Entering law students
your socio-economic
2L or 3L
background
Total
Experiences arising from Entering law students
your gender
2L or 3L
Total
Experiences arising from Entering law students
your sexual orientation
2L or 3L
Total
Clients look at legal
Entering law students
problems through their
2L or 3L
own cultural lens.
Total
Lawyers look at legal
Entering law students
problems through their
2L or 3L
own cultural lens.
Total
How a client
Entering law students
communicates with his or 2L or 3L
her lawyer is not
Total
influenced by the client’s
cultural background.†
I do not view the legal
Entering law students
system through a
2L or 3L
culturally-biased lens.†
Total
If a client’s cultural
Entering law students
practice is to defer
2L or 3L

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss2/1

N
309
282
591
309
282
591
309
280
589
309
281
590
309
282
591
309
280
589
309
281
590
307
281
588
309
281
590

Mean
3.14
3.10
3.12
2.85
2.70
2.78
3.20
2.95
3.08
3.92
4.10
4.01
3.41
3.80
3.60
2.31
2.60
2.45
5.04
5.16
5.09
3.72
4.33
4.01
5.09
5.30
5.19

SD
1.55
1.66
1.60
1.60
1.62
1.61
1.59
1.60
1.59
1.43
1.47
1.45
1.59
1.61
1.61
1.54
1.69
1.62
0.97
0.95
0.97
1.31
1.18
1.28
1.06
1.00
1.04

309
280
589
306
278

3.66
4.09
3.86
2.82
2.54

1.38
1.34
1.37
1.23
1.20

Sig.

p<.01
p<.05

p<.000
p<.05

p<.000
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Survey Items
decision making to others
in the client’s family, a
lawyer should help the
client understand why he
or she should make his or
her own decisions about
the case.†
A lawyer’s
socioeconomic
background influences
how the lawyer perceives
a client’s behavior.
Legal education should
not include education
about cultural issues that
may arise when
providing legal services
to people from different
cultural backgrounds
than my own.†
A lawyer should assume
that a client’s visible lack
of emotion means that
the client does not feel
strongly about what is
being discussed.†
Judges do not look at
legal problems through
their own cultural lens.†
In general, I am able to
recognize when my
reactions to others are
based on stereotypical
beliefs.
How a lawyer
communicates with his or
her client is not
influenced by the
lawyer’s cultural
background.†
When a client refuses to
look his or her lawyer in
the eyes, the lawyer
should assume the client
is not being truthful.†
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Total

N
584

Mean SD
2.68 1.22

Sig.
p<.05

Entering law students
2L or 3L
Total

307
279
586

4.03
4.58
4.29

1.22
1.12
1.20

p<.000

Entering law students
2L or 3L
Total

308
280
588

5.08
5.04
5.06

1.13
1.31
1.22

Entering law students
2L or 3L
Total

305
281
586

5.36
5.39
5.37

0.87
0.99
0.93

Entering law students
2L or 3L
Total
Entering law students
2L or 3L
Total

309
279
588
307
280
587

4.42
4.91
4.65
4.68
4.52
4.61

1.24
1.18
1.23
0.89
0.92
0.91

Entering law students
2L or 3L
Total

309
280
589

4.50
4.86
4.67

0.96
0.99
0.99

Entering law students
2L or 3L
Total

307
279
586

5.16
5.21
5.19

0.93
0.91
0.92

p<.000
p<.05

p<.000
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Survey Items
N
Mean SD
Sig.
In general, I can
Entering law students 308
4.26 1.01
accurately identify my
2L or 3L
279
4.14 1.06
culturally-biased
Total
587
4.20 1.04
assumptions about others
who are from cultures
different from my own.
Lawyers belonging to
Entering law students 309
3.22 1.32
racial and ethnic
2L or 3L
281
3.65 1.33 p<.000
minorities bring
Total
590
3.42 1.34
culturally-biased
assumptions into the
lawyer/client
relationship.
When a client shakes
Entering law students 308
4.15 1.28
hands with a male
2L or 3L
281
4.04 1.35
attorney but refuses to
Total
589
4.10 1.31
shake hands with a
female attorney, the
lawyers should assume
the client will not respect
advice given by the
female attorney.†
White lawyers bring
Entering law students 309
3.26 1.36
culturally-biased
2L or 3L
280
3.93 1.37 p<.000
assumptions into the
Total
589
3.58 1.40
lawyer/client
relationship.
Law professors should
Entering law students 308
4.67 1.08
discuss with their
2L or 3L
279
4.44 1.39 p<.05
students the cultural
Total
587
4.56 1.24
assumptions embedded in
appellate legal opinions.
A law student’s ability to Entering law students 309
4.23 1.31
recognize cultural
2L or 3L
281
3.93 1.54 p<.05
diversity issues as they
Total
590
4.09 1.43
relate to the lawyering
process should be
assessed during law
school.
† Item was reverse coded
Note. Mean range = 1-6 with higher mean score representing higher level of cultural
sensibility.
**Survey Item Means by Student Level (cont.)
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APPENDIX C: SURVEY ITEM MEANS BY UNIVERSITY
Survey Items
Experiences arising from your
racial identity
Experiences arising from your
ethnic identity
Experiences arising from your
religious identity
Experiences arising from your
socio-economic background
Experiences arising from your
gender
Experiences arising from your
sexual orientation
Clients look at legal problems
through their own cultural lens.
Lawyers look at legal problems
through their own cultural lens.
How a client communicates
with his or her lawyer is not
influenced by the client’s
cultural background.†
I do not view the legal system
through a culturally-biased
lens.†
If a client’s cultural practice is
to defer decision making to
others in the client’s family, a
lawyer should help the client
understand why he or she
should make his or her own
decisions about the case.†
A lawyer’s socioeconomic
background influences how the
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Southern Urban
Northern
Total
Southern Urban
Northern
Total
Southern Urban
Northern
Total
Southern Urban
Northern
Total
Southern Urban
Northern
Total
Southern Urban
Northern
Total
Southern Urban
Northern
Total
Southern Urban
Northern
Total
Southern Urban
Northern
Total

N
318
273
591
318
273
591
317
272
589
317
273
590
318
273
591
317
272
589
317
273
590
317
271
588
317
273
590

Mean
3.06
3.19
3.12
2.85
2.69
2.78
3.14
3.00
3.08
3.86
4.18
4.01
3.45
3.77
3.60
2.27
2.66
2.45
5.04
5.15
5.09
3.79
4.27
4.01
5.10
5.30
5.19

SD
1.61
1.60
1.60
1.63
1.58
1.61
1.57
1.62
1.59
1.42
1.46
1.45
1.57
1.65
1.61
1.51
1.71
1.62
0.97
0.96
0.97
1.28
1.24
1.28
1.07
0.99
1.04

Southern Urban
Northern
Total
Southern Urban
Northern
Total

316
273
589
311
273
584

3.61
4.16
3.86
2.71
2.65
2.68

1.37
1.32
1.37
1.25
1.19
1.22

Southern Urban 315
Northern
271

4.03
4.60

1.18
1.16

Sig.

p<.05

p<.000
p<.05

p<.000

p<.000
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Survey Items
lawyer perceives a client’s
behavior.
Legal education should not
include education about cultural
issues that may arise when
providing legal services to
people from different cultural
backgrounds than my own.†
A lawyer should assume that a
client’s visible lack of emotion
means that the client does not
feel strongly about what is
being discussed.†
Judges do not look at legal
problems through their own
cultural lens.†
In general, I am able to
recognize when my reactions to
others are based on
stereotypical beliefs.
How a lawyer communicates
with his or her client is not
influenced by the lawyer’s
cultural background.†
When a client refuses to look
his or her lawyer in the eyes,
the lawyer should assume the
client is not being truthful.†
In general, I can accurately
identify my culturally-biased
assumptions about others who
are from cultures different from
my own.
Lawyers belonging to racial and
ethnic minorities bring
culturally-biased assumptions
into the lawyer/client
relationship.
When a client shakes hands
with a male attorney but refuses
to shake hands with a female
attorney, the lawyers should
assume the client will not
respect advice given by the
female attorney.†
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Total
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N
586

Mean SD
4.29 1.20

Sig.

Southern Urban 316
Northern
272
Total
588

4.99
5.14
5.06

1.23
1.20
1.22

Southern Urban 314
Northern
272
Total
586

5.30
5.46
5.37

0.94
0.90
0.93

Southern Urban
Northern
Total
Southern Urban
Northern
Total

316
272
588
315
272
587

4.50
4.83
4.65
4.66
4.55
4.61

1.28
1.16
1.23
0.90
0.92
0.91

Southern Urban 316
Northern
273
Total
589

4.47
4.90
4.67

1.01
0.91
0.99

p<.000

Southern Urban 314
Northern
272
Total
586

5.08
5.31
5.19

0.99
0.82
0.92

p<.01

Southern Urban 315
Northern
272
Total
587

4.26
4.13
4.20

1.05
1.03
1.04

Southern Urban 317
Northern
273
Total
590

3.27
3.60
3.42

1.26
1.41
1.34

p<.01

Southern Urban 316
Northern
273
Total
589

3.97
4.24
4.10

1.35
1.26
1.31

p<.05

p<.01
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Survey Items
N
Mean SD
Sig.
White lawyers bring culturally- Southern Urban 317
3.25 1.35
biased assumptions into the
Northern
272
3.96 1.37 p<.000
lawyer/client relationship.
Total
589
3.58 1.40
Law professors should discuss Southern Urban 315
4.51 1.18
with their students the cultural
Northern
272
4.61 1.31
assumptions embedded in
Total
587
4.56 1.24
appellate legal opinions.
A law student’s ability to
Southern Urban 317
4.08 1.41
recognize cultural diversity
Northern
273
4.10 1.45
issues as they relate to the
Total
590
4.09 1.43
lawyering process should be
assessed during law school.
† Item was reverse coded
Note. Mean range = 1-6 with higher mean score representing higher level of cultural
sensibility.
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APPENDIX D**: SURVEY ITEM MEANS BY RACE/ETHNICITY
Survey Items
Experiences arising from your
racial identity
Experiences arising from your
ethnic identity
Experiences arising from your
religious identity
Experiences arising from your
socio-economic background
Experiences arising from your
gender
Experiences arising from your
sexual orientation
Clients look at legal problems
through their own cultural lens.
Lawyers look at legal problems
through their own cultural lens.
How a client communicates with
his or her lawyer is not influenced
by the client’s cultural
background.†
I do not view the legal system
through a culturally-biased lens.†
If a client’s cultural practice is to
defer decision making to others in
the client’s family, a lawyer should
help the client understand why he
or she should make his or her own
decisions about the case.†
A lawyer’s socioeconomic
background influences how the

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss2/1

Non White
White
Total
Non White
White
Total
Non White
White
Total
Non White
White
Total
Non White
White
Total
Non White
White
Total
Non White
White
Total
Non White
White
Total
Non White
White
Total

N
132
435
567
132
435
567
132
433
565
131
435
566
132
435
567
132
434
566
132
435
567
132
433
565
132
435
567

Mean
4.11
2.83
3.13
3.91
2.43
2.78
3.27
3.00
3.06
4.18
3.95
4.00
3.91
3.53
3.62
2.36
2.47
2.44
5.14
5.08
5.09
4.07
3.97
4.00
5.13
5.21
5.19

SD
1.56
1.49
1.60
1.70
1.41
1.60
1.73
1.54
1.59
1.38
1.44
1.43
1.72
1.56
1.61
1.74
1.56
1.60
1.05
0.94
0.97
1.47
1.23
1.29
1.20
0.99
1.05

Non White
White
Total
Non White
White
Total

132
434
566
131
430
561

3.91
3.85
3.86
2.64
2.69
2.68

1.37
1.36
1.36
1.29
1.19
1.21

Non White
White

132
431

4.33
4.27

1.35
1.15

Sig.
p<.000
p<.000

p<.05
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lawyer perceives a client’s
behavior.
Legal education should not include
education about cultural issues that
may arise when providing legal
services to people from different
cultural backgrounds than my
own.†
A lawyer should assume that a
client’s visible lack of emotion
means that the client does not feel
strongly about what is being
discussed.†
Judges do not look at legal
problems through their own
cultural lens.†
In general, I am able to recognize
when my reactions to others are
based on stereotypical beliefs.
How a lawyer communicates with
his or her client is not influenced
by the lawyer’s cultural
background.†
When a client refuses to look his or
her lawyer in the eyes, the lawyer
should assume the client is not
being truthful.†
In general, I can accurately identify
my culturally-biased assumptions
about others who are from cultures
different from my own.
Lawyers belonging to racial and
ethnic minorities bring culturallybiased assumptions into the
lawyer/client relationship.
When a client shakes hands with a
male attorney but refuses to shake
hands with a female attorney, the
lawyers should assume the client
will not respect advice given by the
female attorney.†
White lawyers bring culturallybiased assumptions into the
lawyer/client relationship.
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Total

N
563

Mean SD
4.28 1.20

Non White
White
Total

131
433
564

5.25
5.03
5.09

1.14
1.20
1.19

Non White
White
Total

129
433
562

5.40
5.36
5.37

0.98
0.91
0.92

Non White
White
Total
Non White
White
Total
Non White
White
Total

131
434
565
132
432
564
132
433
565

4.81
4.60
4.65
4.70
4.58
4.61
4.89
4.61
4.67

1.20
1.24
1.23
0.99
0.89
0.91
1.00
0.98
0.99

Non White
White
Total

131
432
563

5.23
5.17
5.18

0.96
0.90
0.92

Non White
White
Total

132
432
564

4.35
4.15
4.20

1.13
1.01
1.04

Non White
White
Total

132
434
566

3.14
3.49
3.41

1.40
1.31
1.34

Non White
White
Total

132
433
565

4.02
4.09
4.07

1.33
1.31
1.31

Non White
White
Total

132
433
565

3.69
3.53
3.57

1.38
1.40
1.40

243
Sig.

p<.05

p<.05
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Survey Items
N
Mean SD
Sig.
Law professors should discuss with Non White 131
4.89 1.06
their students the cultural
assumptions embedded in appellate White
432
4.49 1.23 p<.01
legal opinions.
Total
563
4.58 1.20
A law student’s ability to recognize Non White 132
4.55 1.29
cultural diversity issues as they
White
434
3.97 1.40 p<.000
relate to the lawyering process
Total
566
4.11 1.39
should be assessed during law
school.
† Item was reverse coded
Note. Mean range = 1-6 with higher mean score representing higher level of cultural
sensibility.
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APPENDIX E**: SURVEY ITEM MEANS BY GENDER
Survey Items
Experiences arising from your racial Female
identity
Male
Total
Experiences arising from your
Female
ethnic identity
Male
Total
Experiences arising from your
Female
religious identity
Male
Total
Experiences arising from your
Female
socio-economic background
Male
Total
Experiences arising from your
Female
gender
Male
Total
Experiences arising from your
Female
sexual orientation
Male
Total
Clients look at legal problems
Female
through their own cultural lens.
Male
Total
Lawyers look at legal problems
Female
through their own cultural lens.
Male
Total
How a client communicates with his Female
or her lawyer is not influenced by
Male
the client’s cultural background.†
Total
I do not view the legal system
Female
through a culturally-biased lens.†
Male
Total
If a client’s cultural practice is to
Female
defer decision making to others in
Male
the client’s family, a lawyer should Total
help the client understand why he or
she should make his or her own
decisions about the case.†
A lawyer’s socioeconomic
Female
background influences how the
Male
lawyer perceives a client’s behavior. Total
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N
287
291
578
287
291
578
286
290
576
286
291
577
287
291
578
286
291
577
287
291
578
286
290
576
287
291
578
287
290
577
285
287
572

Mean
3.55
2.71
3.13
3.13
2.43
2.78
3.21
2.93
3.07
4.21
3.79
4.00
4.39
2.83
3.61
2.65
2.25
2.45
5.26
4.93
5.10
4.23
3.77
4.00
5.34
5.038
5.19
4.04
3.67
3.85
2.66
2.67
2.66

SD
1.61
1.49
1.61
1.65
1.50
1.61
1.54
1.62
1.59
1.35
1.51
1.45
1.35
1.45
1.60
1.67
1.53
1.62
0.92
0.99
0.97
1.29
1.25
1.29
0.96
1.10
1.04
1.34
1.39
1.38
1.18
1.25
1.21

285
289
574

4.40
4.19
4.29

1.17
1.23
1.21

Sig.
p<.000
p<.000
p<.05
p<.01
p<.000
p<.01
p<.000
p<.000
p<.000
p<.01

p<.05
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Survey Items
Legal education should not include
education about cultural issues that
may arise when providing legal
services to people from different
cultural backgrounds than my own.†
A lawyer should assume that a
client’s visible lack of emotion
means that the client does not feel
strongly about what is being
discussed.†
Judges do not look at legal problems
through their own cultural lens.†

[Vol. 38

N
285

Mean SD
5.3439 1.11

Sig.

Female
Male
Total

290
575

4.8069 1.25
5.0730 1.21

p<.000

Female
Male
Total

285
288
573

5.43
5.32
5.37

.95
.91
.93

Female
Male
Total
In general, I am able to recognize
Female
when my reactions to others are
Male
based on stereotypical beliefs.
Total
How a lawyer communicates with
Female
his or her client is not influenced by Male
the lawyer’s cultural background.†
Total
When a client refuses to look his or Female
her lawyer in the eyes, the lawyer
Male
should assume the client is not being Total
truthful.†
In general, I can accurately identify Female
my culturally-biased assumptions
Male
about others who are from cultures
Total
different from my own.
Lawyers belonging to racial and
Female
ethnic minorities bring culturallyMale
biased assumptions into the
Total
lawyer/client relationship.
When a client shakes hands with a
Female
male attorney but refuses to shake
Male
hands with a female attorney, the
Total
lawyers should assume the client
will not respect advice given by the
female attorney.†
White lawyers bring culturallyFemale
biased assumptions into the
Male
lawyer/client relationship.
Total
Law professors should discuss with Female
their students the cultural
Male
assumptions embedded in appellate Total
legal opinions.

286
290
576
287
288
575
286
290
576
287
287
574

4.77
4.52
4.64
4.65
4.57
4.61
4.83
4.52
4.67
5.24
5.12
5.18

1.20
1.26
1.24
.88
.93
.91
1.00
.96
.99
.90
.94
.92

286
289
575

4.26
4.15
4.21

1.06
1.02
1.04

287
290
577

3.38
3.46
3.42

1.41
1.27
1.34

287
289
576

4.02
4.15
4.09

1.34
1.28
1.31

287
289
576
286
288
574

3.74
3.44
3.59
4.79
4.38
4.59

1.39
1.41
1.40
1.10
1.29
1.22
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p<.05

p<.000

p<.05

p<.05
p<.000
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Survey Items
N
Mean SD
Sig.
A law student’s ability to recognize Female 287
4.38
1.35
cultural diversity issues as they
relate to the lawyering process
Male
290
3.85
1.43
p<.000
should be assessed during law
Total
577
4.11
1.42
school.
† Item was reverse coded
Note. Mean range = 1-6 with higher mean score representing higher level of cultural
sensibility.
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PROLOGUE
The sting of recession that grips the American economy is even more
dramatic in the realm of legal education. 1 Law schools, in addition to
producing too many graduates for an already too full legal economy, also
face a barrage of bad press,2 dwindling LSAT takers,3 and sharp declines in
student applications, 4 not to mention sharp criticism about high costs of
tuition and spiraling student debt.5 Due to this perfect storm of troubles, law
schools are now being forced to plan more strategically than in decades of

* Associate Professor, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern
University. Special thanks to Professor Olympia Duhart, Dr. Docia Rudley, and Dean Dannye
R. Holley for their insights and intellectual support.
** Assistant Professor and Director of Experiential Learning Programs, Thurgood
Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University.
1.
Stanley Fish, The Bad News Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2012,
9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/20/the-bad-news-law-schools/.
2.
See, e.g., id. (summarizing much of the negative press).
3.
See, e.g., John Schwartz, Drop in LSAT Takers Shows Legal Field’s
Slump, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2013, at A.20.
4.
Three-Year ABA Volume Comparison, LSAC, http://www.lsac.org/
lsacresources/data/three-year-volume (last updated March 7, 2014).
5.
See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS ix (John M.
Conley & Lynn Mather eds., 2012).
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prosperity.6 Among the implicit critiques of legal education are the more
direct critiques coming from the corporate world.7 In particular, large law
firms are demanding in growing unison that J.D. graduates be more practice
ready for the rigors of corporate practice.8 Although big firms employ only a
small percentage of all J.D. graduates, they are influencing the discussion
with support from members of the academy, bench, and bar, all of whom
support increasing practical skills training, albeit under different rationales.9
This article examines this transformation in legal education through
the lens of critical pedagogy. At its base, critical pedagogy is about
“devis[ing] more equitable methods of teaching, help[ing] students develop
consciousness of freedom, and [helping them] connect knowledge to
power.” 10 The insights of critical pedagogy are valuable for a fuller
understanding of experiential education and its potential to affect students in
profound ways, particularly as a means of empowerment.11 Although this is
an understudied area of pedagogical scholarship, as one scholar notes,
[p]ower relations pervade the regime of practices that constitute
legal education, operating in subtle but nevertheless concrete ways
to shape the actions of students, teachers, professionals, and
administrators. Yet, despite their pervasiveness, legal education
scholarship does not effectively grasp or explore power relations—
they do not feature as objects of research in an explicit manner,
and when they are considered, they are understood in problematic
ways.12

6.
THE N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON NEW LAWYERS IN A CHANGING
PROFESSION, N.Y.C. BAR, DEVELOPING LEGAL CAREERS AND DELIVERING JUSTICE IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 45–47 (2013), available at http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/developing-legal-careersand-delivering-justice-in-the-21st-century.pdf.
7.
See id. at 23.
8.
See id. at 22–23.
9.
See id. at 26–27 (citing that firms of 501 or more employees employed
“nearly [twenty percent] of 2010 graduates from law schools in New York State”); Press
Release, N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n, New York City Bar Association Task Force Calls for Changes in
Education and Career Focus for New Lawyers—Report Announces Pilot Programs and Urges
Focus on Unmet Middle Class Legal Needs (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.nycbar.org/mediaaamp-publications/press-releases/press-archives–2013/1885–new-york-city-bar-associationtask-force-calls-for-changes-in-education-and-career-focus-for-new-lawyers-reportannounces-pilot-programs-and-urges-focus-on-unmet-middle-class-legal-needs/.
10.
SpearIt, Priorities of Pedagogy: Classroom Justice in the Law School
Setting, 48 CAL. W. L. REV. 467, 469 (2012) [hereinafter SpearIt, Priorities of Pedagogy:
Classroom Justice in the Law School Setting].
11.
See id. at 472.
12.
Matthew Ball, Power in Legal Education: A (New) Critical and
Analytical Approach, 12 QUEENSL. U. TECH. L. & JUST., Apr. 12, 2012, at 157, 157.
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Critical pedagogy is a frame for considering how experiential education
empowers students and leads to other positive outcomes. 13 Although
advocates of experiential education typically emphasize the needs of the
profession and student marketability, critical pedagogy reveals more at stake
for students—including experiencing greater agency, autonomy, and
hopefully, greater justice.14
The article outlines a student-centered set of rationales for adopting
experiential principles. As such it seeks to engage law professors of all
persuasions to consider what experiential education means for students
personally. More pointedly, this article attempts to break down some of the
great divide between teaching doctrine and experiential education.15 Infusing
doctrinal courses with opportunities for experiential learning will be
imperative for law schools; and so it will be imperative to engage doctrinal
faculty.16 The pages that follow are an attempt.
Among the most compelling rationales for enhancing experiential
education is its potential to engage students in justice directly, and not simply
as a lesson from a book.17 For example, students who experience the law
through direct interaction with indigent clients learn valuable lessons in
justice and the unmet legal needs that affect the most vulnerable and
marginalized segments of society.18 Students learn through their experience
that justice is complex and multilayered, and indeed unstable. Yet, by
assisting such clients, students experience the law as stewards of justice,
rather than floundering law students. Students get the opportunity to learn
justice inside and outside of the classroom setting, and are assessed in
abilities other than typical law school test-taking. 19 A more variegated
approach to assessments promises more student evaluation of the skills and
values that lawyers need for successful and meaningful practice.20

13.
SpearIt, Priorities of Pedagogy: Classroom Justice in the Law School
Setting, supra note 10, at 469.
14.
See id. at 469–70, 479.
15.
Jessica Erickson, Experiential Education in the Lecture Hall, 6 N.E. U.
L.J. 87, 87 (2013) (describing doctrine faculty and skills faculty as “composed of two separate
worlds”).
16.
Id. at 87–88.
17.
SpearIt, Priorities of Pedagogy: Classroom Justice in the Law School
Setting, supra note 10, at 470.
18.
See, e.g., VULNERABLE POPULATIONS AND TRANSFORMATIVE LAW
TEACHING: A CRITICAL READER 62–63, 399 (Soc’y of Am. Law Teachers & Golden Gate
Univ. Sch. of Law eds., 2011).
19.
Deborah Maranville et al., Re-Vision Quest: A Law School Guide to
Designing Experiential Courses Involving Real Lawyering, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 517, 527,
530–32 (20112012).
20.
See id. at 531–32.
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The potential benefit of experiential education hardly means there is
not a potential for pitfalls in implementing and maintaining experiential
curricula.21 For example, as one commentator notes:
[D]eveloping a conceptual framework for articulating options may
provoke controversy because of its potential to be misunderstood
as suggesting that all experiences have equal value. Such an
interpretation would permit law schools to ignore the
consequences of the choices that they explicitly and implicitly
make, as long as they provide some kind of experiential
opportunity.22

Accordingly, one might easily imagine courses consisting of little more than
a mundane, semester-long task, or students unable to match their practical
interests with the available curriculum.23 Educators must avoid these pitfalls
through praxis in pedagogy, and further develop ways to exploit experiential
education as a means to enhance the law school experience.24
I.

REFORMING LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA: MORE EXPERIENTIAL
EDUCATION

With the employment market for attorneys currently in a subpar
state, 25 legal employers have the attention of both the American Bar
Association (“ABA”) and law schools, and these employers are demanding
practice-ready graduates. 26 Historically, the legal academy has been
generally content with a model of education that focuses on legal theory and
case law doctrine, with schools typically leaving most of the practical
21.
E.g., Martin J. Katz, Facilitating Better Law Teaching—Now, 62 EMORY
L.J. 823, 833 (2013) (describing the pitfalls of simulation training and the “vast difference
between good simulations and bad ones”).
22.
Maranville et al., supra note 19, at 51920.
23.
See David F. Chavkin, Experiential Learning: A Critical Element of
Legal Education in China (and Elsewhere), 22 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 3,
5 (2009) (describing apprentice-lawyers who spent hours “photocopying or delivering
documents for their host law practices”); Nantiya Ruan, Experiential Learning in the FirstYear Curriculum: The Public-Interest Partnership, 8 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD
191, 194 (2011) (advocating “the public-interest-partnership . . . as an approach that best
integrates the experiential learning of simulated and live client interactions, while lessening
the impact of the negative aspects of both traditional approaches”).
24.
Ruan, supra note 23, at 191–93.
25.
See, e.g., William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, The Law School
Bubble: Federal Loans Inflate College Budgets, but How Long Will that Last if Law Grads
Can’t Pay their Bills?, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2012, at 30, 32.
26.
See, e.g., David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at A1.
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training of new attorneys to the auspices of employers.27 However, in the
most recent response to the call for more practice-ready graduates, law
schools are increasingly turning to experiential models of various types.28
Notwithstanding the push towards more experiential education, there is great
uncertainty as to how to implement experiential curricula within law school,
where not even field trips are a regular feature of the law school syllabus.29
Experiential education offers a very different model, one that
concentrates on teaching through real-life work experience. 30 Broadly
speaking, experiential education may be viewed as a form of active learning
that has conceptual overlap with European models of work-based learning,
which attempt to formalize the workplace as an authentic learning
environment. 31 It is broad in scope and “incorporates a continuum of
learning opportunities.”32
The animating theory of experiential education draws on a
distinguished history and lineage, including the works of John Dewey, David
Kolb, and Paulo Freire, among others. 33 It involves “[l]earning from an
27.
Id. But see David M. Siegel, The Ambivalent Role of Experiential
Learning in American Legal Education and the Problem of Legal Culture, 10 GERMAN L.J.
815, 815–16, 818 (2009) (noting that despite criticism of theory-driven rather than practicedriven education, American law schools expressly draw on experiential learning through the
use of legal clinics and by bringing in adjunct instructors who are engaged in full time
practice).
28.
See Ed Finkel, Schools Respond to Shifts in Legal Landscape, STUDENT
LAW., Jan. 2012, at 20, 21–22 (examining various programs developed in law schools to make
students more ready for practice); Robert A. Parker & Sue Schechter, The Ugly Duckling
Comes of Age: The Promise of Full-Time Field Placements 2 (Soc. Sci. Research Network,
Working Paper No. I20, K19, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1886509.
29.
Noelle Higgins et al., Field Trips as Teaching Tools in the Law
Curriculum, 88 RES. EDUCATION 102, 105 (2012) (stating that even when field trips are
undertaken in the law school setting, “they are generally included in an ad hoc manner, often
with no real context and/or without learning outcomes attached, or no post-trip analysis
undertaken.”).
30.
See Katz, supra note 21, at 830.
31.
See C.U. Chisholm et al., The Characterisation of Work-Based Learning
by Consideration of the Theories of Experiential Learning, 44 EUR. J. EDUCATION 319, 319
(2009) (discussing “how experiential learning theories can contribute to the development of a
common theoretical framework which draws together lifelong learning practice to support the
conceptualization of work-based learning”).
32.
Chavkin, supra note 23, at 11.
33.
Robert Dinerstein, Experiential Legal Education: New Wine and New
Bottles, SYLLABUS, Winter 2012-2013, at 2, 2; see generally JOHN DEWEY, HOW WE THINK: A
RESTATEMENT OF THE RELATION OF REFLECTIVE THINKING TO THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS (1933);
PAOLO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (Myra Bergman Ramos trans., 30th Anniversary
ed. 2005); DAVID A. KOLB, EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING: EXPERIENCE AS THE SOURCE OF
LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT (1984).
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individual’s own experiences” 34 or a type “of learning undertaken by
students who are given a chance to acquire and apply knowledge, skills, and
feelings in an immediate and relevant setting.”35 This definition is partially
based on the model developed by David Kolb and Roger Fry, which outlines
four primary elements: 1) concrete experience, 2) observation and reflection,
3) formation of abstract concepts, and 4) testing the abstract concepts in new
situations. 36 Conceptually, these elements overlap with Patrick Brayer’s
definition of social practice theory of learning as one that emphasizes the
importance of the social content of learning; “the student learns laterally
through collaborat[ion] . . . with an . . . array of workers and peers and
vertically through the central, fluid dyad involving the supervisor/expert and
the student/novice.” 37 In all regards, then, experiential learning is a
“pedagogy of systemic interaction.”38
In legal education, there is no unanimous theory on the content of
experiential education, but there has been headway. 39 For example, the
Clinical Legal Education Association’s (“CLEA”) Best Practices for Legal
Education report has reiterated how experiential learning is distinct from
experiential education.40 According to this report, “[e]xperiential education
integrates theory and practice by combining academic inquiry with actual
experience”; it is focused on academic inquiry and in the way teachers
design and structure the student’s experience. 41 Whereas experiential
education focuses on the intentional design to teach by experience,
experiential learning corresponds to student learning, and thus can occur in
informal settings—even though the learning is not experiential by design.42

34.
Patrick C. Brayer, A Law Clinic Systems Theory and the Pedagogy of
Interaction: Creating a Legal Learning System, 12 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 49, 49 (2012).
35.
Mark K. Smith, David A. Kolb on Experiential Learning, INFED (2010),
http://infed.org/mobi/david-a-kolb-on-experiential-learning/.
36.
Id.; see also ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL
EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD MAP 122 (1st ed. 2007).
37.
Brook K. Baker, Practice-Based Learning: Emphasizing Practice and
Offering Critical Perspectives on the Dangers of “Co-Op”tation, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 619,
624 (2011–2012); see also Brayer, supra note 34, at 50.
38.
Brayer, supra note 34, at 50.
39.
See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 36, at 121–22.
40.
Id. at 121; see also Lewis Jackson & Doug MacIsaac, Introduction to a
New Approach to Experiential Learning, 62 N. DIRECTIONS FOR ADULT & CONTINUING EDUC.
17, 22 (1994); James E. Moliterno, Legal Education, Experiential Education, and
Professional Responsibility, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 71, 78 (1996) (emphasizing that
“[l]earning is not education, and experiential learning differs from experiential education.
Learning happens with or without teachers and institutions”).
41.
STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 36, at 121, 123.
42.
Id. at 121.
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Under these terms, what law schools are attempting to attain is experiential
education that leads to experiential learning.43
Historically, law schools have been teaching by experience through
clinics, externships, or course simulations, although only a minority of law
students are typically afforded the chance to do clinical work.44 At present,
the ABA does not mandate any specific experiential education or
experiential learning opportunity for member schools. The winds of change
have been blowing, however.45 For example, at its 2011 Annual Meeting,
the ABA House of Delegates adopted a resolution “urg[ing] legal education
providers to implement curricular programs intended to develop practiceready lawyers.”46 More concretely, the ABA Standards Review Committee
recently voted to put forth a proposal for a mandatory six-unit practical skills
requirement for all graduates of accredited law schools.47 If implemented,
this would be a mandatory requirement, whereas now the standards say that
law schools must provide “substantial opportunities for live-client or other
real-life practice experiences,”48 and that students should receive “substantial
instruction in . . . other professional skills generally regarded as necessary for
effective and responsible participation in the legal profession.”49

43.
See id. at 122. Although some law school professors would limit
experiential education to real-life experiences, Best Practices include simulation courses, as
well as in-house clinics and externships. Id. Recently, Susan Brooks has included simulationbased courses in her definition of experiential education. Susan L. Brooks, Meeting the
Professional Identity Challenge in Legal Education Through a Relationship-Centered
Experiential Curriculum, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 395, 403 (2012).
44.
See Katz, supra note 21, at 829.
45.
See AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION 10B 1 (Aug. 8–9, 2011).
46.
Id.
47.
Memorandum from Solomon Oliver, Jr., Council Chairperson, Am. Bar
Ass’n, Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, & Barry A. Currier, Managing Dir. of
Accreditation & Legal Educ., Am. Bar Ass’n, Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the
Bar to Interested Persons & Entities (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_res
olutions/201312_notice_comment_stds_205_207_303a3_603a_c.authcheckdam.pdf;
Karen
Sloan, ABA Reconsiders Practical Skills Mandate for Law Schools, NAT’L L.J., (Dec. 09,
2013, 3:49 PM) http://www.ctlawtribune.com/id=1202631585383/ABA-ReconsidersPractical-Skills-Mandate-for-Law-Schools.
48.
SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N,
ABA STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 22 (2013)
[hereinafter ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS],
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/
Standards/2013_2014_final_aba_standards_and_rules_of_procedure_for_approval_of_law_
schools_body.authcheckdam.pdf (noting in interpretation 302-5 that these can be clinics or
field placements).
49.
Id. at 21.
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The ABA does not define experiential, but states:
To qualify as experiential, a course must be primarily
experiential in nature and:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

integrate doctrine, theory, skills and legal ethics, and
engage students in performance of one or more
professional skills identified in Standard 302;
develop the concepts underlying the professional skills
being taught;
provide multiple opportunities for performance; and
provide opportunities for self-evaluation.50

Although the ABA’s attempt to require more experiential learning for law
students is a step in the right direction, the California State Bar Task Force
has adopted a model that would require “all new Bar admittees [to]
demonstrate . . . at least [fifteen hours] of practice based, experiential
coursework.”51 This figure is also the minimum recommendation endorsed
by the CLEA.52 More recently, the ABA has revisited the six unit proposal
and has invited comment on whether the ABA should make fifteen hours of
experiential learning a requirement for all graduates of accredited law
schools. 53 The Society of American Law Teachers has been among the
voices in support of the proposal.54

50.
Draft for November Meeting, Am. Bar Ass’n, Section of Legal Educ. &
Admission to the Bar, Standards Review Comm. (Nov. 16–17, 2012), http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/legal_education/committees/
standards_review_documents/July2012/2012_nov_src_meeting_materials.authcheckdam.pdf.
51.
TASK FORCE ON ADMISSIONS REGULATION REFORM, STATE BAR OF CAL.,
PHASE I FINAL REPORT 10 (2013), available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/
bog/bot_ExecDir/STATE_BAR_TASK_FORCE_REPORT_(FINAL_AS_
APPROVED_6_11_13)_062413.pdf.
52.
Michele Pistone, CLEA Calls on ABA to Require 15 Credits of
Experiential Learning, BEST PRAC. FOR LEGAL EDUC. (July 1, 2013), http://
bestpracticeslegaled.albanylawblogs.org/2013/07/01/clea-calls-on-aba-to-require-15-creditsof-experiential-learning/.
53.
Karen Sloan, ABA Reconsiders Practical Skills Mandate for Law Schools,
NAT’L L.J. (Dec. 09, 2013, 3:49 PM), http://www.ctlawtribune.com/id=1202631585383/ABAReconsiders-Practical-Skills-Mandate-for-Law-Schools.
54.
Letter from Jackie Gardina, Co-President, Soc’y of Am. Law Teachers &
Ngai Pindell, Co-President, Soc’y of Am. Law Teachers, to Dean Jeffrey E. Lewis, Chair,
Am. Bar Ass’n Standards Review Comm. (Apr. 13, 2012), available at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/legal_education/committees/stan
dards_review_documents/20120416_comment_outcome_measures_salt.authcheckdam.pdf.
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While the actions of the ABA convey a sense of urgency, the call to
make law students more practice ready is not new.55 Publications like Best
Practices for Legal Education: A Vision and a Roadmap, 56 Educating
Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law (“Carnegie Report”) in
2007,57 and Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession:
Narrowing the Gap in 1992 58 have inspired subsequent revisions of
Curriculum Standards 302 (b)(1) and 305 of the ABA Standards and Rules of
Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 59 —all of which stress the
importance of applied legal training in the modern law school curriculum.
One of the most prominent voices among these is the Carnegie
Report and its advocacy of apprenticeships in legal education—particularly,
third apprenticeships, which allow for “knowledge, skills, and the socialethical dimensions of lawyering [to] come together [and] help students
bridge the gap from law school to practice.”60 The report’s recommendations
have been recently criticized for teaching students “what experts are doing
[rather than] what they are thinking as they deal with a lawyering
problem.”61
Despite such criticism, the report is correct to note that few students
are afforded the chance to mimic lawyers by doing what experts do, let alone
to delve into conceptual competences. Instead, law schools have strongly
55.
See Keith A. Findley, Rediscovering the Lawyer School: Curriculum
Reform in Wisconsin, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 295, 305–07 (2006).
56.
See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 36, at 123.
57.
WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF
LAW 8 (2007), available at http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/sites/default/files/publications/
elibrary_pdf_632.pdf.
58.
SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N,
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM:
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP
331 (1992), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/
legal_education/2013_legal_education_and_professional_development_maccrate_report).auth
checkdam.pdf.
59.
ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
SCHOOLS, supra note 48, at 21–22 (requiring that approved law schools “offer substantial
opportunities for . . . real-life practice experiences, appropriately supervised”).
60.
Laurie Morin & Susan Waysdorf, The Service-Learning Model in the Law
School Curriculum, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 561, 562 (2011–2012); SULLIVAN ET AL., supra
note 57, at 8.
61.
Stefan H. Krieger & Serge A. Martinez, Performance Isn’t Everything:
The Importance of Conceptual Competence in Outcome Assessment of Experiential Learning,
19 CLINICAL L. REV. 251, 251, 256 (2012) (admonishing that the ABA or a law school
following the lead of the Carnegie Report “will unreflectively define ‘competency of an entrylevel practitioner’ primarily in terms of the ability to perform certain lawyering tasks rather
than the capacity to reason in practice”).
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emphasized legal reasoning, black letter law, and standardized testing, with
some schools adhering to mandatory course schedules that leave students
little opportunity for the sort of courses that would provide personal
interaction with lawyers or other legal professionals.62
How a non-client model became the dominant model of legal
education is a curious development. 63 One researcher suggests that law
schools followed flawed assumptions about learning. 64 For example, one
was to understand learning as primarily theoretical rather than contextual,
and more precisely, that cognitive attainment was synonymous with the
“ability to assimilate abstract knowledge and . . . apply that knowledge.”65
Research shows, however, that human cognition is situational more than
abstract; “[h]umans do not confront a particular place and time, a local field
of action, with a predetermined set of responses.”66 “Instead, the primary
resources humans bring to bear are exemplars of past practice—memories of
comparable dilemmas . . . [which] are typically derived from practice [and]
only secondarily [derived] from classroom investigations . . . .”67
Another errant assumption was “that learning should be controlled
and relatively selfless or disinterested rather than self-directed, identityfocused, and self-actualizing.”68 From this perspective, students held little
agency and autonomy.69 Related was the assumption that legal education
was primarily a solitary rather than a social endeavor.70 Under this premise,
students were expected to “read, research, and write largely on their own,”
producing a solitary model that made the student dependent on what was in
one’s own head.71
Experiential education represents the antithesis to these
misunderstandings about education. The approach provides students the
opportunity to practice as they learn, and practice what they learn. The
apprenticeship-like experiences of experiential learning have been likened to
“a cornerstone for effective learning” 72 that contributes to a process of
acculturating students to legal practice by interaction with clients, attorneys,
and judges, which provides tools necessary to succeed in the legal
62.
See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 57, at 5–6.
63.
For a historical perspective, see A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School
Critique in Historical Perspective, 69 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1949, 1949 (2012).
64.
Baker, supra note 37, at 621.
65.
Id. at 621–22.
66.
Id. at 622.
67.
Id.
68.
Id. at 621.
69.
See Baker, supra note 37, at 621.
70.
Id.
71.
Id. at 624.
72.
Id. at 620.
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profession. 73 Learning in practice encourages students to enter a
participatory and cognitive apprenticeship with senior practitioners where
they can collaborate to resolve authentic dilemmas while conceptualizing the
workplace as an organic place of learning.74
Experiential education is thus the means to practice-based
competence, by which students develop “[r]elational skills, situation skills,
[and] gap-closing skills.” 75 The skills are learned best through repeated
collaborative experiences—through increasing social practice, or as one
commentator put it, “[q]uite simply, if learning is about increased access to
performance, then the way to maximize learning is to perform, not to talk
about it,” but to do it.76 “[P]edagogy that empowers . . . students to develop
genuine understandings must [thus] be primarily contextual rather than
didactic and prescriptive.”77 “[L]earning in the workplace also permits the
development of relational skills and situation assessment skills that thereafter
permit the adaptation, transfer, and deployment of performance
competencies to new and unfamiliar tasks.” 78 The end result of repeat
experience in the field of practice is a full repertoire of collaborative skills
that are impossible to achieve in the classroom alone.
From the student’s perspective, perhaps the most significant aspect
of experiential learning is the opportunity for reflection. The ability to look
to the past as a means of making a better decision in the present is the
pathway for students to become self-learners. It is also a chance to reflect on
the force of law, as well as one’s duty to the legal profession, and more
importantly, to society at large, all of which are detailed in the following
section.
II.

UNDERSTANDING THE SHIFT WITHIN A CRITICAL FRAMEWORK

The growing emphasis on practical skills in law schools may be
properly understood as a critique of a teaching model that has dominated law
schools for the last century.79 Critical pedagogy is a power-full analytic for
73.
Id. at 629 n.27.
74.
See John Seely Brown et al., Situated Cognition and the Culture of
Learning, EDUC. RESEARCHER, Jan.–Feb. 1989, at 32, 37.
75.
Baker, supra note 37, at 627.
76.
William F. Hanks, Foreword to JEAN LAVE & ETIENNE WENGER,
SITUATED LEARNING: LEGITIMATE PERIPHERAL PARTICIPATION 13, 22 (1991).
77.
Baker, supra note 37, at 628.
78.
Id. at 626.
79.
Erickson, supra note 15, at 110 (arguing “that the push for experiential
education in law schools is really a push for better teaching”); Moliterno, supra note 40, at 94
(describing how the basic model of legal education has not changed since the time of
Christopher Columbus Langdell, “except for a modest and separatist move toward the
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assessing this revolution in legal education. As an interpretive lens, it
reveals experiential education as a boon not for the legal profession alone,
but also for the soon-to-be-lawyer; it provides insight to the practical and
professional outcomes associated with experience-based learning, including
those that bear directly on students. The reformation thus represents not only
more opportunity for students to gain hands on or on the job experience, but
an opportunity for teachers to create a more meaningful experience for
students.
A.

Theoretical Overview

A central tenet of the critical theory of legal education has been to
focus on power relations within law schools. The dominant theme of
theorists, however, has been largely evaluative, as one scholar notes:
[T]he exercise of power was a bad thing. It was understood as a
possession that was held by some—primarily the legal
profession—and exercised over others—namely law students—in
order to achieve the ends of those wielding it. The exercise of
power was positioned as negative and repressive, as stifling or
denying the real interests of law students and leading to
ideological indoctrination. It was implied that good could only
come from . . . total removal of power relations. . . . [P]ower was
assumed to operate upon an inert and passive material, with
ideologies being deposited into the empty receptacle that is the
student, and teaching and assessment practices working to
determine the shape of the legal graduate.80

Of course removing all power relations from education rings impossible, so
rather than try to eliminate power, the idea has been to try to recalibrate the
balance of power. 81 Critical pedagogy provides a theoretical basis for
achieving a better balance by its commitment to a dialectical understanding
of the student and teacher relationship.82 Conceptually, this understanding
renders the identity of each party dependent upon the existence of the other;
that is, the teacher cannot exist without the student, and vice-versa.83 This

experiential model resulting from the clinical education movement. All of the changes in
legal education, aside from the clinical education movement, have been about what is taught,
not how it is taught. The mainstream of legal education remains almost as alien from the
apprentice system as at the time of Langdell’s revolution . . . .”).
80.
Ball, supra note 12, at 159–60 (emphasis in original).
81.
See id. at 161–62, 166.
82.
See id. at 161.
83.
See id.

Published by NSUWorks, 2014

99

Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1

2014]

EXPERIENTIAL EDUCATION AS CRITICAL PEDAGOGY

261

base proposition situates the student and teacher on equal conceptual terrain
and proclaims their interdependence.84
Experiential education may be properly viewed as a species of
critical pedagogy, particularly in its advocacy of the apprenticeship model—
the “apprenticeship of identity and purpose”85—which “introduces students
to the purposes and attitudes that are guided by the values for which the
professional community is responsible.”86
As such, experiential education in law school provides students
unique opportunities to immerse themselves within the trenches of the
profession, alongside other professionals, thereby encouraging students to
form professional relationships. “In forming professional relationships, the
student is provided with multiple experiences from the other members of the
[legal] system . . . .”87 Students who participate in experiential education
programming enter a learning system that has a multitude of subsystem
relationships: student-attorney, student-support staff, student-investigator,
student-student, student-court clerk, student-judge and student-client.88 The
student is then empowered through “learning [that] occurs when the student
utilizes interpersonal skills to achieve a desired outcome, while [developing
and] maintaining a differentiated professional identity.” 89 The learning
continues on several different levels, horizontally and vertically. “[F]or
instance, [externships] provide students with the opportunity to develop
relationships with judges, clerks, opposing counsel, support staff,
investigators, social workers, supervising attorneys, fellow students and most
importantly, clients and their support systems.” 90 If the learning system
environment is properly designed with sufficient interaction, this cycle of
student learning will continue to advance the student toward higher levels of
individual complexity.91
“Students learn how to develop and change by interacting with their
environment while learning the importance of maintaining a personal style
and philosophy that brings value and power to their interactions with

84.
See id. at 161–62.
85.
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 57, at 8, 28 (proposing that professional
schools must expose students to three apprenticeships to prepare them for professional
practice: The first apprenticeship (cognitive) focuses on knowledge and ways of thinking; the
second apprenticeship is to the shared forms of expert practice through experience; and the
third apprenticeship of identity and purpose).
86.
Id. at 28.
87.
Brayer, supra note 34, at 55.
88.
Id.
89.
Id. at 56.
90.
Id. at 55.
91.
Id. at 57.
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others.”92 When students are able to learn from the legal system directly to
maximize both institutional and individual practice goals, “they achieve
equilibrium with the new social learning system.” 93 When students reach
this state, they become “better prepared to learn and grow in future work
environments.”94
Another critical aspect of experiential education is its emphasis on
reflective learning. Reflective learning is founded on the premise that
intelligent individuals continually attempt to restructure their
environment to maximize individual purposes and goals [and
ultimately,] “the maintenance and enhancement of one’s self.”
The individual accomplishes this task by way of experiential
experimentation, attempting various courses of action, and
adopting the one that proves the most effective. A person’s
understanding grows when this form of experimentation is used to
learn from experience.95

In order to engage law students and provide opportunities for them to
become what the market is now demanding—more practice ready law
school graduates—some schools have chosen to use more formal models
such as the service learning model or the systems theory model to implement
experiential learning. 96 Externship programs, pro bono programs, and
clinical programs are common in law schools, and they correspond with both
service-learning and systems theory models of education.
“Service-learning is a [domain] of experiential [education in
which] students and faculty collaborate with communities to
address problems and issues, simultaneously gaining knowledge
and skills and advancing personal development. . . .” [A] critical
aspect of the [service-learning] experience, in order to differentiate
it from other volunteer activities, is making certain there is a
means for critical reflection by students. [It has been stated that]
in any discussion of service-learning “it is particularly important to
distinguish between two levels of learning . . .—learning to give
service and learning how to learn . . . from the giving of service. . .
. .” [S]ervice-learning is beneficial to students because . . . it
92.
Brayer, supra note 34, at 58–59.
93.
Id. at 55.
94.
Id.
95.
Id. at 59.
96.
This term practice ready was criticized by Dean Gilbert Holmes—during
a work in progress session of the Mid-Atlantic People of Color Legal Scholarship—as
somewhat impossible to achieve, and that instead, law schools should be teaching students
how to become a proficient practitioner. Gilbert Holmes, Dean, Univ. La Verne, Training the
Lawyer in the 21st century (Jan. 24, 2013).
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“increases [cognitive] retention; . . . increases the relevancy of
education to students [by involving them in real world situations]; .
. . enhances personalized education for students; teaches positive
values, leadership, citizenship and personal responsibility;
empowers students as learners, teachers, achievers, and leaders;
[and] invites students to become members of their own
community; [and] teaches job skills.”97

Distinct from service learning, a systems theory model is a clinical
refram[ing] [of] professional experience as an interaction with a
professional environment. . . . [The] theory operates on the
premise that students should reframe how they look at their
[environment] so that the challenges that make up their
professional system are not seen as problems but as means to a
solution. Reframing by the student is realized in a clinical system
as educators maximize professional interactions and teach from
emerging interactive patterns.98

This reframing necessarily guides students in the “creation of a professional
learning environment that enhances the practice of reflective learning,
teaching, and thinking.”99 Under this system, learning “from experience is
impossible if numerous, complex, and diverse interactions do not exist.”100
B.

Critical Shifts at a Historically Black University

The critical underpinnings of experiential education are easy to
outline, but determining how to create such learning environments on the
ground is a greater challenge. The experiential learning program at
Thurgood Marshall School of Law (“TMSL”) is a model that is striving for a
synthesis of these complex and diverse interactions. However, as a
historically black university (“HBCU”), the institution faces unique
challenges in incorporating its rendition of the Carnegie approach to legal
education.
The mission of TMSL is to prepare a diverse group of students for
leadership roles in the legal profession, business, and government. In
97.
Katryna Johnson, Creating Experiential Learning in the Graduate
Classroom Through Community Engagement, 6 AM. J. BUS. EDUC. 149, 149 (2013)
(discussing how business school educators can create “[e]xperiential learning opportunities
through client-based projects”); Mary Pat Treuthart, Weaving a Tapestry: Providing Context
Through Service-Learning, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 215, 220–21 (2002) (last alteration in original).
98.
Brayer, supra note 34, at 50.
99.
Id. at 59.
100.
Id. at 52.
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keeping with its rich tradition as an HBCU, TMSL is recognized as one of
the most diverse Law Schools in the country.101 Guided by this mission, the
experiential learning program’s focus is to create a vibrant learning
environment grounded in a legal educational program that immerses each
student in multi-level learning opportunities. This experiential education is
designed by forging stronger connections among the cognitive, practical and
professional identity aspects of becoming a lawyer. This model engages
legal education from the perspective of the student; and thus, the program is
oriented around student-centered teaching and seeks to increase student
opportunity to learn-by-doing; learn-by-experiencing; learn-by-observing;
learn-by-evaluating, assessing, and incorporating these experiences; learnby-self transformation; and learn-by-developing a professional identity.
A host of animating questions guide the model of experiential
education at TMSL: What do students value in legal education? How best
do students believe they should be trained and about what do they feel they
should be trained? What do students expect to receive from their legal
education? What transformation do law students expect to experience in law
school as a direct result of their legal education and how does this
transformation translate to being better practitioners? How do students
measure the worth and value of their legal education?
These questions are foundational for creating and incorporating the
experiential program. The program takes a holistic approach to the process
of experiential education, which involves a number of distinct, yet
interrelated programs: Lawyer Processing; Appellate Litigation-Bridge to
Practice Skills Program; Trial Simulation; Classroom Simulations; Liveclient Clinical Programs; Externship Programs; Client Counseling Programs;
Mediation Certification Courses; Mock Trial; Moot Court; and a Texas
Legislative Internship Program.
Lawyer Processing (“LP”) is a two-semester course and is required
of all first-year students. 102 LP is the first-year students’ foundational
clinical course and focuses on practice-oriented legal analysis and writing.103
LP introduces students to fundamentals of legal reasoning, basic forms of
legal writing, including objective memoranda of law, client opinion letters
and trial court motion practice briefs, and the basic sources and processes of
legal research.104 These skills are taught using the clinical method, with the
client’s perspective firmly in mind and with the students learning by acting
101.
Mission and History, TEX. S. U., http://www.tsulaw.edu/history.html (last
visited Aug. 22, 2014).
102.
Thurgood Marshall School of Law, American Bar Association Report,
Lawyering Process Program Description and Assessment (last updated January 2011).
103.
Id.
104.
Id.
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as lawyers. 105 The LP professors have voluntarily adopted a uniform
syllabus with agreed to student learning outcomes that are assessed at the end
of each semester.106
The Appellate Litigation-Bridge to Practice Program is a onesemester course that is required for all 2L students. The Appellate Litigation
professors with the assistance of the Director of Assessments have
collectively identified minimum Student Learning Outcomes that all students
should achieve while enrolled in Appellate Litigation. Students are required
in each section of the class, taught by different professors, to attend a
minimum number of live appellate court oral arguments, conduct legal
research and write an appellate brief based on an adopted case book or based
on an actual case that was pending before an appellate tribunal, and present
an oral argument, based on the written brief, before a panel of practicing
attorneys or sitting judges. At least one section videotapes the student’s oral
argument presentations for later individual evaluation and critique. By
requiring the students to read like lawyers, research as lawyers, observe
practicing attorneys and sitting judges, write as lawyers, present oral
arguments as lawyers and accept critique as lawyers receive, the model aims
to utilize multi-level learning and equip students with resources needed to
develop and refine their professional identities. The model also prepares
students to participate in internal and external Moot Court competitions,
giving students enhanced opportunities to develop their legal writing and oral
advocacy skills.
Trial Simulation at TMSL is a one-semester course that is required
of all 3L students. Students are immersed in a courtroom setting as a means
of learning strategies for courtroom litigation under the instruction of leading
jurists and lawyers. Utilizing a “learn by doing” approach, students in the
Trial Simulation program practice direct and cross examinations of
witnesses, learn how to make memorable opening statements, craft powerful
closing arguments, as well as interview and prepare witnesses. The course
concludes with students conducting a full trial before a presiding judicial
officer.
Classroom Simulations are another way that students encounter
experiential learning at TMSL. Through classroom simulations, professors
incorporate opportunities for students to acquire doctrinal knowledge
through traditional and non-traditional modalities, alike.107 For instance, one

105.
Id.
106.
Interview with Casandra Hill, Director of Lawyer Processing at Thurgood
Marshall School of Law.
107.
For further ideas on how to incorporate experiential education in doctrinal
courses, see Margaret B. Kwoka, Intersecting Experiential Education and Social Justice
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Evidence course requires students to draft trial pleadings based on fact
patterns, statutes, and other materials distributed and studied over the course
of the semester.108 In addition to the drafting of pleadings, students in the
course are given the opportunity to observe evidentiary hearings and are
given directed, reflective journal writing assignments that examine, analyze,
and evaluate the adherence to or the violation of evidentiary practices. In
addition, one of the Property courses has adopted a “Bridge to Practice”
course book that contains simulations covering varying issues, which allows
and encourages students to take on the role of attorney, oral advocate, or
legal writer. These simulations encourage students to take information from
a case book and a rule book, analyze it, evaluate it, and then apply it to a
given context that has meaning in the benefit of a client. In another course,
Criminal Procedure, students are similarly required to draft trial pleadings
and are given the opportunity to present mock trial arguments in support of
the drafted motions to a panel of professors serving as the presiding bench.
For TMSL and other schools committed to serving the community, a
learning experience that also offers service to disenfranchised and
underserved communities is paramount to the law school’s existence. The
school’s live-client clinical program is designed to give students an
opportunity to serve the community in the role of attorney, putting into
practice what they have learned in their substantial courses, while developing
their professional identity. As attorneys, students are supervised by licensed
attorneys who direct the individual legal clinics. Students are responsible for
every aspect of an attorney-client relationship, including client interviewing,
file maintenance, maintaining client confidentiality, trial preparation, and
direct client representation. Students have the opportunity to put into
practice what they have learned from their doctrinal classes and the
opportunity to see how the application of the law affects clients. Students
are able to work in several legal environments where they learn vertically
from their clients, their supervising attorneys, managing attorneys, and
judges, and where they learn horizontally from their fellow student attorneys,
new associates, paralegal professionals, and other support faculty. In the
process of serving clients, students have the opportunity to find and hear
their voice as an advocate for others, as well as uphold justice on behalf of
their clients. They experience study as a legal professional and develop their
professional identity in accepting the call to represent another human being
in the pursuit of justice. Live-client clinics give students the opportunity to
Teaching, 6 NORTHEASTERN U. L.J. 111, 115 (2013) (describing ways that doctrinal professors
“can incorporate experiential components into the curriculum”).
108.
Pedro A. Malavet, Evidence: Law 6330, U. FLORIDA (2013), http://
nersp.osg.ufl.edu/~malavet/evidence/evmain.htm. Some courses, such as Professor Pedro
Malavet’s Evidence course, have been incorporating such assignments for years. See id.
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learn through directed service and gives them the chance to become agents of
positive change while directing the transformation that they—as students—
expect from their legal education.
The Externship Program is designed to give students an opportunity
for immersion into a legal environment outside the law school setting with
simultaneous study in the classroom. 109 The program is a bifurcated
experience that requires students to participate in the off-campus practicum
and in the classroom. The structure of the off-campus practicum is such that
the supervising attorney at the placement is the primary contact for the
student, similar to that of a new associate answering to a junior or senior
partner. Student work schedules are submitted by the student and approved
by the supervising attorney. Students engage in basic professional practices
and are responsible for documenting their time, calendaring, and for
completing their assignments timely. They must also maintain professional
decorum in the legal office and in the courtroom, and communicate
effectively with their superiors, colleagues, and clients. Students are
evaluated by their placement supervisor that holds them accountable for
matters involving legal advocacy, professionalism, ethical responsibility, and
client and office management. The classroom component of the externship
program is designed as a reflective group class, whose goal is two-fold: 1) to
meet the identified student learning outcomes and the educational mission of
the law school and 2) to develop an environment for reflective personal and
professional growth. The classroom component seeks to enhance legal
writing skills by requiring reflective journals, as well as improve legal
analysis by engaging students in thoughtful and critical guided reflection
about live legal scenarios occurring in their placements.
The Client Counseling program is an example of how TMSL has
identified a necessary skill set and provided it with a platform to be explored
with greater focus and clarity. This program takes the form of a competition
team, conceived and developed as a legal teaching technique, intended to
promote greater knowledge and interest among law students in the
preventive law and counseling functions of practice. It also encourages
students to develop interviewing, planning, and analytical skills in the
lawyer-client relationship in the law office.
Recognizing that resolution of legal matters is the reason clients seek
legal representation, TMSL offers a mediation certificate that allows students
109.
Various outside offices include the offices of District Attorneys, County
Attorneys, City Attorneys, the Attorney General, the United States Department of the
Treasury, non-profit organizations, such as Legal Aid organizations, immigrant rights
organizations, public policy organizations, and legislative organizations, Federal Courts, State
Courts, Appellate Courts, the United States Attorney’s office, and other governmental, nonprofit, and judicial offices.
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to serve as bona fide mediators in actual, live legal disputes. As TMSL is
committed to providing budding attorneys the skill of resolution, this
certification is a requirement for enrollment in the mediation live-client
clinic. This mediation training, coupled with the experience that students
receive in the live-client mediation clinic, allows them to graduate well-able
to enter the legal community credentialed and experienced in the area of
legal dispute resolution.
The aim of the TMSL Mock Trial Advocacy Program is to create
competent trial lawyers. Student knowledge of substantive law is integrated
in an intensive course study of trial skills that prepares students for national
competition. The program provides all students an opportunity to experience
the vigor of trial preparation in a controlled classroom environment, coupled
with the opportunity to compete against top ranked law schools in a state and
national arena. The classroom component of the program surpasses the skills
taught in Trial Simulation and introduces the students to advanced learning
in the art of questioning technique, evidence, jury profiling and selection,
theory, and platform skills.
The Moot Court program is designed to be a comprehensive
experience, with a goal of giving each participant opportunity to handle an
appellate case from beginning to end. Under the guidance of faculty and
subject matter experts from the legal community, students are trained for the
challenge of competing in intramural, intermural and national moot court
competitions while learning legal professionalism. This opportunity to take
doctrinal knowledge and use that knowledge in the context of advocating for
a client enhances the educational experiences of each student. Through this
program, students participate in multi-level learning that encourages them to
excel in the art of persuasive oral advocacy while solidifying their legal
research and writing skills.
The Texas Legislative Internship Program (“TLIP”) is an
educational internship program sponsored by Senator Rodney Ellis and
administered by Texas Southern University.110 TLIP provides opportunities
for graduate students to serve as interns in the Texas Legislature, in various
state agencies, and in local government. 111 A TLIP internship lasts one
academic semester and affords students the experience public service. 112
During legislative sessions, TLIP interns are placed as legislative assistants
in the offices of ranking members of the Legislature, including the offices of
the Governor, Lieutenant Governor and the Chief Justice of the Supreme
110.
Texas Legislative Internship Program, SENATE TEX., http://
www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/senate/members/dist13/tlip/about.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2014).
111.
Id.
112.
Id.
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Court. 113 The experience offered to students often initiates or focuses a
career in public service, with several TLIP participants having continued in
public service at the federal, state and local levels of government.114
Although the vision of experiential education at TMSL is easy to
outline, life on the ground is a work-in-progress, and there is still a lot of
work ahead. Implementation of experiential learning at TMSL, perhaps like
other HBCUs, comes with high trade-off costs. For example, bar passage
has been a perpetual nemesis of the school. Yet in the most recent Texas Bar
Examination, nearly eighty percent of the school’s students passed on the
first attempt, which is among the school’s highest scores ever.115 Part of the
success in passage may be the product of a concerted effort at creating a
curricular regime based on bar subjects, enhancing academic support, and
developing assessment tools. The mandatory course regime alone leaves
students little say for the first two years in the name of concentrating on bar
subjects and bar-style multiple choice and essay questions. Needless to say,
greater emphasis on skills training sits in tension with the need to teach
students how to pass the bar; time and resources spent on practice training
leaves less time for practicing the exam.
The program plans to continue researching and developing ways to
maintain its bar passage rate at the same time it graduates law students with
skills to compete in the legal market. It will continue exploring ways to
incorporate student-centered teaching, with identified student learning
outcomes, in all aspects of the law school curriculum, as well as explore how
greater cultural competency training can be implemented in professionalism
training. 116 One of the tangible goals of the program is to create
opportunities for every student to take at least thirty credits of recognized,
upper level experiential learning courses that would include non-traditional
business association and appellate litigation courses, traditional clinical
offerings, trial advocacy and externship courses, and newly designed probono externship opportunities. Additional aspirations include developing
affiliations with associations, such as the Alliance for Experiential Learning

113.
Id.
114.
Id.
115.
See TSU’s Thurgood Marshall School of Law Improves Performance on
Texas Bar Examination, TSU E-NEWS NOW (Tex. S. Univ.), Nov. 11–17, 2013, at 1, 1–2,
http://www.tsu.edu/About/Administration/University_Advancement/Communications/
Publications/enews/TSU%20E-News%20NOW%20Nov%2011-17%202013a.pdf.
116.
E.g., Brooks, supra note 43, at 408 (“Effective interactions with clients
and other individuals encountered in our daily work require attention to four key dimensions
to build positive professional relationships: (1) culture, (2) empowerment . . . .”).
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in the Law, 117 and establishing new affiliations with other experiential
alliances such as Educating Tomorrow’s Lawyers.118
III.

UNINTENDED OUTCOMES: STUDENT SATISFACTION

As described above, the call for more experiential education
conceives of skills development largely in terms of the benefits to the
profession, however there is more to experiential education than the
competencies and skills students acquire. Indeed, the shift to a more skillsbased approach promises more than simply greater practical and professional
development for law students. There are collateral benefits that impact the
students personally as well. This section considers how pedagogy can
catalyze student transformation and lead to greater personal satisfaction.119
This account of experiential education sets the stage for this article’s finale,
which stresses critical pedagogy as essential to the praxis of exploiting
experiential education and maximizing the benefits for students.

117.
Alliance for Experiential Learning in Law, NORTHEASTERN U. SCH. LAW,
http://www.northeastern.edu/law/experience/leadership/alliance.html (last visited Mar. 16,
2014).
The Alliance for Experiential Learning in Law was convened by
Northeastern University School of Law in 2011 when a small group of legal
educators met to discuss how best to improve legal education in response to
significant disruptions in the profession and changes in our society. The Alliance
has grown to include legal educators and practitioners affiliated with almost [one
hundred] law schools and legal service organizations who have joined together to
develop a new approach to legal education and promote transformative approaches
and programs for curriculum reform. The Alliance’s ultimate goal is to ensure that
law graduates are ready to practice with a full complement of skills and ethical and
social values necessary to serve clients and the public interest, now and in the
future.

Id.
118.
Inst. for the Advancement of the Am. Legal Sys., Univ. of Fla., About
ETL, EDUCATING TOMORROW’S LAW., http://educatingtomorrowslawyers.du.edu/about-etl/
(last visited Mar. 16, 2014).
[Educating Tomorrow’s Lawyers] is an initiative of IAALS, the Institute
for the Advancement of the American Legal System. We work to align legal
education with the needs of an evolving profession by facilitating, evaluating, and
promoting law teaching methods designed to produce graduates who are
employable and practice-ready; able to meet the needs of their employers, their
clients, and society; and prepared to lead and respond to changes in the legal
profession throughout their careers.

Id.
119.
E.g., Carolyn Grose, Beyond Skills Training, Revisited: The Clinical
Education Spiral, 19 CLINICAL L. REV. 489, 510–11 (2013) (describing reflections made by
students in an Estates and Trusts course, including one student who writes, “‘[c]lient work is
rewarding because it matters—helping people who depend on us’”).
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Greater Autonomy and Agency

Experiential learning promises greater autonomy and agency for
students, both of which are largely suppressed in dominant models of legal
education. As used here, autonomy and agency are not synonymous; they
indicate different capacities. Whereas autonomy indicates the ability to
choose or decide a course of action, agency refers to the ability to act.
Experiential education contributes to both.
Students have greater autonomy in multiple ways. Most basically,
experiential opportunities in the curriculum allow for more diverse course
options for students. The options increase when schools mandate fewer core
courses to afford space for mandatory experiential courses. Simultaneously,
students have more variety as to how they will be evaluated, which
ultimately affects a student’s transcript and grade point average. Although
the traditional model constricts student learning to perform and be evaluated
in a singular analytical dimension, experiential learning opens up a world of
assessment focused on various skills, including the competence to produce
legal products, interact with clients, or effectively manage a law practice.
The ability to choose more experiential programming also enhances
autonomy by allowing students to work in clinics and other settings and
represent clients. For some, the experience is the pathway to the sort of
justice-oriented work that drove some to law school in the first place.120 As
one commentator noted some decades ago, clinical education furthers
professional responsibility because students are implicated in real decisionmaking.121
Students wield greater agency through enhanced experiential
curricula and acquire skills that are not possible through classroom
instruction. Although students indeed practice writing briefs, memos, and
motions, doing so on behalf of a real-life client takes on a different meaning

120.
See Sarah Valentine, Leveraging Legal Research, in VULNERABLE
POPULATIONS AND TRANSFORMATIVE LAW TEACHING: A CRITICAL READER 145 (Soc’y of Am.
Law Teachers & Golden Gate Univ. Sch. of Law eds., 2011) (describing that despite the
observation that many “law students . . . cite working with underserved communities as a goal,
less than three percent of . . . graduates [actually] pursue public interest work”); William P.
Quigley, Letter to a Law Student Interested in Social Justice, 1 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 7, 9
(2007); Tan N. Nguyen, An Affair to Forget: Law School’s Deleterious Effect on Student’s
Public Interest Aspirations, CONN. PUB. INT. L.J., Spring 2008, at 95, 95.
121.
GARY BELLOW, ON TEACHING THE TEACHERS: SOME PRELIMINARY
REFLECTIONS ON CLINICAL EDUCATION AS METHODOLOGY IN CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE
LAW STUDENT 391 (1973).
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for students.122 It is a shift from focusing on one’s grade to focusing on the
needs of the client, which has real-life consequences beyond the student.
Accordingly as one clinician has noted,
[s]cholars and teachers and our own human instinct tell us
that responsibility for another human being, coupled with
appropriate supervision and the opportunity for reflection lead to a
deeper and richer educational experience. Students make choices
more intentionally and thoughtfully because something other than
their personal academic success is at stake. They are motivated to
learn more thoroughly because whether they get the answer right
matters beyond a particular test or grade.
One of the reasons that client-centered clinical
representation works is that students are more motivated to learn
by being given responsibility over a case, and that this
responsibility in turn leads to greater identification with clients and
others who are similarly situated.123

Under this type of learning model, students get a sense of both their power to
influence the world and their ethical responsibilities to the profession.
Moreover, students get the chance to cultivate compassion and judgment.
B.

Greater Justice

Time spent in experiential settings provides students opportunity to
confront justice issues face-to-face, while enabling students to help others
access justice.124 It provides opportunity for instruction in the “MacCrate
Report’s . . . core professional value of ‘[f]airness, [j]ustice, and
[m]orality.’”125 In addition to learning about and helping to fill the justice
gap, experiential learning leads to more just academic outcomes for students.
Both in terms of teaching and evaluation, enhancement of experiential
education helps to level the academic terrain, and give practical and
professional competencies a more prominent place in the law school
repertoire.

122.
See, e.g., Grose, supra note 119, at 510 (noting one clinical student’s
teaching evaluation: “Real problems [sic] better than hypos; matters to me more to have an
answer—more personal, seeing their faces.”).
123.
Id. at 511.
124.
See Jon C. Dubin, Clinical Design for Social Justice Imperatives, 51 SMU
L. REV. 1461, 1462, 1475–77 (1998) (exploring “the social justice dimensions of clinical
design features in the deeply underserved communities”).
125.
Jane H. Aiken, Striving to Teach “Justice, Fairness, and Morality,” 4
CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 4 (1997); Dubin, supra note 124, at 1478.
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Filling the Justice Gap and Fulfilling Missions

Justice, however defined, “is about the exercise of power.”126 “In
order to promote justice, one must be explicit about how power operates,
particularly in its subtle and invisible manifestations.”127 Teaching students
about deconstructing power, identifying privilege, and taking “responsibility
for the ways in which the law confers dominance,” is a means of using
“power and privilege in socially productive ways.”128
Experiential education advances justice by supporting discrete types
of service learning as a means to apprenticeship.129 As an approach, service
learning integrates hands-on social action, volunteerism, and learning
objectives into an apprenticeship model that can be likened to clinical legal
education.130 It affords opportunities for students to serve communities in
experiential settings, allows students to fulfill their professional
responsibilities, 131 and, for some, their school’s stated mission. As one
Associate Dean for Experiential Education has put it, it is not enough to
teach students to be practice ready; educators must teach students how to be
justice ready.132 This is especially so for those students who come to law
school as an advocate of justice.133

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Aiken, supra note 125, at 10.
Id.
Id. at 11.
See Morin & Waysdorf, supra note 60, at 568–72.
Id. at 590.

A set of service-learning principles, first drafted in 1979 by educator Robert
Sigmon and generally accepted across the discipline, highlight three fundamental
principles that may or may not intersect with principles of clinical legal education.
The Sigmon principles are: “1. [t]hose being served control the service(s)
provided; 2. [t]hose being served become better able to serve and be served by their
own actions; and 3. [t]hose who serve also are learners and have significant control
over what is expected to be learned.”

Id. at 565 n.16.
131.
See Grose, supra note 119, at 495 (describing one of the broad goals of
traditional clinical pedagogy as “teach[ing], or at least expos[ing] students to, concepts of
social justice”).
132.
Jane H. Aiken, The Clinical Mission of Justice Readiness, 32 B.C. J. L. &
SOC. JUST. 231, 231 (2012); Our Faculty: Jane H. Aiken, GEORGETOWN L.,
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/aiken-jane-h.cfm (last visited Mar. 16, 2014). But see
Praveen Kosuri, Losing My Religion: The Place of Social Justice in Clinical Legal Education,
32 B.C. J. L. & SOC. JUST. 331, 331 (2012).
133.
See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Teaching the Tensions, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
739, 743 (2010) (“Justice is the reason why many of my students have come to law school.
But justice is not what the law provides.”).
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Service learning furthers student development by allowing
representation of clients who cannot afford legal representation, 134 which
“contribute[s] to the student’s development as a critically thinking, socially
responsible practitioner.”135 Through experience, students grapple with the
real world of need, where “less than one in ten of those involved in the
justice system have legal representation”136 and few legal problems of lowincome individuals are dealt with by legal professionals.137
As a general rule, law professors fail to integrate any sort of access
to justice commitment into the curriculum and law schools have ignored their
role in helping students appreciate that lawyers have unique social
obligations to the public. “The Society of American Law Teachers’
Committee on Access to Justice attributes this failure to law schools and
their curricula, . . . assert[ing] that schools fail to cultivate a service mentality
among law students, graduating few with any understanding of the crisis.”138
However, too often the justice element of the law is relegated to those few
who identify strongly with a public interest track.
Nonetheless, providing service to the community is also a means for
students to fulfill one’s professional responsibility. According to ABA
Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 6.1, a lawyer has a duty to
provide pro bono legal services for others with limited means, charities, and
the government, among others.139 Despite this noble aspiration of the bar,
Rule 6.1 stands as a minority rule among bar members, as indicated by “the
ABA Standing Committee on Pro Bono and Public Service, [which] reported
that only one-fourth of all respondents met the minimum

134.
See THE N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON NEW LAWYERS IN A
CHANGING PROFESSION, supra note 6, at 90.
135.
Grose, supra note 119, at 511; Stephen Wizner, Beyond Skills Training, 7
CLINICAL L. REV. 327, 328–30 (2001) (asserting that “[s]erving as an advocate on behalf of a
low-income client under good supervision can deepen the student’s understanding and
compassion, and cause her to affirm the common humanity she shares with her client and with
others in her client’s position”).
136.
SpearIt, Model Rule 6.1: A Lawyer’s Duty to Increase Access to Justice,
A.B.A. (Nov. 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/young_lawyer/2012-13/
november_2012_vol_17_no_2/model_rule_6_1.html [hereinafter SpearIt, Model Rule 6.1: A
Lawyer’s Duty to Increase Access to Justice].
137.
See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA:
THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 19–20 (2009),
available at http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/documenting_the_justice_gap_
in_america_2009.pdf.
138.
SpearIt, Model Rule 6.1: A Lawyer’s Duty to Increase Access to Justice,
supra note 136.
139.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2013); see also SpearIt, Model
Rule 6.1: A Lawyer’s Duty to Increase Access to Justice, supra note 136.
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recommendation.”140 Representing needy clients thus advances justice for
students and fulfills a lawyer’s ethical responsibility.
Whether experiential learning, when fully embraced, will produce
law students who indeed pursue justice and service upon graduation is
uncertain. Determining this with precision is constrained by the need to sift
such students from those who came into law school determined to advance
social justice, from those influenced by a faculty member, from those
targeted by a specific strategic planning goal. Despite these uncertainties,
experiential education promises a greater commitment to measuring
effectiveness in terms of student outcomes over faculty performance, which
effectively changes the power dynamic of a law school’s learning culture.
Finally, for other students, helping individuals with their legal
problems advances the school’s mission. For many law schools, religious
and secular alike, being of service to the community is integral to the
school’s identity. Experiential learning is a means to connect students to the
community for the benefit of both, which abides by institutional ideals of
service of humanity141 and social justice,142 among other humanistic goals.
2.

More Variety in Learning and Fairness in Grading

Experiential education leads to greater classroom justice by offering
more variety in coursework, which concomitantly requires greater variety in
the way students are evaluated and graded. Teaching students in practical
settings also recalibrates the heavy reliance on casebook study and doctrine.
There would be less emphasis on Socratic regimes and the suffocating
environments 143 they create, and more involvement with actual lawyering
practices, including interviewing clients, drafting and filing documents, and
meeting work deadlines. The opportunity for more on-the-job learning
means more justice for those who learn best by doing.

140.
SpearIt, Model Rule 6.1: A Lawyer’s Duty to Increase Access to Justice,
supra note 136; see also ABA STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO AND PUB. SERV., SUPPORTING
JUSTICE II: A REPORT ON THE PRO BONO WORK OF AMERICA’S LAWYERS vii (2009).
141.
E.g., Mission Statement, SAINT LOUIS U., http://www.slu.edu/x5021.xml
(last visited Mar. 16, 2014).
142.
E.g., Mission Statement, GONZAGA U., http://issuu.com/gonzaga/docs/
mission-statement?mode=embed&layout=http://skin.issuu.com/v/light/layout.xml&showFlip
Btn=true&viewMode=presentation (last visited Mar. 16, 2014).
143.
See Andrew J. McClurg, Poetry in Commotion: Katko v. Briney and the
Bards of First-Year Torts, L. TCHR., Fall 1996, at 1, 1; Kenneth L. Schneyer, Bully Pulpit:
Effective Teachers Face Their Power over Students Honestly, L. TCHR., Spring 1996, at 1, 1
(describing the Socratic method as “where systematic humiliation of the student is only a
hair’s breadth away from the formal structure and purpose of the pedagogical method”).
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More curricula based on experiential learning potentially levels the
field in evaluating and grading students as well. With more courses being
evaluated by different metrics, experiential learning provides greater
opportunity to be graded by options other than the typical multiple-choice
exam. More experience-based learning frees students from typical pen-andpaper-type examinations and doles out more grades for specific legal tasks
such as writing briefs, arguing cases, or mediating cases, thereby rewarding
professional and practical competencies in addition to knowledge of blackletter law.
IV.

PRAXIS IN LAW TEACHING

The thrust of this article highlights the student benefits of
experiential education and the transformative potential for students.
Experience-based teaching is more than training students in particular legal
competencies but also, a means of empowering students professionally and
helping them achieve greater justice. When students provide legal assistance
to the community, they not only gain practical experience of the law, but also
ensure that law schools do more than just teach about justice—they advance
it. Teachers who are cognizant of these effects on students can work to
facilitate not only student acquisition of practical skills, but also the
acquisition of a more meaningful investment in law school.
Successful implementation of experiential education in law school
depends on maximizing positive outcomes and minimizing the negatives.
Toward this end, critical pedagogy provides a theoretical frame for
exploiting experiential education in order to maximize outcomes for both
students and the legal profession. This article offers a candid look at a
program that is engaged in the process, including adding more skills training
on the syllabus of doctrinal courses. Although such courses have not been
the traditional locus of experiential education in law school, there are
compelling reasons for rethinking this tradition and reimagining the
possibilities.
Ultimately, this work is about experiential education’s personal
impact on students. As much of the clamor for more practical skills training
has been voiced in terms of benefit to the legal profession, there has been
little inquiry into what it means for students or the law school experience.
This article has attempted to fill in some of the void.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, reality television programming has fed
the American audience’s increasing interest in how people behave in The
Real World.1 Today’s law students approach their legal education with a
similar focus. With a drive to acquire skills needed to succeed in the real
world of lawyering, students highly value work done by real lawyers2 on
behalf of real clients.3
Law professors who teach persuasive writing can leverage this
interest in the real world by using materials from real cases to teach
important persuasive writing techniques. Happily, using real cases does
more than simply pique students’ interest in learning. Materials from real
cases, when used in an active learning environment,4 are exemplary tools to
teach the most critical components of persuasive writing. Among those
critical components are development of a theme, organization of legal
arguments, and effective use of case authority.
This article describes a comprehensive case-study exercise that uses
practitioners’ briefs and judicial opinions to teach these critical components
of persuasive writing. This exercise does more than require students to read
an excerpt of a brief or judicial opinion that might illustrate a single
persuasive writing technique. Rather, students assess the strength of real
pieces of advocacy only after they have learned the applicable law. Students
then step into the role of the practitioner and construct arguments by
applying the law to facts taken from a real case. Students compare the
quality of their arguments to the arguments made in a real brief—a poorly
written brief—and assess how the brief failed to meet their expectations
about how best to persuade. Finally, students read the decision rendered in
the real case and analyze whether the quality of persuasive writing affected
the outcome of the case.

1.
See The Real World: New York—Main, MTV, http://www.mtv.com/
shows/realworld-season1/series.jhtml#moreinfo (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). MTV’s The Real
World: New York debuted in 1992. Id. The Real World has been cited as the show that “set
the template for contemporary reality TV.” Michael Hirschorn, The Case for Reality TV,
ATLANTIC (May 1, 2007, 12:00 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/05/
the-case-for-reality-tv/305791/.
2.
Law professors apparently are not real lawyers. A student once noted on
my course evaluation that it was clear that I “used to be a lawyer.”
3.
Jason M. Dolin, Opportunity Lost: How Law School Disappoints Law
Students, the Public, and the Legal Profession, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 219, 241–432 (2007).
4.
Active learning requires students to engage in higher order thinking,
forcing them to engage in analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST
PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD MAP 124 (1st ed. 2007).
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Section I of this article describes the primary pedagogical goals of
the exercise: To focus on the most challenging aspects of persuasive writing,
to use an active learning approach, and to add the real world element by
using briefs and judicial opinions from real cases. Section I also discusses
how this exercise, by requiring students to exercise their own judgment to
develop viable arguments, differs from past uses of briefs and judicial
opinions to teach persuasive writing.
Section II of the article then describes the specifics of the exercise,
including the materials used, the class discussion, and student reactions.
Section III discusses the multiple benefits of this exercise. The primary
benefit of the exercise is its effectiveness in teaching students the critical
components of persuasive writing; namely theme, organization, and use of
case authority. The exercise also helps students to develop high standards
for the quality of persuasive writing they expect to see as a reader—
standards they transfer to their own work when they begin to write. Best of
all, students enjoy the exercise. Students appreciate the opportunity to see
how advocacy is conducted in the real world and enjoy their active role in
the learning process.
The Appendices to this article contain the documents that students
use to record their impressions of the documents that they analyze as part of
the exercise.
I.
A.

PEDAGOGICAL GOALS

To Focus on the Challenging Elements of Persuasive Writing

This exercise is designed to teach students three critical elements of
persuasive writing: Development of a theme,5 organization of legal
arguments,6 and persuasive use of case authority.7 While there are several
5.
Theme—also known as theory of the case—is a concise statement why the
facts and the law together compel the conclusion that the result being advocated is the just
result in the case. See MARY BETH BEAZLEY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO APPELLATE ADVOCACY
37–38 (2d ed. 2006); MICHAEL R. FONTHAM ET AL., PERSUASIVE WRITTEN AND ORAL
ADVOCACY IN THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS 8–9 (2d ed. 2007).
6.
To create a well-organized argument, the writer must identify all relevant
legal arguments, examine the relationship between the various arguments, and create a
hierarchy of arguments in order to present each argument with maximum impact. See
BEAZLEY, supra note 5, at 70–71; FONTHAM ET AL., supra note 5, at 10–16. After having
identified each argument and the order in which the various arguments will be presented, the
writer must carefully outline each particular argument so that the argument is complete. See
BEAZLEY, supra note 5, at 75–76.
7.
To use case authority well, the writer must provide sufficient information
so that the reader understands the case’s relevance to the issue. See id. at 80–81. Poor use of
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other important elements of persuasive writing,8 in my experience students
do not struggle equally with all persuasive writing techniques. With
relatively little classroom instruction and targeted comments on students’
individual work, most students will improve their persuasive writing with
regard to the more obvious issues such as proper punctuation or citation
form. But most students struggle quite a bit when learning the critical
elements of persuasive writing—how to develop a strong theme, organize
legal arguments well, and use case authority for maximum impact.9
For example, students may construct a theme, but often they confine
it to a short paragraph, usually at the beginning of the brief. Students also
may use a shrill or table-thumping10 tone when articulating a theme.
Students likewise struggle to organize legal arguments properly; often
students may present arguments in the wrong order or have distinct
arguments wander in and out of each other due to a lack of structure.11
Finally, students often do not use the cases to their best advantage in the
brief, relying on excessive quotations or cursory citations rather than fully
describing how the authority supports a particular position.12
It is easy to understand why these particular elements of persuasive
writing are difficult for students to grasp. Unlike a spelling, grammar, or
citation error, the elements of theme, organization, and effective use of case
authority are more abstract and subtle. And yet every lawyer who has
litigated in private practice has seen a brief that, while it may contain no
obvious errors, fails to persuade the reader. The lack of persuasion largely is
case authority—particularly an overreliance on case quotations—creates unpersuasive
arguments. Id. at 89–90.
8.
Other important elements of persuasive writing are the writer’s tone, good
citation form, appropriate grammar, adherence to rules of punctuation, and lack of spelling or
typographical errors. See id. at 205. While these elements of legal writing are important,
issues of legal analysis and organization are critical to good legal writing and should take
precedence when a legal writing professor seeks to improve students’ work. Daniel L.
Barnett, Triage in the Trenches of the Legal Writing Course: The Theory and Methodology of
Analytical Critique, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 651, 654–55 (2007) (suggesting that legal writing
professors who are commenting on student work first address substantive issues of poor legal
analysis or organization before grammar or punctuation issues).
9.
Cara Cunningham & Michelle Streicher, The Methodology of Persuasion:
A Process-Based Approach to Persuasive Writing, 13 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING
INST. 159, 193–94, 205 (2007) (identifying the failure to effectively present a theme and lack
of organization of the argument as common persuasive writing problems exhibited by novice
writers).
10.
Stephen V. Armstrong & Timothy P. Terrell, The Rhetoric of Persuasive
Writing, 15 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 189, 189 (2007) (describing the tone as
table-thumping).
11.
FONTHAM ET AL., supra note 5, at 9 (explaining that poor organization can
cause a brief to wander).
12.
BEAZLEY, supra note 5, at 102, 115–16.
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due to defects in these more subtle elements of persuasive writing—theme,
organization, and use of case authority.
Thus, the challenge is to isolate these more essential elements of
persuasive writing to help students better understand why these elements are
so important.13 By eliminating the distraction caused by grammar,
punctuation, or citation errors, this exercise enables students to understand
that a piece of advocacy can be aesthetically acceptable yet fail to persuade.
By targeting only the more abstract concepts of theme, organization, and use
of authority, the exercise helps students focus on the elements of persuasive
writing that most often will make the difference between winning or losing a
case.
B.

To Use an Active Learning Approach

Another goal in developing this exercise was to use an active
learning approach. The differences between active learning and passive
learning primarily have been described in the classroom context.14 Passive
learning refers to class instruction in which there is a one-way transfer of
information from the instructor to the students, whose primary job is to
listen.15 Active learning is a method of learning that “requires students to
[engage in] higher-order thinking [such as] analysis, synthesis, and
evaluation.”16 Simulation exercises, where students assume the role of the
practitioner, are a particularly effective form of active learning.17
Reading is part of active learning,18 and students who read real world
examples of advocacy are not entirely engaged in passive learning.
However, depending on the manner in which the material is presented,
students may not be actively engaged for several reasons.
First, when asked to read a piece of well-written advocacy19 that
addresses an unfamiliar legal issue, students may not be able to critically
13.
Barnett, supra note 8, at 654–55.
14.
Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gely, Taking Back the Law School Classroom:
Using Technology to Foster Active Student Learning, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 551, 552–53 (2004).
15.
Gerald F. Hess, Principle 3: Good Practice Encourages Active Learning,
49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 401, 401 (1999) (Students are engaged in passive learning “when their
primary role is to listen to an authority who organizes and presents information and concepts.
Active learning occurs when students do more than listen.”).
16.
Caron & Gely, supra note 14, at 552; Hess, supra note 15, at 401.
17.
See Hess, supra note 15, at 410–11.
18.
Caron & Gely, supra note 14, at 553.
19.
Maria Ciampi has compiled a set of well-written briefs and judicial
opinions, together with annotations and commentary to highlight particular persuasive writing
techniques. MARIA L. CIAMPI & WILLIAM H. MANZ, THE QUESTION PRESENTED: MODEL
APPELLATE BRIEFS (2000). Other texts compile excerpts of briefs, judicial opinions, and
speeches, also with commentary and annotations that highlight good oral or written advocacy
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analyze the document simply because they do not understand the law being
applied.20 First-year law students may be particularly ill-equipped to engage
in a critical analysis of legal arguments addressing an unfamiliar issue
because they have so little knowledge of the law in general. Even upperlevel law students may have difficulty evaluating the strength of an argument
that addresses a complex legal issue beyond the students’ knowledge.21
Without any background in the law, students assigned to read a wellwritten piece of advocacy simply may accept the professor’s opinion that a
brief is well-written at face-value and copy the document’s form or structure
for their own work.22 Students thus will not engage in any critical analysis of
how the writer constructed a persuasive argument.23 If students view the
document only as a fill-in-the-blank form to be adapted for their own work,
they are not engaged in the type of higher order thinking that is characteristic
of active learning.
The tendency to use the document passively may be heightened if the
real brief addresses the same legal issue as the students’ writing assignment,
such as an assignment to draft a trial motion or appellate brief. If the
document addresses the same legal issue as a writing assignment and also
has the professor’s stamp of approval, anxious students may treat the
document as a template to be copied rather than a tool for learning.
One way to avoid having students use a practitioner’s brief as a
template for their own work is to ask students to read a poorly written brief
and analyze why it fails to persuade. Because federal and state judges are
increasingly willing to criticize poor writing, it is not difficult to find an

techniques. ROSS GUBERMAN, POINT MADE: HOW TO WRITE LIKE THE NATION’S TOP
ADVOCATES (2011); NOAH A. MESSING, THE ART OF ADVOCACY: BRIEFS, MOTIONS, AND
WRITING STRATEGIES OF AMERICA’S BEST LAWYERS (2013).
20.
Andrea McArdle, Teaching Writing in Clinical, Lawyering, and Legal
Writing Courses: Negotiating Professional and Personal Voice, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 501,
515 (2006) (students will better examine persuasive writing if they understand the underlying
law).
21.
See CIAMPI & MANZ, supra note 19, at 30, 180, 230 (briefs involve issues
such as the constitutionality and application of anti-trafficking provisions of the Federal
Archeological Resources Protection Act, criminal violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, and alleged violations of the City Charter of the City of New York by a former
New York City Comptroller with regard to business dealings with a business entity).
22.
McArdle, supra note 20, at 514.
23.
Miriam E. Felsenburg & Laura P. Graham, A Better Beginning: Why and
How to Help Novice Legal Writers Build a Solid Foundation by Shifting Their Focus from
Product to Process, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 83, 98 (2011–2012) (students tend to use examples
of memos and briefs as templates or go-bys); see also Anna P. Hemingway, Making Effective
Use of Practitioners’ Briefs in the Law School Curriculum, 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 417, 422
(2010) (students should not rely on practitioners’ briefs as templates).
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example of a poor quality brief.24 Yet the analysis of a judicially-criticized
brief may have limited value to students, primarily due to the nature of the
judicial criticism. Judges generally take the time to criticize only the most
obvious errors such as “‘deliberate mischaracterization[s] of precedent,’”25
arguments that are “‘rambling stream[s] of consciousness,’”26 “‘inaccurate
[or] incomplete case citations,’”27 or “‘innumerable and blatant typographical
and grammatical errors.’”28
Judicial criticism of poorly written briefs thus clearly delivers a do
not do this message with regard to these blatant errors. That cautionary
message, however, is not much guidance in developing good persuasive
writing techniques. Nor does it engage students in active learning. To the
contrary, students need not engage in much critical analysis to determine that
a document riddled with typographical errors will fail to persuade.
Thus, a primary goal of the exercise is to keep students either from
using a well-written brief only as a do this template or from dismissing a
poorly written brief as a do not do this note of caution. To do so, this
exercise employs an active learning approach.29 Rather than having students
dutifully follow along while the professor walks them through an example of
good persuasive writing, this exercise is student-driven.30 The students take
the lead not only in evaluating the persuasive qualities of several documents,
but also in constructing arguments using law with which the students are
familiar. The exercise thus requires students to engage in active learning
activities such as synthesizing, evaluating, and creating arguments.31
Finally, to avoid the situation where students will use the documents
as templates or models for their own work, this exercise is not tied to any
graded writing assignment. Students are explicitly told their assignment is to
24.
See Hemingway, supra note 23, at 421–22 (discussing use of
practitioners’ briefs as a “how not to do it” example); see generally JUDITH D. FISCHER,
PLEASING THE COURT: WRITING ETHICAL AND EFFECTIVE BRIEFS (2d ed. 2011) (compiling
excerpts of judicial opinions that criticize the quality of writing in briefs and other
documents).
25.
FISCHER, supra note 24, at 5.
26.
Id. at 23.
27.
Id. at 50.
28.
Id. at 40.
29.
See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 110, 123–24. Active learning
methods seek to replace “passive receipt of information transmitted by an instructor” with
other activities, including “talking, writing, reading, reflecting, and evaluating information
received.” Caron & Gely, supra note 14, at 553.
30.
Hemingway, supra note 23, at 426–27 (noting that when the professor led
the students through examples of strong point headings written in real briefs, the “students
dutifully followed along . . . [but] did not seem overly enthused”).
31.
Hess, supra note 15, at 401 (Students are “more active when they discuss
concepts or skills, write about them, and apply them in a simulation or in real life.”).
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identify the presence or absence of persuasive writing techniques in the
documents; consider whether, why, and how the documents persuade them
as readers; and evaluate how persuasive writing—or lack thereof—may have
affected the outcome of a real case. Disconnecting the exercise from any
graded writing assignment eliminates the worry that students will view the
document as a form to be followed rather than a tool for learning.
C.

To Connect with the Real World

A third goal of this exercise is to have the students understand that
good theme, organization, and use of case authority are not academic
concepts created by their professor, but are essential tools for the practicing
lawyer. The best way to drive this point home is to connect students to the
real world of lawyering. Once students see that these persuasive writing
techniques can make the difference in the outcome of a real case, they are
more eager to master the techniques. Making it real gives the students both
focus and incentive to improve their writing.
II.
A.

THE EXERCISE

Format of the Exercise

This exercise is taught over two sixty-minute class sessions and
includes both assigned readings and questionnaires for students to complete.
The first step introduces the students to the substantive law around which the
exercise revolves. In this exercise, the legal issue is whether a police stop of
a vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable
searches and seizures. This issue is not tied to the students’ writing
assignment. For this reason, students are able to focus on assessing the
persuasive qualities of the documents without trying to replicate the format
or style of the documents in their own work.
Before the first class session, students read several Fourth
Amendment cases to learn the applicable legal principles. This knowledge
of the substantive law vastly increases the students’ ability to critically assess
whether the briefs and judicial opinions addressing this Fourth Amendment
issue either succeed or fail to persuade them as readers.
After completing the background reading, students read and critique
two judicial opinions that apply the substantive law. These opinions are
majority and dissenting opinions from the same case. Both opinions are very
well-written, and they show students how two writers can effectively assert
opposing positions when applying the same law to the same facts. To help
students focus on the specific elements of theme development, organization
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of legal arguments, and use of case authority, they must complete a
questionnaire that records their impressions of the persuasive qualities of the
two opinions.32
Next, we have our first class meeting in which we discuss the
substantive legal issue and the students’ impressions of the arguments made
in the contrasting majority and dissenting opinions. After a thorough
discussion on those topics, I give the students the facts of a real case that
involves the Fourth Amendment issue. Armed with their background
knowledge of the law and two good examples of persuasive writing
addressing both sides of the issue, the students together draft the outline of a
brief advocating for one party in the case. Students also draft a thematic
statement and discuss strategies for using case authority for maximum
persuasive impact.
After class, having already developed expectations for persuasive
writing techniques that should be present in the brief, students read the real
brief that was filed in the actual case. This brief is poorly written. Students
compare this brief to the outline we created in class and complete another
questionnaire in which they record their impressions of the brief’s lack of
persuasion. When the class meets again, we discuss the students’ reactions
to the unpersuasive brief and examine why the brief failed to persuade,
focusing on theme, organization, and use of case authority.
To complete the exercise, the students read the decision reached in
the actual case in which the poorly written brief was filed. Students examine
how the court decided the issue adverse to the party that filed the poorly
written brief and consider the extent to which the poor persuasive writing of
the brief may have affected the outcome of the case.33
B.

The Fourth Amendment Issue

The exercise involves the issue of whether police officers violate the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
when they stop a car based only on an anonymous, phoned-in tip that the
driver may be intoxicated. The real case around which the exercise revolves
is Harris v. Commonwealth (Harris III),34 a 2008 decision by the Supreme
Court of Virginia.
I chose this legal issue and this case for a number of reasons. First,
the Fourth Amendment issue is one that first-year law students can
understand after reading just a few cases. Second, the background cases are
32.
33.
34.
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fairly short and easy to read. Third, because the courts have not uniformly
applied the Fourth Amendment to anonymous phoned-in tips, I can provide
the students with several well-written judicial opinions that use good
persuasive writing techniques to reach opposite conclusions. Fourth, the fact
pattern of the Harris case is straightforward.35 Fifth, a brief filed in the
Harris case provides numerous examples of poor persuasive writing.36
Finally, as discussed below, the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia in
Harris arguably demonstrates that poor brief writing affected the outcome of
the case.37
C.

The Background Reading

To understand the Fourth Amendment issue, students first read three
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. The first two cases,
Adams v. Williams38 and Alabama v. White,39 applied the Court’s 1968
decision in Terry v. Ohio40 and held that the stops made by police using
information provided by informants were constitutional.41 In Adams, the
police acted on a tip from a known informant that an individual was carrying
a firearm.42 The Court in Adams held that the Terry stop43 was constitutional
because the “informant was known to [the police] . . . and had provided
[reliable] information in the past.”44 In White, the police acted on a tip from
an anonymous informant who provided specific information about a drug

35.
Id. at 144.
36.
See Brief for the Commonwealth at 2, Harris v. Commonwealth, 668
S.E.2d 141 (Va. 2008) (No. 080437).
37.
See, e.g., Harris III, 668 S.E.2d at 144–45.
38.
407 U.S. 143 (1972).
39.
496 U.S. 325 (1990).
40.
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
41.
White, 496 U.S. at 330–31; Adams, 407 U.S. at 147–48. In Terry, the
Supreme Court of the United States first addressed the issue whether a police officer’s stop of
an individual based only on a suspicion of criminal activity violates the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures. Terry, 392 U.S. at 4. The Court held
that a police officer, who both personally observes behavior that he or she considers to be
potentially criminal activity and reasonably suspects that a firearm may be involved, may
conduct a brief search of an individual without violating the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 27.
The Court’s ruling in Terry does not directly address the issue of information provided by
informants, either anonymously or otherwise, but it is the seminal case on the issue of stop
and frisk. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 9.1, at 352–69 (5th ed. 2012).
42.
Adams, 407 U.S. at 146–48.
43.
A police officer’s stop of an individual or car is commonly referred to as a
“Terry stop.” See, e.g., 4 LAFAVE, supra note 41, at § 9.2(d), at 400–01.
44.
Adams, 407 U.S. at 146.
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transaction.45 The Court held that the anonymous tip was sufficiently
reliable both in its factual details and its prediction of the defendant’s future
criminal behavior to justify the investigatory stop.46
In the third case, Florida v. J.L.,47 the Court held that police violated
the Fourth Amendment when they stopped and searched an individual based
on an anonymous, phoned-in tip that a young man standing at a bus stop
wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.48 The Court held that the tip had
not been sufficiently reliable in its prediction of future criminal activity to
give police a reasonable, articulable suspicion to make the Terry stop.49 In
so holding, the Court characterized the tipster’s information as a bare report
that essentially identified a particular person without any predictive
information about the individual’s future movements from which the police
could determine the reliability of the tipster’s information.50
After reading these three cases, students should have sufficient
background to understand the Fourth Amendment issue. In addition, the J.L.
decision throws a monkey wrench into the application of the Fourth
Amendment to Terry stops that are based on anonymous tips.51 A typical
anonymous tip about a drunk driver will consist almost entirely of
descriptive information (make, model, color of the car, license plate number,
description of the individual, route and direction, some past driving
infraction)52 rather than predictive information (e.g., predicting the future
manner of driving).53 While cases decided prior to J.L. could rely on the
specificity of the tipster’s descriptive information to justify the Terry stop,54
any cases decided after J.L. would have to address whether the tipster also
provided the necessary predictive information.55 The J.L. decision thus is a
terrific case to demonstrate one of the key elements of persuasive writing,
namely the need to make either a strong analogy when a case favors the
writer’s position or a compelling distinction when it does not.
45.
White, 496 U.S. at 327, 332.
46.
Id. at 332. The informant in White had provided specific information
about the suspect, including the suspect’s name, address, and apartment number, the day on
which the suspect would be possessing drugs, the route she would drive on the day in
question, and her destination, among other details. Id. at 327.
47.
529 U.S. 266 (2000).
48.
Id. at 268–69, 274.
49.
See id. at 271, 274.
50.
Id.
51.
See id. at 271, 274.
52.
E.g., State v. Melanson, 665 A.2d 338, 339 (N.H. 1995).
53.
E.g., State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 627 (Iowa 2001).
54.
See State v. Tucker, 878 P.2d 855, 858 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994); Melanson,
665 A.2d at 339.
55.
See United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 724, 733 (8th Cir. 2001);
People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 811, 813 (Cal. 2006); Walshire, 634 N.W.2d at 627.
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Advocacy that Takes Opposing Positions in the Same Case

After learning the substantive law, the students assess the persuasive
qualities of two contrasting opinions written in a case that involved an
anonymous tip of a drunk driver. In State v. Boyea,56 a case decided only
nine months after J.L., a narrow majority of the Supreme Court of Vermont
upheld the constitutionality of a Terry stop of a suspected drunk driver who
was brought to the police’s attention by an anonymous phoned-in tip.57 The
case contains well-written majority and dissenting opinions, each of which
has a well-developed theme, well-organized legal arguments, and effective
use of case authority.58 Because the majority and dissent take opposing
positions, students can assess the persuasive writing techniques of two
writers who reached opposite conclusions on the same law and facts.
1.

Theme: Public Safety v. Individual Privacy

The majority and dissenting opinions provide starkly contrasting
themes, and each opinion uses a different technique to integrate the particular
theme in the opinion.59 This difference allows the students to appreciate not
just how the writer formulates a theme but also how the theme can be used
effectively throughout the document.
The majority opinion, in upholding the constitutionality of the Terry
stop, strongly asserts a public safety theme.60 The majority advances this
theme by placing the reader in the shoes of a dedicated police officer faced
with the following scenario:
Having received a State Police radio dispatch—derived from an
unnamed informant—reporting a specifically described vehicle
with New York plates traveling in a certain direction on I-89
operating “erratically,” a police officer locates the car, observes it
exit the highway, and pulls out in pursuit. The officer catches up
with the vehicle within minutes, but then faces a difficult decision.
He could, as the officer here, stop the vehicle as soon as possible,
thereby revealing a driver with a blood alcohol level nearly three
times the legal limit and a prior DUI conviction. Or, in the
alternative, he could follow the vehicle for some period of time to
corroborate the report of erratic driving. This could lead to one of
several endings. The vehicle could continue without incident for
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
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several miles, leading the officer to abandon the surveillance. The
vehicle could drift erratically—though harmlessly—onto the
shoulder, providing the corroboration that the officer was seeking
for an investigative detention. Or, finally, the vehicle could veer
precipitously into oncoming traffic, causing an accident.61

This compelling narrative places the reader in the role of protector of public
safety, a perspective that will stay with the reader when evaluating the legal
arguments that follow.62
The majority opinion reiterates and reinforces this theme throughout
the opinion, as is critical in good persuasive writing.63 The opinion provides
students with numerous opportunities to note how the writer integrates the
public safety theme into the legal arguments to persuade the reader.64 The
majority opinion contains numerous variations of its original public safety
theme, including such phrases as: (1) the “imminent risks that a drunk driver
poses to himself and the public;”65 (2) the “‘potential risk of harm to the
defendant and the public;’”66 (3) the “‘gravity of the risk of harm;’”67 (4) the
“public’s interest in safety;”68 (5) the “‘danger to the public [that] is clear,
urgent, and immediate;’”69 (6) the “‘dangerous public safety hazard;’”70 and
(7) the “‘threat to the lives or safety of others that is posed by someone who
may be driving while intoxicated or impaired,’”71 among many other
examples.72 The theme is articulated both as the rationale for several cases
that upheld the constitutionality of a Terry stop of a suspected drunk driver
and as an independent policy argument in favor of constitutionality.73 Theme
supports precedent and precedent supports theme. Each strengthens the other
to create compelling arguments.74

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Boyea, 765 A.2d at 862.
See id.
See id. at 862–68.
See id.
Id. at 863.
Boyea, 765 A.2d at 863 (quoting State v. Lamb, 720 A.2d 1101, 1104 (Vt.

67.
68.

Id. at 864 (quoting Lamb, 720 A.2d at 1105).
Id. at 865 (citing State v. Tucker, 878 P.2d 855, 861 (Kan. Ct. App.

1998)).
1994)).
69.
Id. (quoting Tucker, 878 P.2d at 861).
70.
Id. at 864 (quoting State v. Melanson, 665 A.2d 338, 340 (N.H. 1995)).
71.
Boyea, 765 A.2d at 866 (quoting McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071,
1081 (Wyo. 1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
72.
See id. at 862–68.
73.
Id. at 865 (discussing Tucker, 878 P.2d at 862).
74.
See id. (discussing Tucker, 878 P.2d at 862).
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The dissenting opinion also has a well-crafted theme that emphasizes
the Fourth Amendment’s central role as protecting citizens’ individual
privacy.75 Like the majority, the dissent places this theme squarely before
the reader at the beginning of the opinion:
Constitutional rights are not based on speculations.
Whatever frightening scenarios may be imagined by police
officers or appellate judges, the Framers of our Constitution struck
a balance between individual privacy and the intrusive power of
government, a balance that we have a duty to protect. The Fourth
Amendment is the source of protection against searches and
seizures that are based on unreliable information. When an
anonymous tip provides the sole basis for the seizure, the need for
reliability is heightened. Today’s decision allows the police to
dispense with this constitutional requirement and turn over to the
public the power to cause the search or seizure of a person driving
a car.76

After the opening paragraph, the dissenting opinion’s use of theme differs
from the majority opinion.77 Unlike the majority opinion, which weaves
thematic statements into its discussion of case precedent, the dissenting
opinion rather starkly is divided between precedent arguments and policy
arguments, the latter argument being a detailed discussion of the original
intent of the Fourth Amendment as an essential restraint on government
action.78 The dissent’s thematic statements appear largely in this policy
discussion.79 This different use of theme is one technique that the students
evaluate as part of the exercise.80
2.

Organization of Precedent Arguments

The majority and dissenting opinions in Boyea also show student’s
stark contrasts in the organization of legal arguments.81 In Boyea, the
organizational structure is most evident in the manner in which the majority
and dissent present their positive and negative precedent arguments.82
Although the legal issue involves a federal constitutional issue, the majority
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
dissenting).
82.
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opinion at first ignores the federal cases, particularly the J.L. decision.83
Rather, the majority opinion discusses several state court cases decided
before J.L. in which the courts upheld as constitutional Terry stops of drunk
drivers that were based on anonymous tips.84 The Boyea majority opinion
casts these pre-J.L. state cases as important precedent, stating when
“[c]onfronted with this precise issue, a majority of courts have concluded
that failing to stop a vehicle in these circumstances in order to confirm or
dispel the officer’s suspicions exposes the public, and the driver, to an
unreasonable risk of death or injury.”85 The majority then describes several
of the state court cases in great detail, including both the facts of particular
cases and the various courts’ statements about the public safety danger that a
drunk driver presents.86
By characterizing the state court cases as the majority view and by
providing extensive details about the cases, the Boyea majority opinion
causes the reader to feel the weight of precedent in favor of the
constitutionality of the Terry stop.87 This technique first convinces the
reader that substantial precedent supports the constitutionality of the stop. In
addition, it primes the reader for the majority’s later discussion of the
Supreme Court precedent, particularly the Court’s then-recent decision in
J.L.88
The dissenting opinion in Boyea organizes its legal arguments in
exactly the opposite way.89 The dissent first notes that the case involves a
question of federal constitutional law, emphasizing that the court is “bound
by the Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment.”90
The dissent then discusses the Supreme Court cases, particularly, the
decisions in J.L. and White, at length.91 This discussion includes very
specific information about both the facts and the Court’s rationale in each
case, focusing on the Court’s requirement that the tipster’s information be

83.
Id. at 866 (majority opinion).
84.
Id. at 864–66.
85.
Id. at 863.
86.
Boyea, 765 A.2d at 863–66. The majority does acknowledge the
existence of some state court cases in which courts found Terry stops to be unconstitutional.
Id. at 866–67. This technique accomplishes two goals. Id. First, the majority opinion appears
more credible because it acknowledges that the case law is not unanimous. See id. at 866.
Second, the majority distinguishes the facts of those cases in terms of the quality of the
tipster’s information to bolster the reliability of the tip in the case before it. Id. at 866–67.
87.
Boyea, 765 A.2d at 863–65.
88.
Id. at 866–68.
89.
Id. at 877 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
90.
Id.
91.
Id. at 877–81.
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both reliable and predictive.92 The dissent concludes this discussion by
asserting that, “[b]ecause the claim here is based solely on the Fourth
Amendment, we must ask ourselves how the . . . Supreme Court [of the
United States] would be likely to rule about the anonymous tip in this case
after White and J.L.”93 The structure of the dissenting opinion thus gives the
reader the impression that the Supreme Court itself would rule the Terry stop
to be unconstitutional.94
After discussing the federal cases in detail, the dissent discusses the
state court cases only briefly.95 It cites several decisions in which state
courts held that anonymous tips to police—reporting a variety of crimes, not
just drunk driving—were unconstitutional for a variety of reasons.96 The
dissent thus creates the impression that the prior precedent reaches
inconsistent conclusion on the issue of constitutionality and, for this reason,
no great weight should be assigned to any of the state court decisions.97
By organizing the arguments using federal and state law in exactly
opposite ways, the majority and dissenting opinions demonstrate the
importance of good organization at the macro level.98 The majority
opinion’s extended discussion of favorable precedent, albeit state court cases
addressing a federal constitutional issue, makes a compelling argument in
favor of constitutionality.99 In the dissenting opinion, the prominent and
extended discussion of the Supreme Court cases diminishes the persuasive
value of the non-binding state court decisions.100 Students thus see how two
writers, reaching different conclusions on the same legal issue, can craft
persuasive arguments by altering the order in which precedent-based
arguments are presented and in varying the level of detail used to discuss
favorable and unfavorable precedent.101

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
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Persuasive Use of Case Authority

The Boyea opinions also illustrate effective use of case authority.102
In each opinion, the discussion of the most favorable cases is very
detailed.103 Both opinions go far beyond a mere fact-to-fact analogy or
distinction of the precedent cases; rather the opinions use all of the pieces
and parts of the cases—facts, rationale and policy arguments—to create a
compelling argument for the advocated position.104 None of the common
mistakes of novice legal writers, mainly overreliance on case citations or
excessive quotes from the cases, are present.105
The best example of how to use case authority for maximum impact
is the two opinions’ different treatment of the J.L. decision.106 When Boyea
was decided, the J.L. decision was the most recent and relevant precedent on
this Fourth Amendment issue.107 For the majority, J.L. was a problematic
case that had to be distinguished.108 The majority effectively does so by
employing several different techniques.109 First, the majority uses words or
phrases that characterize the decision as unimportant or narrowly decided.110
For example, the majority characterizes J.L. as a relatively brief111 ruling in
which the Supreme Court had been “particularly careful . . . to limit its
holding to the facts.”112 These words and phrases give the reader the
impression that the case does not contribute much to the Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
The majority then engages in robust analogical reasoning.113 Stating
that J.L. “provides an illuminating contrast to the case at bar,” the majority
provides great detail about the quality of information provided by the tipster:
The informant reported a vehicle operating erratically; provided a
description of the make, model, and color of the subject vehicle, as
102.
See Boyea, 765 A.2d at 863–66 (majority opinion), 877–80 (Johnson, J.,
dissenting).
103.
Id.
104.
Id.
105.
See id. The majority opinion in Boyea does contain a few block
quotations from cases, but the block quotations are used well. See id. at 865–66 (majority
opinion).
106.
Boyea, 765 A.2d at 866–68 (majority opinion), 877–81 (Johnson, J.,
dissenting).
107.
Id. at 866–67 (majority opinion), 877 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
108.
Id. at 866–68 (majority opinion).
109.
See id.
110.
Id. at 868 n.8.
111.
Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867.
112.
Id.
113.
See id. at 866–68.
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well as the additional specific information that it had New York
plates; identified the vehicle’s current location; and reported the
direction in which it was traveling. The officer went to the
predicted location and within minutes confirmed the accuracy of
the reported location and description, thus supporting the
informant’s credibility and the reasonable inference that the caller
had personally observed the vehicle. The information that the
vehicle was acting erratically equally supported a reasonable
inference that the driver might be intoxicated or otherwise
impaired.114

The majority distinguishes those facts from the facts of J.L., characterizing
the J.L. tip as “nothing more than a bare-bones description of an individual
standing at a bus stop.”115 Finally, the majority links the facts of the tipster’s
information to the Court’s requirements of reliability and predictability,
stating that the information “described with particularity, and accurately
predicted, the location of a fast moving vehicle on a freeway.”116
Yet the majority opinion goes beyond merely comparing and
contrasting the facts about the anonymous tips in each case. The majority
also uses dicta in J.L. to argue that the Fourth Amendment analysis differs
because J.L. involved the crime of firearms possession, not drunk driving.117
In J.L., the Court had declined to create a firearms exception that would have
created a relaxed requirement of reliability or prediction for anonymous tips
about alleged crimes involving firearms.118 The Court did, however, leave
open the possibility that certain anonymous tips, such as “a report of a person
carrying a bomb,” might present such a danger to public safety to justify a
relaxed requirement of reliability.119
The majority leverages this piece of the J.L. opinion to its advantage.
It characterizes J.L. as a circumstance involving a “relative lack of
urgency,”120 arguing that the police officers in J.L. had time to safely observe
the individual to determine whether any criminal activity was underway.121
The majority thus portrays J.L. as a more static situation than a situation
involving a drunk driver, stating that “[a]n officer in pursuit of a reportedly
drunk driver on a freeway does not enjoy [the] luxury” of observing the
driver “without running the risk of death or injury with every passing
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
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Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272–73 (2000).
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moment.”122 The majority even characterizes the drunk driver on the road as
a mobile bomb.123
For the students, the majority’s treatment of J.L. is an excellent
example of how to wring everything out of an important case. The majority
does not simply engage in the expected argument—making a factual
distinction between the quality of the tipster’s information in J.L. and the
quality of the tipster’s information in Boyea. Rather, the majority engages in
a multi-pronged attack on the J.L. decision, choosing words and phrases that
portray the case as not detailed—a relatively brief opinion—and extending
the Court’s rationale on a non-decision—not creating a firearms exception—
so as to further distinguish the case.124 The students clearly see that
persuasive arguments about the applicability of case decisions should extend
well beyond a fact-to-fact analogy or distinction.
The dissenting opinion takes a similar approach, but with the
opposite goal of portraying J.L. as controlling on the issue before the
court.125 Like the majority opinion, the dissenting opinion chooses words
and phrases to further this goal, characterizing J.L. as “recent and relevant
precedent from the [Supreme Court of the] United States”126 and a “recent
pronouncement by th[e] Court on the exact issue of anonymous tips . . .
closely analogous case.”127 The dissent then illustrates the close factual
analogy between the tip provided in J.L. and the tip provided in Boyea.128
The dissent notes that the description of the car, a “blue-purple Jetta with
New York license plates,” is factually indistinguishable from the description
of the individual in J.L., “a young black ma[n] wearing a plaid shirt.”129 The
location identified in J.L., a “specific bus stop,” likewise is indistinguishable
from the Boyea tipster’s statement that the car was traveling between two
specific exits on the highway.130 Finishing the close factual analogy, the
dissent notes that the allegation of wrongdoing in J.L., that the young man
was carrying a gun, likewise is closely analogous to the allegation that Ms.
Boyea was engaged in erratic driving.131

122.
Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867.
123.
Id.
124.
See id.
125.
See id. at 877–82 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
126.
Id. at 877.
127.
Boyea, 765 A.2d at 877–78.
128.
See J.L., 529 U.S. at 268–69; Boyea, 765 A.2d at 877–78.
129.
J.L., 529 U.S. at 271; Boyea, 765 A.2d at 879.
130.
J.L., 529 U.S. at 268; Boyea, 765 A.2d at 863 (majority opinion), 879–80
(Johnson, J., dissenting).
131.
Boyea, 765 A.2d at 879 (Johnson, J., dissenting); see also J.L., 529 U.S. at
268.
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The dissent also directly addresses the majority’s assertion that the
different crimes warrant a different analysis.132 The dissent notes that the
J.L. Court’s rationale for declining to create a firearms exception was the
slippery slope danger that the courts would be unable to “‘securely confine
such an exception to allegations involving firearms.’”133 The dissent
characterizes the majority’s ruling as an automobile exception that
exemplifies the very danger of which the Supreme Court had warned.134 The
dissent concludes by stating that the “automobile exception has no basis in
Supreme Court precedent.”135
To help students identify and assess the persuasive qualities of the
Boyea opinions, I ask them to complete a questionnaire in which they
critique the two opinions as to the elements of theme, organization, and use
of case authority. In class, we use the students’ impressions to lead our
discussion of the persuasive writing techniques present in the two Boyea
opinions; this discussion highlights the different approaches taken in the two
opinions and the relative effectiveness of both opinions in making strong
arguments on opposing sides of the same issue.
In class, I also show students one small section of the concurring
opinion in Boyea. I do not ask the students to read the concurring opinion
because it is rather lengthy; however, I do point out one section where the
concurring opinion provides excellent imagery to support the majority’s
public safety theme.136 The concurring opinion characterizes the threat to
public safety as one of “a drunk driver maneuvering a thousand pounds of
steel, glass, and chrome down a public road.”137 This compelling image is
one that the class agrees should be used by anyone writing a brief in support
of the constitutionality of a Terry stop involving a drunk driver.138
E.

Assessing the Disappointing Brief

In the same class meeting, after we have fully dissected the majority
and dissenting opinions in Boyea, we leave the realm of well-written
advocacy and turn to the next step of the exercise. Now we begin to work
with the Harris III case.139

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
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The defendant in the Harris III case was arrested in the early
morning hours of December 31, 2005.140 On April 3, 2006, a grand jury for
the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia indicted Mr. Harris on
one count of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a felony given Mr.
Harris’s two prior convictions for the same offense.141 On April 26, 2006,
Mr. Harris filed a motion to suppress any evidence stemming from the police
officer’s stop of his car on the ground that the stop violated the Fourth
Amendment.142 On July 7, 2006, the Circuit Court judge denied the motion
to suppress, after which Mr. Harris was immediately found guilty.143 Mr.
Harris then appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress.144 On
February 5, 2008, the Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the defendant’s
conviction, ruling that the Terry stop of Mr. Harris’s car did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.145
I give my students a set of facts from the Harris III case, as follows:
The police received an anonymous tip of suspected drunk driving.146 The
tipster had identified: (1) the street location of the car; (2) the direction the
car was driving; (3) the car’s make, color, and a partial license plate number;
and (4) the driver’s name and the type of shirt he was wearing.147 After
locating the car on the street named by the tipster, the police officer had
followed the driver for a few blocks before pulling the car over.148 The
driver failed the field sobriety tests and he was charged with operating a
vehicle while intoxicated, his third drunk driving offense.149
I also note the procedural history of the case and the basis for the
appellate court’s ruling. It is important for the students to understand that the
defendant twice had unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of the
Terry stop.150 Students also must understand the nature of the appellate
140.
Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 2.
141.
Grand Jury Charges, Commonwealth v. Harris, 2006 WL 6436367 (Va.
Cir. Ct. Apr. 3, 2006) (No. 06-F-1159 BBC).
142.
Motion to Suppress at 6, Commonwealth v. Harris, No. 06F1159, 2006
WL 6436367 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 7, 2006).
143.
Commonwealth v. Harris (Harris I), No. 06F1159, 2006 WL 6436367, at
*1 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 7, 2006), rev’d, 668 S.E.2d 141 (Va. 2008). Westlaw incorrectly
identifies the case at the trial court level as Commonwealth v. Moses, using the defendant’s
middle name as his last name. Id.
144.
Harris v. Commonwealth (Harris II), No. 2320-06-2, 2008 WL 301334, at
*1 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2008), rev’d, 668 S.E.2d 141 (Va. 2008).
145.
Id. at *3, 56.
146.
Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 2.
147.
Id.
148.
Id. at 3.
149.
Id. at 1, 4 (noting prior convictions).
150.
Harris II, 2008 WL 301334, at *2–3, 6; Harris I, No. 06F1159, 2006 WL
6436367, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 7, 2006), rev’d, 668 S.E.2d 141 (Va. 2008).
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court’s ruling. In ruling that the Terry stop was constitutional, the appellate
court had not relied solely on the anonymous tip as justifying the stop, but
also had noted the police officer’s own observations of the driver during the
few minutes before the officer pulled the driver over.151
Finally, I tell the students that the case has been appealed to the
Supreme Court of Virginia and that we will, as a class, construct an outline
of the Commonwealth’s brief arguing that the stop was constitutional.152 I
tell the students that all of the cases they have read, including Boyea, are
relevant authority that may be used in the brief. I also give them an excerpt
from Jackson v. Commonwealth,153 a 2004 decision in which the Supreme
Court of Virginia had distinguished Boyea.154 The court in Jackson had held,
on facts very similar to J.L., that a Terry stop based on an anonymous tip of
firearms possession violated the Fourth Amendment.155 In its brief arguing
that the stop in Jackson was constitutional, the Commonwealth had cited
Boyea and other cases involving anonymous tips about drunk driving.156 In
rejecting that argument, the Supreme Court of Virginia had expressed
approval for the holding in Boyea as appropriate for a drunk driving offense,
stating:
Nor are we persuaded by the cases relied on by the
Commonwealth and the Court of Appeals. Those cases are either
inapposite or involved tips that contained indicia of reliability not
present here. For example, Wheat, 278 F.3d 722; State v.
Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625 (Iowa 2001); Rutzinski, 241 Wis.2d
729, 623 N.W.2d 516; and State v. Boyea, 171 Vt. 401, 765 A.2d
862 (2000), all addressed the reliability of anonymous reports of
erratic or drunk drivers. That circumstance and the imminent
public danger associated with it are not factors in this case. . . . We
agree that “[i]n contrast to the report of an individual in possession
of a gun, an anonymous report of an erratic or drunk driver on the
highway presents a qualitatively different level of danger, and
concomitantly greater urgency for prompt action.” Id.157

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Harris II, 2008 WL 301334, at *5.
Harris III, 668 S.E.2d 141, 143 (Va. 2008).
594 S.E.2d 595 (Va. 2004).
Id. at 603.
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268, 273–74 (2000); Jackson, 594 S.E.2d at

597, 603.
156.
See State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 867 (Vt. 2000); Jackson v.
Commonwealth, 594 S.E.2d 595, 603 (Va. 2004); Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note
36, at 13, 16, 19.
157.
Jackson, 594 S.E.2d at 603 (alteration in original) (quoting Boyea, 765
A.2d at 867).
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Thus, armed with (1) the facts of the Harris III case; (2) the precedent cases,
including J.L. and Boyea; and (3) the Supreme Court of Virginia’s statements
in Jackson, the class begins to construct an outline of the Commonwealth’s
brief in the Harris case. We develop our theme, organize our legal
arguments, and discuss how best to use our case authority.
With respect to theme, the students suggest that the brief should
adopt the threat to public safety theme articulated by the majority in
Boyea.158 The students recognize that the theme will be strengthened by the
Boyea concurring opinion’s image of “a thousand pounds of steel, glass, and
chrome [being maneuvered] down a public road.”159 Students also propose
that the Supreme Court of Virginia’s statement in Jackson should be featured
prominently in the Commonwealth’s brief in the Harris III case.160 Several
students suggest that the introduction of the brief filed in the Harris III case
should remind the Supreme Court of Virginia of its statement made in
Jackson only a few years earlier. In the real brief that the students will later
read, the quote from Jackson does not appear until page sixteen of a twentyone page brief.161
When the class discusses how to organize legal arguments, we have
two choices. The appellate court in Harris II had found the stop to be
constitutional based not solely on the tipster’s information but also on the
police officer’s observation of unusual driving before stopping the car.162
The Commonwealth thus has two alternative arguments. One argument is
that the stop was constitutional based solely on the tipster’s information.163
The other argument is that the tip and the officer’s personal observations
together gave rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion of drunk driving
sufficient to justify the stop.164
As we prepare our in-class outline of the Harris III brief, we discuss
how best to present these two arguments. Because the first argument—that
158.
Boyea, 765 A.2d at 862–65, 867.
159.
Id. at 875 (Skoglund, J., concurring).
160.
Jackson, 594 S.E.2d at 603.
161.
Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 16 (quoting Jackson, 594
S.E.2d at 603). Although this article provides the Westlaw citation to the Commonwealth’s
brief, I use the PDF form of the document in class so that students can see the appearance of
the brief as it was filed with the court.
162.
Harris II, No. 2320-06-2, 2008 WL 301334, at *5–6 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 5,
2008), rev’d, 668 S.E.2d 141 (Va. 2008); Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 9
(describing the driving as unusual).
163.
Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 15.
164.
Id. at 7–8. The Virginia Court of Appeals, in affirming the trial court’s
denial of Mr. Harris’s motion to suppress, specifically distinguished the facts of the case from
those present in either Jackson or J.L. on the grounds that the police officer, by observing Mr.
Harris’s driving before pulling him over, had “corroborated the criminal component” of the
tipster’s information. See Harris II, 2008 WL 301334, at *5–6.
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the tip alone was sufficient to justify the stop—allows the writer to advance a
compelling theme and use highly relevant cases like Boyea, it appears to be
the leading argument. Some students question whether the brief’s first legal
argument should be grounds upon which the Commonwealth previously won
the case.165 This is a debatable issue, and we usually have a good discussion
about the order of presenting these two arguments.
When we discuss how best to structure the single argument that the
tip provided sufficient information to justify the stop, students suggest that
the argument begin with a detailed discussion of Jackson and its approval of
the Boyea holding in the drunk driving context.166 The students also suggest
that the argument should discuss in detail any favorable state court cases,
particularly Boyea. Students also recognize that other favorable cases may
have been decided in the years following Boyea and suggest that the brief use
any positive precedent decided after Boyea.
When we discuss how to best use the case authority, the class agrees
that the majority opinion in Boyea should be highlighted as a closely
analogous case. We compare the quality of the information of the tip in the
Boyea case to the tip provided in Harris III, to argue that the tipster in Harris
III provided even more reliable information than the tipster in Boyea (partial
license plate, name of the driver, and what the driver was wearing).167 In
addition, we discuss how the majority opinion in Boyea provides other
means to distinguish the J.L. decision based on the public safety theme and
the firearms exception.168
We end our class meeting with a firm—if somewhat basic—outline
of the structure of the Commonwealth’s brief to be filed before the Supreme
Court of Virginia in the Harris III case. After class, I provide the students
with a copy of our class outline, the actual brief in the Harris III case, and a
form that asks them to record their impressions of persuasiveness of the
brief.
In our second class meeting, we review the students’ reaction to the
Commonwealth’s brief filed in the Harris III case. Students highlight
several reasons why the brief failed to persuade. They can identify the
absence of the key elements of persuasive writing: Theme, organization of
legal arguments, and persuasive use of case authority. They understand that
the cumulative effect of the brief’s defects with regard to these elements
makes the document unpersuasive. In addition, the students are disappointed
165.
See Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 9.
166.
See State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 875 (Vt. 2000); Jackson, 594 S.E.2d at
603; Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 9–11, 13.
167.
Boyea, 765 A.2d at 863 (describing the tipster’s information); Brief for the
Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 7, 9–10.
168.
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 274 (2000); Boyea, 765 A.2d at 866–67.
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that the brief failed to live up to the expectations they had developed when
we outlined the brief in our earlier class. Indeed, their disappointment is
heightened by the fact that the students had certain expectations about the
document before they read it.
The Commonwealth’s brief in Harris III lacks a theme. The first
argument, which asserts that the stop was constitutional based on the tip and
the officer’s personal observations together, has no theme at all.169 It also is
the longer of the two arguments identified in the brief, taking ten pages of the
sixteen pages of the Argument section.170 The second argument only halfheartedly asserts the obvious public safety theme.171 The heading for this
second argument, “Stop Supported [b]y Danger [f]rom Intoxicated Driver,”
is an incomplete sentence that is not written persuasively.172 The phrase
“threat to public safety” appears only twice in the brief; it appears once intext on page fifteen of the twenty-one page brief and once in a parenthetical
following a case citation.173 The quote from the Jackson decision regarding
the “‘greater urgency for prompt action’” needed when police receive a
report of a drunk driver does not appear until page sixteen of the brief.174
The image set forth in the concurring opinion in Boyea—that of the “drunk
driver maneuvering a thousand pounds of steel, glass and chrome down a
public road”—is not in the brief at all.175
The brief also is poorly organized. Again, the two main arguments
in support of the constitutionality of the stop are (1) that the tipster’s
information, standing alone, was sufficiently reliable to justify the stop; or
(2) that the police officer personally observed enough suspicious driving to
justify the stop.176 The Harris III brief is weak because it begins with the
second argument.177
This argument relies on more generic Fourth
Amendment principles to analyze whether a police officer’s observations in a
variety of circumstances can give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal
169.
See Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 7–14. The lack of a
theme is evident even from a brief review of the Table of Contents. See id. at i. The relevant
point headings in the Argument Section are “The Officer Properly Conducted An
Investigatory Stop” and “Sufficient Independent Corroboration.” Id. Neither heading
provides a hint of a theme that might support the constitutionality of the stop. See id.
170.
Id. at 4–14.
171.
See Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 15–21.
172.
See id. at 15.
173.
Id. at 15, 16 (quoting State v. Stolte, 991 S.W.2d 336, 343 (Tex. Ct. App.
1999)).
174.
Id. at 16 (quoting Jackson v. Commonwealth, 594 S.E.2d 595, 603 (Va.
2004)).
175.
State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 875 (Vt. 2000); Brief for the
Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 1–21.
176.
Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 7–21.
177.
See id. at 5–6.
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activity.178 Because the argument does not feature factually relevant drunk
driving cases, the writer cannot either advance a compelling theme using the
precedent or make robust analogies to cases involving substantially similar
facts.
The brief itself amply demonstrates this weakness. The first
paragraph of the argument consists of three sentences; each sentence
extensively quotes a different case, and each quotation sets forth only a
general principle of Fourth Amendment law.179 This structure is not
persuasive for two reasons. First, the boring recitation of legal principles
does not persuade the reader that the position being advanced is the correct
result under the law.180 Second, the absence of a strong discussion of
factually relevant cases gives the reader the impression that no such
compelling precedent exists.
Moreover, after a few pages, the police officer observation argument
begins to morph into an argument that the tipster’s information alone was
sufficient to justify the stop.181 At this point, the brief begins to cite some of
the relevant case law, particularly the J.L. decision, on the issue of the
reliability of anonymous tips.182 However, the brief lacks a cohesive
presentation of the cases that addressed anonymous tips about drunk
driving.183 To the contrary, the brief makes only passing references to the
relevant cases by name, as if the cases previously had been discussed for the

178.
179.

See id. at 5–7.
Id. at 5–6. The first paragraph of the argument section reads:

It is elementary that “the fourth amendment does not proscribe all
searches and seizures, only those that are ‘unreasonable.’”
Stanley v.
Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 873, 875, 433 S.E.2d 512, 513 (1993) (quoting Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)). “Whether a search is unreasonable is determined by
balancing the individual’s right to be free from arbitrary government intrusions
against society’s countervailing interest in preventing or detecting crime and in
protecting its law enforcement officers.” Harrell v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App.
398, 403, 517 S.E.2d 256, 258 (1999). “In deciding whether to make a stop or
effect a pat-down search, an officer is entitled to rely upon the totality of the
circumstances—the whole picture.” Peguese v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 349,
351, 451 S.E.2d 412, 413 (1994)(en banc).

Id.
180.
One such example is the legal proposition that “‘[a] trained law
enforcement officer may be able to identify criminal behavior which would appear innocent to
an untrained observer.’” Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 6 (quoting Alston v.
Commonwealth, 581 S.E.2d 245, 251 (Va. Ct. App. 2003)). That legal proposition seems to
have no bearing on the case given the Commonwealth’s argument that the defendant’s driving
was unusual or erratic. Id. at 9.
181.
See id. at 10.
182.
See id. at 9–10 (citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273–74 (2000)).
183.
See id. at 11–12.
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reader.184 The brief thus demonstrates how the failure to present arguments
in the correct order can lead to a scattershot presentation of the law.
Finally, the brief makes poor use of the case authority. The brief
does cite Boyea and several decisions of other state courts in which the
courts found a Terry stop based on the anonymous tip of a drunk driver to be
constitutional.185 However, the brief contains no detailed discussion of any
drunk driving case. Thus, the brief makes no argument analogizing the facts
of Harris III to any prior drunk driving case. Boyea and other favorable
cases are cited in a long string citation of state court cases or in two separate,
page-long block quotations from a single California case, the facts of which
are not explained to the reader.186 In this regard, the brief amply
demonstrates how case citations and block quotations do not convince the
reader that the precedent is well-reasoned and should be followed.
Not only does the brief omit any robust analogies to favorable cases,
the brief also does not distinguish J.L. from the facts in the case. The only
attempt to distinguish J.L. is an extensive block quote from the Court of
Appeals decision in Harris III.187 Given that the Supreme Court of Virginia
in Jackson strictly followed J.L. in a case involving a crime of firearms
possession, the failure to distinguish J.L., or otherwise argue that drunk
driving differs from the crime of firearms possession, cripples the brief’s
ability to persuade the reader.188
F.

Assessing the Consequences of Poor Advocacy

Our second class meeting discusses all of the defects of the Harris
brief. The students, having acquired competence in recognizing and
assessing strong persuasive legal writing, drive this discussion in class.
Moreover, they are quite animated in their assessment of the brief and its
184.
Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 10–11. When the brief
first refers to the J.L. decision in-text, it does so as if the reader already knows all of the
relevant information about the case. Id. at 10 (“The open nature of the conduct here, unlike
that of possession of a concealed weapon, as in J.L., reduces the concern about the basis for
the informant’s knowledge about the activity.”). When the brief first mentions the Jackson
decision in-text, it does so in a single sentence that divides two lengthy block quotations from
the Harris Appellate Opinion. Id. at 11–12.
185.
See id. at 13, 16–17.
186.
Id. at 11 (block quotation of the appellate court’s opinion), 12 (second
block quotation of the appellate court’s opinion), 17 (block quotation of People v. Wells, 136
P.3d 810, 815–16 (Cal. 2006)), 18 (block quotation of Wells, 136 P.3d at 816). Viewing the
brief in PDF form best demonstrates why page-long block quotations bore the reader. See
Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 11–18.
187.
Id. at 11–12.
188.
See Jackson v. Commonwealth, 594 S.E.2d 595, 600–01 (Va. 2004)
(citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000)).
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disappointing qualities. Because of the work they have done to learn the law
and assess the arguments, the students are invested in the quality of the
Commonwealth’s brief, and they are disappointed that the real product did
not live up to their expectations.
We conclude this exercise by briefly reviewing the potential
consequences of the brief’s lack of persuasion. First, the students read the
Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision in Harris III, in which the court held
that the Terry stop had violated the Fourth Amendment.189 We discuss
whether poor briefing by the Commonwealth led to an adverse result in the
case. Next, the students read an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts of
the Supreme Court of the United States in which Chief Justice Roberts
dissented from the Court’s denial of the Commonwealth’s petition for a writ
of certiorari in the Harris IV case.190 This well-written opinion brings the
lesson full circle.
1.

The Supreme Court of Virginia’s Decision in Harris IV

The Harris IV case was narrowly decided by a 4-3 majority of the
Supreme Court of Virginia.191 There are a number of indications in the
opinion that poor briefing could have played a part in the court’s decision.
First, in determining that the stop was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of
Virginia reversed the rulings of both of the lower state courts.192 A criminal
defendant who has lost at both the trial and appellate court levels faces a high
obstacle to win in the court of last resort.193 The fact that the Commonwealth
lost before the Supreme Court of Virginia after having won twice in the
lower courts is itself significant when assessing the strength of the
Commonwealth’s arguments before the Supreme Court of Virginia.
Second, the majority in Harris III barely acknowledges that the case
involves drunk driving or the threat to public safety that drunk driving
poses.194 The majority never cites the court’s own prior statement in Jackson
about the “greater urgency for prompt action” that may be required when
police receive a tip about a suspected drunk driver.195 Nor does it mention
any of the decisions of other state courts, like Boyea, in which Terry stops
189.
Harris III, 668 S.E.2d 141, 147 (Va. 2008).
190.
Virginia v. Harris (Harris IV), 558 U.S. 978, 978–81 (2009) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting), denying cert. to 668 S.E.2d 141 (Va. 2008).
191.
Id. at 978.
192.
Harris III, 668 S.E.2d at 147.
193.
6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 11.7(g), at 616 (5th ed. 2012) (noting obstacles to a defendant’s successful
appeal of an adverse ruling on a Fourth Amendment issue).
194.
Harris III, 668 S.E.2d at 150 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
195.
Id. (quoting Jackson v. Commonwealth, 594 S.E.2d 595, 603 (Va. 2004)).

Published by NSUWorks, 2014

143

Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1

2014]

LRW’S THE REAL WORLD

305

based on anonymous tips of drunk driving were found to be constitutional.196
In fact, the majority in Harris III never uses the word drunk, a strong
indication that the majority did not view the case as one involving the danger
to public safety posed by drunk drivers on the road.197
Finally, the nature of the court’s ruling indicates that poor briefing
may have resulted in a poorly-crafted legal rule on this Fourth Amendment
issue. Relying heavily on White, J.L., and Jackson, the majority held that the
anonymous tip did not contain sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the
stop.198 It went far beyond the facts of the particular case, however, to hold
that an investigatory stop of a suspected drunk driver is never justified
“unless the suspected driver operates his or her vehicle in some fashion
objectively indicating that the driver is intoxicated.”199 The Supreme Court
of Virginia thus created a blanket rule that, in all cases involving an
anonymous tip of a drunk driver, the person behind the wheel actually must
drive drunk before police may stop the car.
The three dissenting justices in Harris III severely criticized the
majority for failing to address the obvious public safety concerns posed by a
drunk driver, stating that “the majority fails to understand” the contours of
the legal issue before it.200 The dissent highlights the Supreme Court of
Virginia’s prior statement in Jackson, that a drunk driver presents a public
safety danger that requires a “greater urgency for prompt action.”201 The
dissent also quotes the majority opinion in Boyea characterizing the drunk
driver as akin to a mobile bomb.202 Finally, the dissent chides the majority
for ignoring substantial precedent like Boyea, stating:
On brief, the Commonwealth discusses at length the decisions
from other jurisdictions holding that anonymous tips about
incidents of drunk driving require less corroboration than tips
196.
Compare id., with State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 868 (Vt. 2000).
197.
In contrast, the majority opinion in Boyea uses the word drunk nine times.
See Boyea, 765 A.2d at 863–67. This repeated use of the word drunk bolsters the public
safety theme.* In contrast, the majority in Harris III only uses the word intoxicated, and
mainly uses the word only to describe either information from the tip or the crime with which
the defendant was charged. See Harris III, 668 S.E.2d at 143–44, 146 (defendant “was
charged with feloniously operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated;” officer received a
report from dispatch about an intoxicated driver; the tip included the information that the
driver was intoxicated).
198.
Harris III, 668 S.E.2d at 145–46 (citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270
(2000); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328–31 (1990); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 594
S.E.2d 595, 599–600 (Va. 2004)).
199.
Harris III, 668 S.E.2d at 146.
200.
Id. at 147 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
201.
Id. at 150 (quoting Jackson, 594 S.E.2d at 603).
202.
Id. (quoting Jackson, 594 S.E.2d at 603).
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concerning matters presenting less imminent danger to the public,
and decisions holding that anonymous tips concerning drunk
driving may be sufficiently reliable to justify an investigatory stop
without independent corroboration. In light of its decision, the
majority, in my view, should address the Commonwealth’s
argument.203

Having read the brief itself, students understand that the dissenting justices
are being charitable when they state that the Commonwealth’s brief
discusses relevant drunk driving cases from other jurisdictions at length.
Indeed, it does not appear that the majority in Harris III ignored a wellreasoned argument that was made at length in the Commonwealth’s brief.
Rather, it seems that the majority virtually ignored the argument because the
brief did not place the argument squarely before the court, let alone articulate
the argument coherently or persuasively.
2.

Chief Justice Roberts’s Dissenting Opinion

In October 2009, the Supreme Court of the United States denied a
writ of certiorari that the Commonwealth of Virginia had filed in the Harris
IV case.204 Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justice Scalia, dissented.205
The dissenting opinion is the final reading of the exercise.
The Roberts dissent strongly articulates the public safety theme that
was so absent in the Commonwealth’s brief. The first sentence of the dissent
tells the reader that “[e]very year, close to [thirteen thousand] people die in
alcohol-related car crashes––roughly one death every [forty] minutes.”206
The dissent then casts the Harris III decision as one that threatens public
safety, stating that the Supreme Court of Virginia has created a legal rule that
will “undermine . . . efforts to get drunk drivers off the road.”207 The dissent
characterizes the legal rule created as one that “commands that police
officers following a driver reported to be drunk do nothing until they see the
driver actually do something unsafe on the road.”208 These strong statements
dramatically convey the risk posed by the Harris III ruling––that police
203.

Harris III, 668 S.E.2d at 150 n.3 (Kinser, J., dissenting) (citations

omitted).
204.
Harris IV, 558 U.S. 978, 978 (2009) (Roberts, J., dissenting), denying
cert. to 668 S.E.2d 141 (Va. 2008).
205.
Id. Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion earned him a “Green Bag
Award” for exemplary legal writing from the Green Bag Journal. Exemplary Legal Writing,
GREEN BAG ALMANAC & READER, http://www.greenbag.org/green_bag_press/almanacs/
almanacs.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
206.
Harris IV, 558 U.S. at 978 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
207.
Id.
208.
Id.

Published by NSUWorks, 2014

145

Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1

2014]

LRW’S THE REAL WORLD

307

officers must watch helplessly from the side of the road while drunk drivers
careen into oncoming traffic.
The dissent also organizes the discussion of the case law to best
effect. While stating that the federal and state courts are split209 on the issue
of whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits investigative stops of suspected
drunk driving based on anonymous tips, the dissent characterizes the cases
finding in favor of constitutionality as the majority viewpoint.210 Cases in
which such stops have been held to be unconstitutional, including Harris III,
are characterized as the minority viewpoint.211 The dissent concludes by
arguing that, given the clear conflict and the high stakes in terms of the
potentially devastating effects of drunk driving, the Court should have heard
the case.212
By reading Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion, students
complete the exercise with a well-written example of advocacy. In addition,
by reading the Supreme Court of Virginia’s opinion in Harris III together
with the Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion, students see the realworld consequences of poor persuasive writing. They experience the
frustration expressed by the dissenting justices of the Supreme Court of
Virginia in Harris III, namely that the majority did not thoughtfully consider
relevant persuasive authority on this very important issue of the proper
balance between Fourth Amendment protections and the dangers of drunk
driving.
III.

BENEFITS OF THE EXERCISE

This exercise, with its focus on essential elements of persuasive
writing in the context of real cases, provides several important benefits to
students. First, the exercise succeeds in teaching students the most
challenging elements of persuasive writing. Second, the exercise teaches
students that, as in the documents they have read, they must critically
examine their own work for the presence or absence of these persuasive
writing techniques. The exercise thus encourages students to take a more
robust view of the writing process, particularly the time and attention needed
to review and revise their work. Third, the exercise energizes and empowers
students by giving them confidence that they can competently assess and
improve their own work. Finally, students see that these persuasive writing
209.
A split among lower federal courts and state courts on a constitutional
issue is a common reason for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in a case. See, e.g., Florida
v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269 (2000).
210.
Harris IV, 558 U.S. at 980.
211.
See id. at 981.
212.
Id.
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techniques are not esoteric or unimportant concepts, but important tools that
can affect the development of the law in the real world.
A.

Teaching the Critical Elements of Persuasive Writing

With its focus on particular elements of theme, organization, and
good use of case authority, the exercise is a powerful tool to teach students
essential persuasive writing techniques. The exercise accomplishes this goal
on several different levels. Students first learn to identify the presence or
absence of persuasive writing techniques through critical reading and
assessment. Because students know the substantive law, they are better able
to identify and analyze the presence or absence of persuasive writing
techniques when they read the various documents in which the law is
applied.213 In addition to reading pieces of advocacy, students also step into
the writer’s role and test their emerging understanding of persuasive writing
techniques by applying the law to the facts of the Harris III case. Students
form judgments about the ordering of precedent or policy arguments and the
juxtaposition of positive precedent with negative precedent. They examine
how best to use relevant cases to make persuasive analogies or distinctions.
This multi-step approach, where students first read arguments and then create
their own arguments, deepens the students’ understanding of the particular
elements of persuasive writing that are the focus of the exercise.
Students’ ability to understand the need for these key elements of
persuasive writing is enhanced by the fact that several documents assert
opposing positions on the same legal issue. In my view, this method is
superior to one where students read excerpts of documents addressing a
variety of legal issues, each of which might illustrate a particular persuasive
writing technique. In this exercise, students are better able to focus on the
persuasive writing techniques because the law does not change materially
from document to document, only the manner in which the writer uses the
law. The ability to see the differences in writing while the law stays the
same is a highly effective teaching tool.
Finally, students become more aware of specific elements of
persuasive writing because they analyze a document that, as to the critical
persuasive writing elements, disappoints them as readers. This example of
deficient advocacy enables the students to understand what qualities must be

213.
See Judith B. Tracy, “I See and I Remember; I Do and I Understand”
Teaching Fundamental Structure in Legal Writing Through the Use of Samples, 21 TOURO L.
REV. 297, 316 (2005) (noting that students have a different learning experience when students
are familiar with the law contained in the document they read).
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present in order for a document to persuade the reader.214 Indeed, students
become quite animated when we critique the Harris brief in class. They
make specific suggestions about how the brief might be improved. This
level of class participation plainly demonstrates that students are actively
engaged in assessing the lack of quality of the poorly written brief.215 The
depth of their analysis of the Harris brief demonstrates that they have indeed
engaged in higher order thinking that is characteristic of active learning.216
B.

A Robust View of the Drafting and Revision Processes

In addition to teaching essential elements of persuasive writing, the
exercise teaches students to take a robust view of the writing process. At the
initial drafting stage, the structure of the exercise also reduces, if not
eliminates, the concern that the students will use the well-written pieces of
advocacy as templates or fill-in-the-blank forms. First, because the examples
of well-written advocacy are judicial opinions, not briefs, students may be
less likely to use the documents as templates. In addition, students may have
difficulty selecting just one of the many examples of well-written advocacy
to be the template. A third reason may be that the exercise involves a careful
examination of a legal issue that does not relate to the students’ writing
assignment.217 Students, therefore, are able to focus on assessing the
materials without the corresponding desire to replicate portions of the
documents in their own writing assignment.
By reducing the tendency to use a document as a template, the
exercise also encourages students to take a more robust view of the writing
process, particularly the process of revising a working draft. Students often
initially view revision or editing as nothing more than a quick, final review
of a document to eliminate any spelling or punctuation errors.218 Because the
214.
See id. at 318 (describing the use of deficient samples of objective
analyses to demonstrate to students why an analysis may not provide complete information to
the reader).
215.
Hemingway, supra note 23, at 426–27 (describing how students came
alive when analyzing poorly written work of actual lawyers).
216.
See id. at 422–23.
217.
Anna Hemingway sets forth several good reasons why students should
read practitioners’ briefs that involve a legal issue and authorities that students must use in
their own writing assignment. Id. Those reasons include the students’ heightened interest in
the material and linking the students’ academic assignment to the real world of lawyering. Id.
I am concerned, however, that overworked and anxious law students will succumb to the
tendency to use the documents as templates. I prefer that my students focus solely on a robust
assessment of the exercise materials without any eye towards adapting or using those
materials as part of their own writing assignment.
218.
See Cunningham & Streicher, supra note 9, at 196–97 (stating that
students tend to edit at the micro level only); Patricia Grande Montana, Better Revision:
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Harris brief does not contain distracting grammar or punctuation errors,
students’ suggestions to improve the brief’s persuasive qualities focus
exclusively on substantive deficiencies. Students thus learn that they should
evaluate their own work using the same measures by which they evaluate the
Harris brief, which refines their understanding of the revising and editing
process. As one student noted: “When reading my own work I sometimes
don’t fully complete my thoughts or [I] use conclusory statements because I
can easily understand the logic and reasoning. However, in reading this
poorly-constructed [brief], I couldn’t follow all of the logic or arguments
created so it ‘drove home’ some comments I’ve received from professors on
exams and memos.”219
C.

Boosting Students’ Confidence

The exercise also has a benefit for students that I did not expect. My
students find the exercise to be a confidence boost.220 One student
commented that the exercise allowed him to see how much he has learned, in
that he can identify mistakes and poor structure of the brief.221 Another
student stated, “reading the Harris brief gave me confidence that I do possess
some admirable writing techniques and skills.”222 Overall, students find it
refreshing to be exposed to something other than five-star writing, which
some see as an unattainable goal.223
D.

A Connection to the Real World

Finally, because the exercise uses real world materials, students
quickly learn that these persuasive writing techniques are essential tools for
the practicing lawyer. Indeed, the exercise has a great impact on the students
because the materials are from a real case. Students are interested to see how
a poor brief can influence the outcome of a case.224 They invariably ask
many questions about the case, including whether the decision in Harris was
Encouraging Student Writers to See Through the Eyes of the Reader, 14 LEGAL WRITING: J.
LEGAL WRITING INST. 291, 293 (2008) (noting that students often view the editing process as
polishing the document to add topic sentences, change words, or fix grammar or citation
form).
219.
Student comments were submitted in writing and are on file with the
author.
220.
See supra Part II.E–F.
221.
See supra Part II.E–F.
222.
See supra Part II.E–F.
223.
McArdle, supra note 20, at 519 (reading practitioner work of uneven
quality can help a discouraged novice writer).
224.
See supra Part II.E–F.
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followed by other state courts, whether Mr. Harris committed another drunk
driving offense, and whether the Supreme Court of the United States has
taken another similar case or clarified the issue of anonymous tips in cases of
suspected drunk driving. Students worry about the dismissal of a case
involving a habitual drunk driver. They see the real world implications of
the Harris decision as potentially affecting the development of the case law
on this legal issue.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This real world focus of the exercise demonstrates to students that
these persuasive writing techniques are not simply professor-created metrics
to assess and grade their work, but important tools both for the practitioner
and the development of the law. Once they perceive that the material being
taught actually matters in The Real World,225 they are anxious to master the
techniques.
I highly recommend this exercise to those legal writing professors
looking for a way to highlight the essential yet subtle aspects of persuasive
writing for students. The materials effectively teach the material, and
students enjoy the process.

225.
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APPENDIX A—STATE V. BOYEA QUESTIONNAIRE
You have read two opinions that advocate opposing positions even
as they apply the same law to the same facts. Use this questionnaire to
record your impressions of the quality of the advocacy in each opinion with
regard to three critical components of persuasive writing: development of a
theme, organization of legal arguments, and use of case authority.
The Majority Opinion

Published by NSUWorks, 2014

1.

Does the majority opinion have an easily identifiable theme? What
is it? Where does the majority first assert its theme?

2.

Review the majority opinion and identify at least three instances
where the majority makes a thematic statement.

3.

Are these thematic statements standing alone, or do they appear as
part of a discussion of case precedent?

4.

Look carefully at the order in which the majority opinion discusses
federal and state court cases addressing the constitutionality of Terry
stops.
a.
What case does it discuss first? What cases are
discussed next?
b.

Where does the majority discuss the Supreme Court
cases?

c.

Do you find this ordering of the discussion to be
persuasive? Why or why not?

5.

Consider the manner in which the majority discusses specific cases.
For example, what is significant about the majority’s discussion of
the McChesney case in terms of persuasive writing? Does the
holding of the case support the majority’s opinion in favor of
constitutionality? How does the majority use the case?

6.

Consider how the majority’s use of the J.L. decision. How does the
majority distinguish J.L.? Does it distinguish the case on its facts
and, if so, how?
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Other than a fact-to-fact comparison, how does the
majority distinguish J.L.?

7.

What is the main policy argument made by the majority? Where
does it appear in the opinion? Is it segregated to a particular
discussion?

8.

If you were writing a brief in support of the constitutionality of a
stop of a drunk driver based on an anonymous tip, what 3–5 quotes
from the majority opinion in Boyea would you use in your brief?
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The Dissenting Opinion
1.

Does the dissenting opinion have an easily identifiable theme? What
is it? When does the theme first appear in the dissenting opinion?

2.

Review the dissenting opinion and identify at least three instances
where the dissent makes a thematic statement.

3.

Look carefully at the order in which the dissenting opinion discusses
federal and state court cases. How does this order of presenting the
law differ from the majority?
a.

4.

Consider how the dissenting opinion discusses a single case.
Specifically, how does the dissenting opinion use J.L. to argue that
the stop was unconstitutional? Does it distinguish the case on its
facts and, if so, how?
a.

5.

Published by NSUWorks, 2014

Does it go beyond a fact-to-fact comparison? How
so?

Consider how the dissenting opinion deals with the state court cases
that were discussed in the majority opinion? How would you
characterize the dissenting opinion’s treatment of those cases?
a.

6.

Do you find this ordering of the discussion to be
persuasive? Why is it persuasive?

Do you find this treatment of the state court cases to
be persuasive in terms of advancing the dissenting
opinion’s argument? Why or why not?

If you were writing a brief arguing that the stop of a drunk driver
based on an anonymous tip was unconstitutional, what 3–5 quotes
from the dissenting opinion in Boyea would you use in your brief?
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APPENDIX B––BRIEF REVIEW FORM
Overall Appearance

Yes

No

The brief has a neat and professional appearance.
Comments:

The Table of Authorities is neat and correctly organized
(cases, constitutions, statutes, rules or regulations,
secondary sources).
Comments:

The Table of Contents contains point headings that use
persuasive language to “tell the story” and/or highlight
legal positions. Point headings are complete sentences.
Comments:

The brief does not contain distracting use of bold face
type, underlining or italics. The font and typeface are
appropriate.
Comments:

The brief contains no spelling or editing errors.
Comments:
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Yes

No

The introduction contains a central theme or message to
support the party’s position.
Comments:

The client is introduced in a sympathetic and/or positive
light.
Comments:

The opposing party is introduced in a less than flattering
light using appropriate language (no personal attacks).
Comments:

The introduction previews the legal arguments, but with a
focus on asserting theme (that the ruling sought is the just
result).
Comments:

The introduction clearly states the relief sought.
Comments:
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Yes

No

Provides a complete procedural history by identifying
relevant filings in the lower court with dates provided
(showing thoroughness).
Comments:

Uses procedural history to best advantage by emphasizing
favorable rulings or casting doubt on unfavorable rulings
(ex: “although noting X, the lower court nonetheless
ruled Y.” Or, “in a well-reasoned opinion, the lower court
correctly ruled Y”).
Comments:
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Yes

No

The Statement of Facts begins by introducing the parties
and their relationship to one another (relative to the legal
dispute). The client is described favorably and opposing
party is cast in an unflattering/unfavorable light given the
case and its issues (a legally unfavorable light, not a
personal attack).
Comments:

The Statement of Facts uses good tone, diction, context
and juxtaposition to present facts in the light most
favorable to the party while still disclosing all relevant
facts (gives most airtime to the best facts).
Comments:

The Statement of Facts includes emotional facts necessary
to bolster the client’s position or characterization of the
facts.
Comments:

The Statement of Facts does not discuss irrelevant facts.
Comments:
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Yes

No

The Statement of Facts does contain legal arguments or
legal conclusions.
Comments:

The Statement of Facts is organized either
chronologically or topically to present the facts clearly for
the reader, choosing the organization structure that best
benefits the client.
Comments:
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Yes

No

Uses the theme or central message to introduce the reader
to the summary of the legal arguments.
Comments:

Provides the correct level of detail (just enough, not too
much) on the legal arguments to allow the reader to
understand the client’s position.
Comments:

Uses persuasive writing style at the word and sentence
level to portray the client’s position as the just result in
the case.
Comments:

Focuses on positive arguments only. Saves discussion of
negative arguments for the Argument section.
Comments:
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Yes

No

Ordering of Arguments
 Has a clear structure of arguments that presents the
arguments in a logical order and to best effect for the
client.
 Starts with “positive” arguments.
 When making policy arguments, uses precedent to
bolster policy arguments; weaves policy points into
case discussions.
 Transitions well to “negative” arguments.
Comments:

Use of Legal Authority:
 Uses a synthesized Rule (if appropriate) that is not a
collection of general, boring principles of law.
 Fully describes favorable precedent without excessive
use of case quotations. Case illustrations of favorable
precedent give the reader all of the necessary
information needed to demonstrate the applicability of
the case to the issue and the impact of its ruling on the
current case.
 Fully distinguishes unfavorable precedent. Gives the
reader all of the necessary information about the case
to demonstrate why the precedent is distinguishable or
otherwise should not be followed in the current case.
Comments:
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Yes

No

Application to Facts:
 Contains a complete application of the facts to the
law by (a) restating the relevant facts; (b)
characterizing those facts to show their relevance;
and (c) linking the characterized facts to the Rule by
using the language of the legal Rule.
 Makes complete analogies to favorable precedent
that, if appropriate, go beyond a fact-to-fact
comparison to include policy arguments from the
precedent case.
 Makes relevant factual distinctions vis-a-vis
unfavorable precedent.
 “Ties up” policy positions to the facts and desired
ruling.
Comments:

Persuasive Writing Style:
 Continues to reiterate and reinforce the theme of the
brief.
 Uses persuasive writing style at the word and
sentence level such that the Argument reads as a
piece of persuasive writing without being “over the
top” in tone.
 Is not so dry in tone that it fails to persuade.
Comments:

Published by NSUWorks, 2014

161

Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1

MOVING THE FOCUS AWAY FROM THE IQ SCORE
TOWARDS THE SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF ADAPTIVE
FUNCTIONING: THE EFFECT OF THE DSM-5 ON THE POSTATKINS CATEGORICAL EXEMPTION OF OFFENDERS WITH
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY FROM THE DEATH PENALTY
JILL V. FELUREN*
I.
II.

III.

IV.
V.

INTRODUCTION............................................................................... 324
MENTAL RETARDATION AND THE DEATH PENALTY ..................... 326
A.
A Brief History of the Death Penalty ................................ 327
B.
The Atkins Case ................................................................ 329
C.
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders .......................................................................... 330
1.
Mental Retardation .............................................. 332
2.
Intelligence Quotient............................................ 335
a.
Potential Issues with IQ Scores .............. 336
3.
Adaptive Functioning .......................................... 338
D.
The Atkins Decision.......................................................... 339
1.
Determinations Left to the States ......................... 341
2.
Other Issues in Applying the Decision ................ 343
3.
Cases Since Atkins ............................................... 344
THE DSM-5 .................................................................................... 346
A.
Intellectual Disability (Intellectual Developmental
Disorder) ........................................................................... 347
1.
Diagnostic Features.............................................. 348
B.
Cautionary Statement for Forensic Use ........................... 350
IMPLICATIONS OF THESE CHANGES................................................ 351
A.
Possible Solutions ............................................................. 356
CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 357

* Jill V. Feluren will receive her J.D. from Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center in May 2015. Jill received a Bachelor of Arts from The George
Washington University in 2010, majoring in Psychology and minoring in English. Jill would
like to thank the members of Nova Law Review—with a special thanks to the green team—for
their hard work and dedication in editing this article. Most of all, she would like to thank her
family and loved ones, especially Mark, Sue, Matt, Chloe, and Blake, for their love, support,
and encouragement during the development of this article, and always.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss2/1

162

: Nova Law Review 38, #2

324

NOVA LAW REVIEW

I.

[Vol. 38

INTRODUCTION

In 2002, in the landmark case of Atkins v. Virginia,1 the Supreme
Court of the United States held, in a 6-3 majority, that the execution of a
defendant with mental retardation was considered to be a violation of the
Eighth Amendment.2 The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment, which led to the Court’s ruling that the execution of a defendant
with an intellectual disability was unconstitutional.3 In order to make this
decision, the Court had to determine how to differentiate between a
defendant with normal intellectual functioning and one with a significant
intellectual disability.4 The Court utilized a few psychological resources,
including the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”
or “Manual”) IV-TR, to determine what criterion was necessary to qualify a
person as having mental retardation.5 By citing the definition of mental
retardation from the DSM in their decision, the Court acknowledged that the
Manual has an important legal use;6 this would later influence many states to
use it in the creation of their own legislation.7
In May of 2013, a fifth edition of the DSM was released.8 In this
new edition, several revisions were made to mental retardation that are
different from the information provided in the DSM-IV-TR, which was the
current edition during the Atkins decision.9 The changes made include a
name change from mental retardation to intellectual disability, as well as a
change in the criterion used to make a clinical diagnosis.10 The diagnostic
1.
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2.
Richard J. Bonnie & Katherine Gustafson, The Challenge of Implementing
Atkins v. Virginia: How Legislatures and Courts Can Promote Accurate Assessments and
Adjudications of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 811, 812
(2007); Joanna Hall, Comment, Atkins v. Virginia: National Consensus or Six-Person
Opinion?, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 361, 362 (2004).
3.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Hall, supra note 2, at 362.
4.
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308–09.
5.
See id. at 308 n.3; see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR:
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS xxix, 41 (4th ed., text rev.
2000) [hereinafter AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR].
6.
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3.
7.
Benjamin J. Clark, Comment, America’s Evolving Stance on Mental
Retardation and the Death Penalty, 7 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 121, 137 (2003).
8.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5: DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5];
Timeline, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/about/pages/timeline.aspx (last
visited Feb. 16, 2014).
9.
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra
note 8, at 33; Intellectual Disability, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/
Documents/Intellectual%20Disability%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
10.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33.
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criteria in the new edition moves away from the prior focus on the
Intelligence Quotient (“IQ”) score—an objective standard—to a
concentration on a measure of the person’s adaptive functioning, which is a
more subjective measure.11 These changes, which create a greater overall
subjective standard for a diagnosis of intellectual disability, differ from those
in place when the Atkins decision was made.12
With the newly released DSM-5 starting to be used by mental health
professionals, the definition in operation for intellectual disability will now
be different from that in place when the Atkins case was decided;13 this
change will inevitably have an impact in the legal field for criminal cases
with defendants that have intellectual disabilities.14 This article will first
discuss the facts of the Atkins case, as well as background information about
mental retardation and the death penalty, the DSM, and the specific
diagnostic standards for mental retardation that were current at the time of
the Atkins decision.15 This section will provide the history and details of the
Atkins case, as well as an explanation of the final holding of the Court.16 The
third section will note the relevant revisions made in the DSM-5 with the
shift from mental retardation to intellectual disability.17 The final section
will analyze the differences between the DSM-IV-TR and the DSM-5.18
This discussion will be an attempt to predict the inevitable impact that the
changes in the new edition of DSM will have on the legal system when
courts are presented with mentally retarded defendants that face capital
punishment; the diagnostic criteria used by professionals to assess the patient
and determine a diagnosis will no longer match up with the law in most
states.19 Additionally, the final section will hypothesize solutions to the
problems that may be created by the revisions.20

11.
12.
note 8, at 33.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss2/1

Id.; Intellectual Disability, supra note 9.
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308–09; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.A.

164

: Nova Law Review 38, #2

326

NOVA LAW REVIEW

II.

[Vol. 38

MENTAL RETARDATION AND THE DEATH PENALTY

The history of mental retardation and the death penalty is a relatively
simple and straightforward one.21 Evidence of the relationship between the
two can be seen dating back as early as the late 1700s when a person that
was deemed by the court to be an idiot “was not subject to criminal
liability.”22 By today’s standards, an idiot would be a person with severe or
profound mental retardation.23 More recently, the Supreme Court of the
United States heard the case of Godfrey v. Georgia24 in 1980.25 In this case,
the Court “discussed the necessity of finding that a defendant has [a] higher
moral culpability than an average criminal in order for the death penalty to
be imposed.”26 The holding of this case will prove to be particularly
important for future defendants with mental impairments when capital
punishment is under consideration; their level of culpability is a factor that
will be assessed by the courts as a determination of whether this punishment
is appropriate.27
Nine years later, the Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari and heard the case of Penry v. Lynaugh28 in 1989; this was the first
time the Court would address the issue of execution of a mentally retarded
defendant.29 In this case, Johnny Paul Penry was sentenced to death after he
confessed to the rape and murder of Pamela Carpenter.30 In state court, a
clinical psychologist testified that Penry had mild to moderate mental
retardation and an IQ score between fifty and sixty-three.31 Despite this, the
jury found Penry competent to stand trial.32 The result of the trial was that
“[t]he jury rejected Penry’s insanity defense and found him guilty of capital
murder.”33

21.
See James W. Ellis, Disability Advocacy and the Death Penalty: The
Road from Penry to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REV. 173, 173 (2003).
22.
Lyn Entzeroth, Constitutional Prohibition on the Execution of the
Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant, 38 TULSA L. REV. 299, 307 (2002).
23.
Id. at 308.
24.
446 U.S. 420 (1980).
25.
Id. at 420.
26.
Änna M. Hagstrom, Atkins v. Virginia: An Empty Holding Devoid of
Justice for the Mentally Retarded, 27 LAW & INEQ. 241, 248 (2009).
27.
See Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 43233; Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 248.
28.
492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002).
29.
Ellis, supra note 21, at 174.
30.
Penry, 492 U.S. at 307.
31.
Id. at 307–08.
32.
Id. at 308.
33.
Id. at 310.
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In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States
specifically addressed the question of whether “it [is] cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment to execute a mentally retarded
person.”34 The result of this case was that the Court failed to find an Eighth
Amendment violation and stated that mental retardation should be viewed
only as a mitigating factor when considering sentencing.35 The Court also
stated that “[w]hile a national consensus against [the] execution of the
mentally retarded may someday emerge . . . there is insufficient evidence of
such a consensus today.”36 Despite the holding, after the Penry decision,
eighteen states enacted legislation granting categorical exemption to any
mentally retarded defendant from the death penalty.37
A.

A Brief History of the Death Penalty

Prior to Penry, in 1972, the Supreme Court of the United States
heard the case of Furman v. Georgia38 and held that in its current use, the
death penalty—also referred to as capital punishment—violated the Eighth
Amendment.39 In this case, three black men had each been accused of the
rape or murder of a woman and for this, they faced the death penalty.40 The
Eighth Amendment “bans the use of cruel and unusual punishment.”41
Specifically, the Eighth Amendment reads, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”42 In writing this amendment, the Framers of the Constitution were
aiming to prevent methods of punishment that would be equivalent to
torture.43 In their decision, the Supreme Court Justices had different
opinions and reasoning behind their choice of whether or not the death
penalty was unconstitutional per se, but did agree on the final holding that
the death penalty in its current form was cruel and unusual punishment.44
However, in 1976, the Supreme Court of the United States heard the
case that established the death penalty could be reinstated and was not

34.
Id. at 313.
35.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Penry, 492 U.S. at 340.
36.
Penry, 492 U.S. at 340 (emphasis added).
37.
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 812.
38.
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
39.
Id. at 239–40; Amanda M. Raines, Note, Prohibiting the Execution of the
Mentally Retarded, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 171, 177–78 (2002).
40.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 239, 252–53 (Douglas, J., concurring).
41.
Raines, supra note 39, at 177.
42.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
43.
Raines, supra note 39, at 177.
44.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40; Raines, supra note 39, at 178.
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entirely unconstitutional.45 Gregg v. Georgia46 presented a case in which the
defendant committed armed robbery and murder; he sought to challenge the
constitutionality of his death sentence.47 The Court held that, as a penalty for
murder, the death penalty does not violate the Eighth Amendment.48 “[T]he
goals of retribution and deterrence of capital crimes may be permissible” as
factors to be considered when making the determination of “‘whether the
death penalty should [or should not] be imposed.’”49 Simply put, to satisfy
the goal of retribution, the Court must determine if the crime committed is
serious enough to deserve the punishment.50 To make this determination, it
is important to note, “the punishment of death is sufficiently related to an
individual’s personal culpability.”51 Essentially, the levels of culpability of
the offender and severity of the punishment must match.52 The theory of
deterrence is based upon the idea that punishment would inhibit a criminal
from engaging in that particular behavior; capital punishment can only be
considered a deterrent if the murder is premeditated and deliberate.53 The
reason behind that is the cause and effect relationship between the crime and
the punishment.54 In making its decision, the Court noted that the
punishment of death could not be said to be disproportionate to the crime of
murder, in which another life is intentionally taken.55 Despite this holding,
opponents to the death penalty still believe that it should be abolished
completely for all offenders.56

45.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976); Kelly Christine Elmore,
Note, Atkins v. Virginia: Death Penalty for the Mentally Retarded—Cruel and Unusual—the
Crime, Not the Punishment, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1285, 1295 (2004).
46.
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
47.
Id. at 158, 162.
48.
Id. at 207; Elmore, supra note 45, at 1295.
49.
Holly T. Sharp, Determining Mental Retardation in Capital Defendants:
Using a Strict IQ Cut-Off Number Will Allow the Execution of Many That Atkins Intended to
Spare, 12 JONES L. REV. 227, 229–30 (2008); see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
50.
J. Amy Dillard, And Death Shall Have No Dominion: How to Achieve the
Categorical Exemption of Mentally Retarded Defendants from Execution, 45 U. RICH. L. REV.
961, 970 (2011).
51.
Hall, supra note 2, at 376.
52.
Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 247.
53.
Hall, supra note 2, at 377.
54.
Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 247.
55.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
56.
Sharp, supra note 49, at 232.
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The Atkins Case

In 2002, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in
the case of Atkins v. Virginia, a criminal case of murder from 1996.57 In this
case, the defendant, Daryl Renard Atkins, was convicted of abducting Eric
Nesbitt, robbing him of the money that he had with him, as well as forcing
him to make a cash withdrawal from an automated teller machine.58 That
evening, William Jones was also present and participated in the abduction
and robbery.59 Later on, Atkins and Jones, who had both been armed with
semiautomatic handguns the entire time, took Nesbitt to a remote location to
shoot him eight times, which resulted in his death.60
“Initially, both Jones and Atkins were indicted [under a] capital
murder” charge for what happened to Nesbitt.61 However, Jones made a deal
to plead guilty to first-degree murder in return for a full testimony against
Atkins; this gave him the sentence of life imprisonment and made it no
longer possible for him to receive the death penalty.62 During Atkins’ trial,
his and Jones’ stories matched up substantially with the exception as to who
actually took the shots resulting in Nesbitt’s death.63 As Jones did not have
any sort of mental deficiency, his testimony was clearer and seemingly more
credible to the jury than that of Atkins; Jones’ clear testimony provided the
jury with sufficient evidence of Atkins’ guilt.64
In the penalty phase of the trial, Dr. Evan Nelson, a forensic
psychologist, testified for the defense about his pre-trial evaluation of
Atkins.65 Taking into consideration “interviews with people who knew
Atkins, a review of school and court records, and the administration of a
standard intelligence test which indicated that Atkins had a full scale IQ of
[fifty-nine],” Dr. Nelson stated that Atkins was mildly mentally retarded and
had been consistently throughout his life.66 Despite this finding provided by
Dr. Nelson, the jury sentenced Atkins to death.67 After a second sentencing
hearing due to a misleading verdict form, the jury rendered the same
verdict.68 With influence from the dramatic shift made in state legislation in
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 307 n.1.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307 n.1.
Id. at 307.
See id.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 308–09.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309.
Id.
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favor of protecting mentally retarded defendants that had occurred since the
Penry decision, as well as the severe opinion of the dissenters, the Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari as that someday mentioned in
the Penry decision had finally arrived, and it was time to review the
relationship between mentally retarded criminal offenders and the death
penalty.69
C.

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders

While reviewing the facts of the case in order to reach a decision, the
Court used two similar psychological definitions to clearly understand Dr.
Nelson’s diagnosis that Atkins was mildly mentally retarded.70 While
multiple sources for a definition exist, the Court chose to use the DSM-IVTR and the similar definition of the American Association of Mental
Retardation (“AAMR”).71 These definitions may differ in language, but
offer the same conceptual information as to how to reach a diagnosis.72
Specifically, the DSM is a diagnostic manual created by the American
Psychiatric Association that classifies each type of mental disorder and
provides diagnostic criteria to be used for a diagnosis.73 The DSM is
particularly important, as it is the manual used by mental health professionals
to make a diagnosis for a patient.74 Psychologists and psychiatrists—and
their work—are important in the legal arena, as they serve as expert
witnesses in cases where the defendant’s mental health is called into
question.75
In the United States, the DSM is the primary tool used for mental
health professionals to make their diagnoses.76 The DSM uses a multiaxial
system, which assesses an individual on five different axes.77 These axes
each refer to a different area of information about that person, which helps
the clinician in creating a comprehensive evaluation of the person.78 This
system also contributes to a convenient format that allows the universal
69.
Id. at 307; Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989), abrogated by
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
70.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 & n.3.
71.
Id. at 308 n.3.
72.
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 819.
73.
John A. Zervopoulos, The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM): An Overview, in 2 EXPERT WITNESS MANUAL 1, 3 (1999); AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at xxiii.
74.
Zervopoulos, supra note 73, at 3.
75.
See id. at 2.
76.
Id. at 3.
77.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 27.
78.
Id.
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understanding of the diagnosis.79 In addition to diagnosis, the DSM also
serves as a tool to develop treatment plans and anticipate treatment
outcomes.80 DSM is so widely accepted that it is also used by the insurance
industry to determine appropriate reimbursements for psychological
treatments.81
As noted, psychologists and psychiatrists use the DSM in their
clinical practices to make diagnoses and can serve as expert witnesses in
death penalty cases involving potentially mentally retarded defendants.82
The expert must assess the defendant as they would if the defendant
individually sought their help in a private practice.83 Diagnosis is
particularly important for a mental health professional serving as an expert in
a capital case as their diagnosis will be determinative of the defendant’s fate;
it is a life or death determination.84 While it may not be a perfect forensic
tool and was not specifically designed for legal use,85 due to its importance
and overwhelming use in the mental health field, the Court chose to refer to
the DSM for information about the psychiatric diagnosis of mental
retardation.86 It has continued to be heavily relied upon for legal
determinations that involve some sort of mental impairment or dysfunction.87
DSM-IV-TR, the edition reviewed by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Atkins, does include a section in the introduction that
cautions about forensic usage of the Manual.88 It states “dangers arise
because of the imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate concern to the
law and the information contained in a clinical diagnosis.”89 It could be
argued that this warning is suggesting that mental health professionals should
limit their conduct to their own field of expertise as the DSM is intended for

79.
Id.
80.
Zervopoulos, supra note 73, at 4.
81.
Id.
82.
John Matthew Fabian et al., Life, Death, and IQ: It’s Much More than
Just a Score: Understanding and Utilizing Forensic Psychological and Neuropsychological
Evaluations in Atkins Intellectual Disability/Mental Retardation Cases, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
399, 403 (2011).
83.
See id.
84.
Id.
85.
See Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 265.
86.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002).
87.
Douglas A. Hass, Could the American Psychiatric Association Cause You
Headaches? The Dangerous Interaction Between the DSM-5 and Employment Law, 44 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 683, 692 (2013).
88.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra
note 5, at xxxii–xxxiii.
89.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at xxxiii.
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use of diagnosis in the mental health field and not for legal determinations.90
The addition of legal information into the DSM would prove to be more
problematic than helpful, which is why forensic additions have not been
included in new editions of the Manual.91 However, it is noted in the DSM
that with proper awareness of the risks and limitations, the DSM should
properly assist legal decision-makers in reaching their final conclusion.92
Despite the brief textual warning in the introduction that the DSM
should not be used for forensic purposes, as information may be
misrepresented, it is frequently used when law and psychology or psychiatry
intersect.93 “Courts, legislators, and government[al] agencies have relied on
the DSM[] as a persuasive” tool when making decisions in cases that involve
mental illness.94 For example, some state and federal statutes make use of
DSM definitions of mental illness or diagnostic criteria.95 Some states make
specific mention of the DSM while others just use the language found in it.96
The DSM is cited over 5500 times in court opinions, including other death
penalty cases.97 Courts have also referred to the DSM with the use of highly
respectful terms in several decisions.98 It is clear that the DSM has played an
important role in the legal world—through the development of legislation
and decisions made in the courtroom—and it will continue to do so.99
1.

Mental Retardation

As stated, the edition of the DSM that was current and in use during
Atkins was the DSM-IV-TR, which is a textual revision of the fourth
edition.100
According to the DSM-IV-TR, mental retardation “is
characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning—an IQ of
approximately [seventy] or below—with onset before age [eighteen] years

90.
Id.; Daniel W. Shuman, The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders in the Courts, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 25, 26 (1989).
91.
See Shuman, supra note 90, at 26–27; Ralph Slovenko, Editorial, The
DSM in Litigation and Legislation, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 6, 6 (2011).
92.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at xxxiii.
93.
Slovenko, supra note 91, at 6.
94.
Hass, supra note 87, at 692.
95.
Cia Bearden, Comment, The Reality of the DSM in the Legal Arena: A
Proposition for Curtailing Undesired Consequences of an Imperfect Tool, 13 HOUS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 79, 80 (2012).
96.
Id. at 97–98.
97.
Slovenko, supra note 91, at 6, 8.
98.
Hass, supra note 87, at 692.
99.
See Slovenko, supra note 91, at 11.
100.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002); AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at xxix.
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and concurrent deficits or impairments in adaptive functioning.”101 At the
time of publication, the prevalence rate of mental retardation was estimated
to be one percent of the population.102 The estimated number of incarcerated
offenders is two percent to twenty-five percent.103 Between four percent and
twenty percent of the offenders currently on death row are estimated to be
mentally retarded; of the three thousand five hundred, this comes out to
about one hundred forty to seven hundred people.104 This is a significant
number of people, which stresses why diagnosis is so important and will
impact the implementation of the Atkins holding; it could result in pardons
from the death penalty.105
The DSM-IV-TR defines the diagnostic features of mental
retardation as including three necessary criterions.106
The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is
accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in
at least two of the following skill areas: [C]ommunication, selfcare, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community
resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure,
health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before age
[eighteen] years (Criterion C).107

Each of the three diagnostic criterions is equally as important; all are
necessary for a person to receive a diagnosis of mental retardation and one
cannot be omitted.108 For example, even if an individual has an IQ score
lower than seventy, a diagnosis cannot be made if there is no impairment in
adaptive functioning.109 Per Criterion B, adaptive functioning is defined as
“how effectively individuals cope with common life demands and how well
they meet the standards of personal independence expected of someone in
their particular age group, sociocultural background, and community
setting.”110 This serves as a protection to ensure that the person is not just a

101.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 39.
102.
Id. at 46.
103.
Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath: Identifying Mentally Retarded
Offenders and Excluding Them from Execution, 30 J. LEGIS. 77, 86 (2003–2004).
104.
Id.
105.
Id. at 85–86.
106.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41.
107.
Id.
108.
See id. at 41–42, 47.
109.
Id. at 42.
110.
Id.
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bad test-taker.111 Adaptive functioning includes “self-direction, functioning
academic skills, work, leisure, health, safety, personal hygiene, self-control,
and aspects of unmanageable behavior” which are each taken into account
when a determination for adaptive functioning is made.112 Any third-party
contacts need to be carefully and thoroughly questioned about the individual
in order for an accurate evaluation of adaptive functioning to be made.113
Assessments do exist, but this type of determination is not one that is easily
assessed by a standardized test.114
The third and final prong, that is equally as important for diagnosis,
is that mental retardation exists and will present itself in childhood.115
Criterion C sets the specification that the person must show signs of
cognitive impairment before the age of eighteen.116 What this means is that a
person with seemingly normal cognitive function cannot unexpectedly
become mentally retarded as an adult.117 This criterion is also in place to
help clinicians with differential diagnosis; this allows them to distinguish
between mental retardation and other intellectual deficits that can be
acquired later in life due to a dramatic change such as brain trauma or
disease.118 Additionally, while a mentally retarded person can be taught
certain skills that can help them function in society in a more normal way,
they can never be fully cured with therapy; this is a chronic condition.119
When Criterion C is evaluated along with the first two criterions, if a
diagnosis of mental retardation is made, it can be sure that it is one that
would reflect the person as a whole including their psychosocial and
cognitive functioning.120
A diagnosis of mental retardation is further divided into four varying
degrees of severity: Mild, moderate, severe, and profound.121 The degree of
severity that is most questioned in a legal setting, particularly in Atkins cases,
is the lowest level—mild mental retardation—which is defined as having an

111.
JAMES R. EISENBERG, LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, AND DEATH PENALTY
LITIGATION 113 (2004).
112.
Id. at 113–14.
113.
Id. at 113.
114.
See id.; Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 846–47.
115.
Raines, supra note 39, at 176.
116.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41.
117.
Raines, supra note 39, at 176.
118.
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 854.
119.
Raines, supra note 39, at 176.
120.
EISENBERG, supra note 111, at 114; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IVTR, supra note 5, at 41.
121.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 39.
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“IQ level [fifty to fifty-five] to approximately [seventy].”122 Why is that? It
is because this group is the closest or borderline to the level of normal
cognitive functioning.123 This group, mild mental retardation, is the largest
group consisting of approximately eighty-five percent of those who have
mental retardation.124 They are described as having the “social and
vocational skills adequate for minimum self-support.”125 Those with this low
degree of severity should live successfully in a community setting either on
their own or under supervision.126
2.

Intelligence Quotient

For Criterion A of a mental retardation diagnosis, general intellectual
functioning is measured and classified by an IQ score.127 In order to assess
subaverage intellectual functioning, it is necessary to implement an
intelligence test.128 Several IQ tests exist and are used in psychometric
testing, so a single individual may have multiple true IQ scores based upon
their performance on each test they have taken.129 The standard and most
frequently used tests are the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test, 3rd edition
(“WAIS-III”) and the Standford-Binet.130 These assessments are designed to
measure a person’s general intelligence score by assessing a broad range of
skills that produce a final numerical score that correlates to his or her level of
mental functioning.131
This score, as it is assessed through the psychometric measures, is an
objective measure of a person’s cognitive performance.132 The person’s raw
122.
Id. at 42; see Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 825; Frank M.
Gresham, Interpretation of Intelligence Test Scores in Atkins Cases: Conceptual and
Psychometric Issues, 16 APPLIED NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 91, 92 (2009).
123.
See Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 88.
124.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 43.
125.
Id.
126.
Id.
127.
Id. at 41.
128.
David L. Rumley, Comment, A License to Kill: The Categorical
Exemption of the Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty, 24 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1299, 1315–
17 (1993); Sharp, supra note 49, at 231.
129.
Gresham, supra note 122, at 93.
130.
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 826; Alexis Krulish Dowling,
Comment, Post-Atkins Problems with Enforcing the Supreme Court’s Ban on Executing the
Mentally Retarded, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 773, 798 (2003); Penny J. White, Symposium,
Treated Differently in Life But Not in Death: The Execution of the Intellectually Disabled
After Atkins v. Virginia, 76 TENN. L. REV. 685, 692 (2009).
131.
Dowling, supra note 130, at 798; see also White, supra note 130, at 692–
93.
132.
See Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 95.
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score is compared to a norm that is predetermined to reach his or her result
IQ score.133 It is important for the courts to be vigilant as to which test was
administered to the defendant and how that particular test is to be interpreted,
as norms for each assessment differ.134 The result—the IQ score—and the
person’s performance on these tests are interpreted to determine if a
defendant has a mental deficiency and, if so, what degree of mental
retardation.135 In general, an IQ score of seventy or below must be obtained
in order to receive a diagnosis of mental retardation; the score serves as an
essential component in the defendant’s diagnosis.136 This score of seventy is
“two standard deviations below the mean” score of one hundred.137
However, it should be noted that in IQ assessment, “there is a measurement
error of approximately [five] points” depending on the testing instrument
used; due to this, mental retardation can also be found in individuals with IQ
scores from seventy to seventy-five that show the appropriate level of
adaptive behavior.138
a.

Potential Issues with IQ Scores

The IQ test, while it appears to be a convenient and relatively simple
tool, is deceiving, as it has been found to have flaws.139 In fact, it is often
referred to as an imperfect tool.140 There can be a discrepancy between what
the court believes an intelligence test measures and what it actually does
measure; the court and legal professionals are not trained in the
comprehension of psychometric measures.141 While these potential issues
are important to consider, reliance on the IQ score remains high, as it
remains heavily used and relied upon.142
One believed flaw of IQ tests is the Flynn Effect—the general
upward trend of IQ scores—which causes a need for the test norms to be
updated and recalculated so that the score can continue to provide an
accurate reflection of the actual IQ.143 James Flynn states that the mean IQ

133.
Dowling, supra note 130, at 798–99; Fabian et al., supra note 82, at 414;
see also Gresham, supra note 122, at 93.
134.
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 825.
135.
See Gresham, supra note 122, at 92.
136.
Clark, supra note 7, at 137; Rumley, supra note 128, at 1317.
137.
Sharp, supra note 49 at 231.
138.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41–42.
139.
Rumley, supra note 128, at 1329.
140.
Id. at 1333–34.
141.
See Gresham, supra note 122, at 96.
142.
Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 95.
143.
Gresham, supra note 122, at 93.
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of Americans increases three points per decade and 0.3 points per year.144
Flynn also believes that intelligence of a single individual does not change,
but the norm changes over time; it could be said that the Flynn Effect has no
impact on death penalty cases as it only concerns norms.145 However, the
problem arises when the IQ assessment used produces scores that rely
entirely on comparison to the norms for their meaning.146 It has also been
found that individuals may score differently on an intelligence test depending
on which point in the norming cycle the person took the assessment.147 For
example, a person’s performance may result in a score in the mentally
retarded range in the beginning of the cycle of a certain assessment and in a
more borderline range at the end of the cycle of that same assessment.148
The other important discrepancy with IQ assessment scores is
practice effects, which is the theory that those with cognitive dysfunction are
often administered multiple tests throughout their lifetime and that causes
inflated IQ scores.149 Due to this, it is known that practice effects occur, and
scores can increase due to the repeated administration of the measures; a
useful rule of thumb is to only use each assessment once a year with an
individual to reduce this effect.150 It is important to note that the smaller the
time interval between administrations of the test, the larger the practice effect
can be.151 The specific outcome of practice effects can also vary; factors that
can alter the performance include “the person’s age, their learning ability and
the time interval between testing.”152 This effect becomes problematic when
a person shows an overall increase in their IQ score, but continues to display
the same deficits in their adaptive functioning.153
Additionally, race and socioeconomic background have also been
found to alter an individual’s IQ score.154 Another possible influence on IQ
score is that a defendant may be able to fake their mental retardation by
purposely doing poorly on an IQ test; the faking of a mental illness is known
as malingering.155 However, even if attempted, the faking of a low IQ score
is difficult to do, and the IQ score is not the only consideration in a
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id. at 94.
Id.
EISENBERG, supra note 111, at 113.
Id.
Gresham, supra note 122, at 94–95.
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 839; Gresham, supra note 122, at

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Gresham, supra note 122, at 95.
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 839.
Id. at 840.
Sharp, supra note 49, at 243.
Id. at 245.

95.
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diagnosis.156 Despite the possibility that there may be some flaws in the IQ
testing system, the IQ score has remained an important factor in determining
the intellectual functioning of a person under the diagnostic criteria DSM-IV
as it is a more objective measure used by the mental health professional to
assess a person’s overall cognitive functioning; it has been continually used
in courts as well.157 Between adaptive functioning and IQ level, the
cognitive IQ tends to be the more stable of the two.158 However, some
believe the IQ score should not be the sole measure used to determine mental
retardation, and thus may not be suited for a legal use.159
3.

Adaptive Functioning

Criterion B describes a more subjective way of assessing the
intellectual functioning of an individual by means of their adaptive
functioning.160 This element, also referred to as adaptive behavior, includes
the mental health professional’s assessment of how much service or support
that a mentally retarded person needs.161 These limitations would affect the
individual’s daily life as well as any stressors in his or her daily life or
immediate environment.162 This measure is looking to “assess deficits in the
performance of adaptive behavioral skills, even more than in the acquisition
of such skills.”163 The reason that this measure is so subjective is that mental
health professionals must rely upon interviews and other information
collected from third parties to make their assessment.164 Other records, such
as those from school, medical professionals, employment, etc., are also
consulted, but those are also the result of a third party’s opinion or
interpretation.165 In addition, over two hundred instruments are available to
be used as a standardized assessment of adaptive behavior, but these
assessments face the same level of scrutiny as IQ assessments; the large
number of available tests shows the level of uncertainty as to what exactly is
to be tested to make the determination.166 Overall, this assessment is
156.
Id. at 246–47.
157.
See Gresham, supra note 122, at 93.
158.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 42.
159.
See Rumley, supra note 128, at 1333; Sharp, supra note 49, at 243.
160.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41–42; see also
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 849; White, supra note 130, at 699.
161.
White, supra note 130, at 699.
162.
Id. at 700.
163.
Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 96–97.
164.
White, supra note 130, at 700.
165.
Id.
166.
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 846; see White, supra note 130, at
700.
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particularly important for individuals with mild mental retardation, as it may
be the determining factor in diagnosis when the IQ score is close to
borderline range.167
D.

The Atkins Decision

The Court, by making use of a clinical definition of mental
retardation, “put professional standards of measurement, assessment, and
diagnosis in the center of Atkins adjudications.”168 The decision in Atkins
creates law that is highly dependent on psychological determinations.169
With the use of the clinical definition of mental retardation and psychometric
measure of IQ score, the Court concluded that the death penalty is not an
appropriate punishment for a criminal defendant that is mentally retarded.170
The Court reasoned that the mentally retarded defendant was “categorically
less culpable than the average criminal.”171 The public consensus from the
consistency in direction of change shown by the states was also a
contributing factor to the decision.172 The Court noted that it was “not so
much the number of these states that is significant, but the consistency of the
direction of change.”173 While looking at this, the Court found that mentally
retarded defendants should be punished in some way, but the death sentence
is not appropriate due to their lower level of personal culpability.174
The Court also held that execution of a mentally retarded person
failed to meet either of the two goals of capital punishment, retribution or
deterrence.175 These societal functions that the death penalty is supposed to
accomplish are not obtained with mentally retarded defendants.176 The goal
of retribution cannot be met with those that have mental impairments as they
are held to have a lower level of culpability.177 Therefore, in order “to ensure
that only the most deserving of execution are put to death, an exclusion for
the mentally retarded is appropriate.”178 Deterrence is not met either due to
167.
168.
169.
170.

Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 847.
Id. at 825.
Id. at 813.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002); Dillard, supra note 50, at

171.

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316; see Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432–33

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315; Hall, supra note 2, at 370.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315.
Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 250.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319–20; Sharp, supra note 49, at 234.
Clark, supra note 7, at 126.
Hall, supra note 2, at 376–77.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.

980.
(1980).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss2/1

178

: Nova Law Review 38, #2

340

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

the fact that the Court has held that a defendant with mental impairment
cannot make the appropriate connection between his or her impulsive
conduct—i.e. murder of another person—with the future punishment of
death due to the imposition of the death penalty.179 The inability to further
these two goals of the death penalty contributed to the Court’s decision to
provide a categorical exemption.180
A final consideration made by the Court was that mentally retarded
defendants face a higher possibility of wrongful execution.181 By nature of
their condition, mentally retarded defendants are at a disadvantage when it
comes to their defense.182 Mentally retarded defendants serve as poor
witnesses, do not serve as much help to their defense counsel, can get
confused easily, can appear to feel no remorse, and suffer other seemingly
negative results of their diminished capacity.183 In addition, mentally
retarded defendants have a much larger risk of making a false confession
than defendants with standard intellectual functioning.184 All of these factors
were considered and contributed to the Court’s decision that mentally
retarded defendants should belong to a categorical exemption and should not
face the death penalty.185
This decision is a unique one, as it expresses a constitutional rule
that is entirely dependent on a definition and diagnostic criteria from clinical
psychology.186 In this case, the Court established “a per se rule exempting
all persons with mental retardation from the death penalty based on diagnosis
alone.”187 The exemption includes all people with the diagnosis regardless of
what level of severity they are found to have.188 This makes the important
question to be answered in these types of cases to be whether or not the
defendant is mentally retarded; this is something that the Court disagreed on
how to determine and left this decision to the states.189 The class that will
prove to be the most difficult to protect and have the most controversy is the
mildly mentally retarded as they come closest to the normal border range.190
179.
Dillard, supra note 50, at 971.
180.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; Sharp, supra note 49, at 234.
181.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 252.
182.
Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 252.
183.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21; Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 252.
184.
Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 252.
185.
Id.
186.
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 813.
187.
Id. at 814.
188.
Id. at 823.
189.
Id. at 815–16; Helen Shin, Note, Is the Death of the Death Penalty Near?
The Impact of Atkins and Roper on the Future of Capital Punishment for Mentally Ill
Defendants, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 465, 479–80 (2007).
190.
See Gresham, supra note 122, at 92; Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 88.
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However, even with this decision, which essentially overrules Penry, the
death penalty remains an appropriate punishment “for a smaller, more
culpable class of defendants.”191
Justice Scalia makes an additional point about the purpose of the
death penalty in his dissent.192 An additional purpose of the death penalty is
to eliminate dangerous offenders; by doing this, the future crimes that they
may commit are effectively prevented.193 It is quite clear that this goal is
reached by the death penalty, as these offenders would no longer commit any
crimes.194 This, however, is a purpose that would be properly served
regardless of how high or low the offender’s IQ score is.195
1.

Determinations Left to the States

In making its decision, the Court neglected to implement a procedure
or designate a specific definition to be applied to determine if a defendant is
mentally retarded.196 By doing this, the Court left state lawmakers and
officials, and in a way, forensic psychologists or psychiatrists, the task of
determining how exactly to enact and properly implement their decision.197
The Court established some guidance by providing two similar definitions in
the cases that implement the same three main criteria for a diagnosis.198 It
could also be argued that the Court intended for the states to adopt one, or a
hybrid form of the two definitions cited in the decision, due to their
similarities.199 Its main determination was to justify the exemption of
mentally retarded defendants from the death penalty; the exact way to
enforce the exemption was not determined.200 Instead, the Court left this task
up to the states, as it had done in Ford v. Wainwright201 for the determination
of competency, and it became the task of the states to develop the
191.
White, supra note 130, at 687; see also Shin, supra note 189, at 481.
192.
Elmore, supra note 45, at 1330.
193.
Id.
194.
Id.
195.
Id.
196.
Dillard, supra note 50, at 969.
197.
Linda Knauss & Joshua Kutinsky, Into the Briar Patch: Ethical
Dilemmas Facing Psychologists Following Atkins v. Virginia, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 121, 121
(2004).
198.
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 812–13, 819.
199.
Id. at 818–19.
200.
Dillard, supra note 50, at 979.
201.
477 U.S. 399 (1986). “[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits states from
carrying out the death penalty on defendants who are insane. . . . However, the Court left it to
the individual states to determine the definition of competence for execution and the
procedures they should use to assess whether a prisoner meets the standard [for] insanity.”
Shin, supra note 189, at 474.
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appropriate means of enforcement.202 Many states have chosen to use the
DSM-IV-TR as their guidelines for making the determination of whether or
not a defendant is mentally retarded.203 If a state were to fail to exclude the
mentally retarded from facing the death penalty, that state would be in direct
violation of the Eighth Amendment.204 Despite this, after the decision was
made, state courts that did not agree with the decision could potentially use
this freedom from the Court and lack of a uniform standard as a way to evade
the Atkins decision.205
The possibility of other complications arose for all states that
complied; for example, the differences and discrepancies between the states
allow for the possibility that one individual “could be found [to be] mentally
retarded in one state, but not . . . another.”206 It depends on the exact
language that was chosen by the state to be enacted in its legislation to
determine what constitutes mental retardation.207 Even without giving a
direct definition for mental retardation, some argue that the Court should
have advised that the states not place as much weight on IQ test scores as
they do.208 However, many states seem to agree that the IQ score cutoff is a
particularly important factor to include in their legislation.209 There are
significant differences amongst the states; some are strict on the IQ score
requirement, while others are more vague by only demanding subaverage
intellectual functioning.210
In addition to a definition, the Court also left it up to the states to
determine the specifics of the procedure, including determining who would
be the fact finder, at which stage the mental functioning of the defendant
should be assessed, and what the suitable burden of proof would be.211 For
example, a majority of states with judicial procedures in place have chosen to
make this determination prior to the start of trial.212 Some states give the
task of determining mental retardation to a jury, while others give it to a trial
judge.213 By neglecting to designate a specific definition and procedure to
202.
Ford, 477 U.S. at 416–17; Dillard, supra note 50, at 978.
203.
Clark, supra note 7, at 137.
204.
White, supra note 130, at 688.
205.
See John H. Blume et al., An Empirical Look at Atkins v. Virginia and Its
Application in Capital Cases, 76 TENN. L. REV. 625, 626 (2009).
206.
Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 260.
207.
See id.
208.
Id. at 262–63, 265.
209.
Id. at 265.
210.
Paul S. Appelbaum, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: After
Atkins, 60 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1295, 1296 (2009).
211.
Blume et al., supra note 205, at 626–27.
212.
Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 114.
213.
Dillard, supra note 50, at 966.
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follow, the Court allows for considerable differences to exist from state to
state.214 These inconsistencies and differences in procedure and definition
could cause contradictory rulings on whether or not a defendant has mental
retardation.215
2.

Other Issues in Applying the Decision

Several other points of ambiguity and perplexity came to light with
the Atkins decision, such as the fact that the Court created a categorical
exemption in the Atkins case.216 The use of this general categorization of
exemption for those with mental retardation eliminates the entire idea of
individual sentencing in our legal system as far as this specific group of
individuals is concerned; it separates those with mental retardation from
everyone else.217 Beyond the separation between those with normal
cognitive functioning and those with impairments, the categorization treats
all those with mental retardation the same without any sort of distinction
made for the varying degrees of mental retardation.218 This creates a level of
equality amongst those with the disorder while diagnosis makes a
differentiation.219
In neglecting to provide a uniform standard for mental retardation,
there is also an issue with IQ assessment.220 Multiple assessment tools exist
to make an assessment, but each has their own set of norms.221 The lack of
uniform testing requirements may be highly problematic.222 Without a set
rule as to which test to use, psychologists must be ethical in their
determination of which test to administer; they must administer a current
edition of an assessment that they have the appropriate level of proficiency to
administer.223 The presence of a uniform rule as to which test to use would
eliminate some of the possible errors and ethical violations that can
potentially occur.224 The uniform rule would have to be updated frequently
as these tests are often revised and the courts would have to use a current
test.225 However, on the other side, the benefits of uniformity could be
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
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Hall, supra note 2, at 385.
Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 260.
Id. at 250; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
Elmore, supra note 45, at 1337.
Id.
See id.
Dowling, supra note 130, at 807.
See id. at 799–800.
See id. at 807.
See id. at 808.
See id. at 810.
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 828.
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outweighed by other disadvantages such as individualized selection for the
defendant and that the clinician should administer the test they feel most
competent using.226
Another important point is potential ethical dilemmas that will be
faced by the mental health professionals who will be assessing the specific
defendant.227 One of the main issues that will be faced by any forensic
psychologist is that they have the potential to do harm to their client;
psychologists, under their ethics code, are not to do any harm to their
clients.228 Additionally, these psychologists must be sure to go into their
assessment of the defendant without any sort of preconceived thoughts about
the crime on trial or what the outcome should be.229 Psychologists have to be
mindful of any possible factor that may cause an unfair or incorrect result on
the IQ assessment and properly account for these potential issues in their
determination and assessment.230 The psychologists in these cases are faced
with several potential ethical issues that they must avoid while trying to
generate the most honest and truthful assessment that they can.231
3.

Cases Since Atkins

In the time since the Atkins decision, many courts have encountered
cases with mentally retarded defendants.232 However, the floodgates did not
open for this type of litigation as was feared in the dissent by Justice Scalia;
there has not been a complete overflow of claims by criminal offenders
claiming to have mental retardation.233 Research shows that of the claims
made that have lost, most failed to prove either subaverage intellectual
functioning or significant limitations in adaptive functioning.234 Data also
shows that the Atkins decision has not been applied to the states in a uniform
way as could be expected from the differing legislation created by each
state.235
226.
Id.
227.
Knauss & Kutinsky, supra note 197, at 124.
228.
Id.
229.
Id. at 125.
230.
Id. at 128.
231.
See id. at 121–23.
232.
E.g., Jackson v. State, 963 So. 2d 150, 152 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006); see
also Blume et al., supra note 205, at 625, 628, 630.
233.
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 353 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Blume et al., supra note 205, at 639.
234.
See Blume et al., supra note 205, at 629–30.
235.
Id. at 629, 639; Elizabeth Dilts, Lawyers Worry New Measure of Mental
Retardation Could Prompt More Executions, REUTERS LEGAL, May 13, 2013, available at
http://archive.is/ToBPv.
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In regard to intellectual functioning, or analysis of the IQ score, prior
clinical research suggests that this should be only “a gateway to a rigorous
assessment of adaptive functioning.”236 This is because it is believed that the
employment of a strict cut-off of a score of seventy may wrongly exclude
those who deserve protection under Atkins.237 In an analysis of multiple
jurisdictions with various IQ cutoff points, it was found that over sixty
percent of those who successfully prove intellectual impairment had no
reported IQ scores over the score of seventy; it is also noted that fifteen
percent of defendants that have been successful with their Atkins claim have
had IQ scores that exceed seventy.238 A small number of successful Atkins
claims involve defendants that have never scored below a seventy on any
intellectual assessment.239 However, there have also been cases with less
success that focus on IQ score; one example is a case in Texas, where a
defendant met the requirement of having an IQ below seventy, but was not
exempted from capital punishment.240
There have been almost one hundred cases since the ruling in Atkins
in which defendants with death penalty sentences have been reduced when
the courts found that they met the necessary requirements to prove they were
mentally retarded.241 This is an impressive statistic considering that between
1976 and 2002, prior to Atkins, there were at least forty-one defendants
executed who would have been found to be mentally retarded and could have
been exempted.242 However, it seems less impressive when it is stated that
only a quarter of the inmates that have claimed to be mentally retarded have
received a stay of execution since the Atkins holding.243 Data shows that
there have been varying levels of success for proving adaptive deficits;
depending on which skill set was chosen as the definition for mental
retardation, which includes several.244 There have also been very few cases
that lose solely on the third prong, which requires onset before the age of
236.
Blume et al., supra note 205, at 631.
237.
Id. at 631–32.
238.
Id. at 632.
239.
Id.
240.
Dilts, supra note 235.
241.
John Blume, Sentence Reversals in Intellectual Disability Cases:
Defendants Whose Death Sentences Have Been Reduced Because of a Finding of “Mental
Retardation” Since Atkins v. Virginia (2002), DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://
deathpenaltyinfo.org/sentence-reversals-intellectual-disability-cases (last updated July 19,
2012).
242.
List of Defendants with Mental Retardation Executed in the United States:
1976–2002, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/list-defendantsmental-retardation-executed-united-states (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
243.
Dilts, supra note 235.
244.
Blume et al., supra note 205, at 634.
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eighteen.245
Together, these results show the inconsistency of the
implementation of Atkins.246
III.

THE DSM-5

The latest edition of the Manual was released in late May of 2013.247
This edition has been a work in progress for fourteen years as its
development began immediately following the release of DSM-IV.248 DSM5 was developed in hope of addressing concerns that had existed with the
prior editions.249 It was also created in order to match up more closely with
the World Health Organization (“WHO”) and their International
Classification of Diseases (“ICD”) as well as other important leading health
organizations; this will provide for more uniform diagnoses in the health
system.250 The newest edition of the Manual features several differences
compared to prior editions, such as a different organizational layout and a
removal of the prior multi-axial system.251 In this edition, all mental
disorders are considered to be on a single axis and are therefore, given equal
weight; prior editions had five axes of unequal weight.252 It is also the first
edition not to make use of traditional Roman Numerals because this edition
is intended to be a living document.253 The believed explanation for this
change to Arabic Numeration is that when new evidence surfaces or changes
occur, the Manual can be changed online which will produce constant
revisions, which will produce more editions labeled with a decimal.254 That
is the hypothesis as to why the decision was made to use the regular
numerical display for this edition.255 Each change and revision was made
245.
Id. at 636.
246.
Id. at 639.
247.
Timeline, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/about/Pages/
Timeline.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
248.
Hass, supra note 87, at 699; Darrel A. Regier et al., Commentary, The
Conceptual Development of DSM-V, 166 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 645, 646 (2009); Timeline, supra
note 247.
249.
Regier et al., supra note 248, at 646.
250.
Regier et al., supra note 248, at 647; Luis Salvador-Carulla et al.,
Intellectual Developmental Disorders: Towards a New Name, Definition and Framework for
“Mental Retardation/Intellectual Disability” in ICD-11, 10 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 175, 175
(2011); Intellectual Disability, supra note 9.
251.
Jerome C. Wakefield, DSM-5:
An Overview of Changes and
Controversies, 41 CLINICAL SOC. WORK J. 139, 140 (2013); Intellectual Disability, supra note
9.
252.
Wakefield, supra note 251, at 142; Intellectual Disability, supra note 9.
253.
Wakefield, supra note 251, at 140.
254.
Id.
255.
Id.
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carefully to improve the Manual and provide more effective treatment and
services.256
A.

Intellectual Disability (Intellectual Developmental Disorder)

The American Psychiatric Association states that “[t]he significant
changes [to intellectual disability] address what the disorder is called, its
impact on a person’s functioning, and criteria improvements to encourage
more comprehensive patient assessment.”257 In DSM-5, the first and most
noticeable difference to mental retardation is the name change; mental
retardation is now referred to as intellectual disability (intellectual
developmental disorder).258 “[T]he parenthetical name . . . is included in the
text to reflect deficits in cognitive capacity beginning in the developmental
period.”259
This change occurred for reasons including “policy,
administrative, and legislative purposes.”260 The new terms were carefully
selected to be widely used and understood261 as of when this name was
determined.262 The phrase intellectual disability is one that is commonly
used in the medical, educational, and other professional fields.263 This name
change will allow for a more universal understanding of what exactly the
disability is.264
In addition to the name change, the fifth edition emphasizes adaptive
functioning of the individual as opposed to the more heavy reliance on the IQ
score that is seen in DSM-IV-TR.265
DSM-5 emphasizes the need to use both clinical assessment and
standardized testing of intelligence when diagnosing intellectual
disability, with the severity of impairment based on adaptive
functioning rather than IQ test scores alone. By removing IQ test
scores from the diagnostic criteria, but still including them in the
text description of intellectual disability, DSM-5 ensures that they
are not overemphasized as the defining factor of a person’s overall

256.
Intellectual Disability, supra note 9.
257.
Id.
258.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33; Intellectual
Disability, supra note 9.
259.
Intellectual Disability, supra note 9.
260.
Salvador-Carulla et al., supra note 250, at 175.
261.
Id. at 176–77.
262.
Id. at 177.
263.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33.
264.
See id.
265.
Wakefield, supra note 251, at 143.
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ability, without adequately considering functioning levels. This is
especially important in forensic cases.266

Furthermore, the specification that the disability must be present
prior to the age of eighteen is removed and replaced with a more generalized
categorization of beginning in the developmental stage.267 This edition does
have some consistency with the prior edition as it states that the prevalence
rate of intellectual disability remains at one percent of the population268 and
still makes use of the four specifications for the degrees of intellectual
disability: Mild, moderate, severe, and profound.269 However, these degrees
of severity are now “defined on the basis of adaptive function[], and not IQ
scores” as it is the level of adaptive functioning that determines the level of
support that will be required for each level of severity.270
1.

Diagnostic Features

DSM-5 defines intellectual disability as “a disorder with onset
during the developmental period that includes both intellectual and adaptive
functioning deficits in conceptual, social, and practical domains.”271 In order
to receive this diagnosis, there are three criteria that must be met by the
individual, which was also true in the prior edition.272 In this edition, the
diagnostic features of intellectual disability are:
The essential features of intellectual disability
(intellectual developmental disorder) are deficits in general mental
abilities (Criterion A) and impairment in everyday adaptive
functioning, in comparison to an individual’s age-, gender-, and
socioculturally matched peers (Criterion B). Onset is during the
developmental period (Criterion C). The diagnosis of intellectual
disability is based on both clinical assessment and standardized
testing of intellectual and adaptive functions.273

266.
267.

Intellectual Disability, supra note 9.
Compare AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41, with
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 38.
268.
Compare AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 46, with
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 38.
269.
Compare AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 42, with
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33.
270.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33.
271.
Id.
272.
Id.; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41.
273.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 37.
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In regard to Criterion A, this refers to intellectual functioning.274 To
meet this, there must be “[d]eficits in intellectual functions . . . confirmed
both by clinical assessment and individualized, standardized intelligence
testing.”275 This includes things such as abstract thinking, practical
understanding, planning, and problem solving.276 IQ scores are used to
determine part of this and are only approximations of the individual’s
intellectual functioning.277 Clinical judgment should always be used when
interpreting the results of an IQ assessment to determine the level of
intellectual function.278
Criterion B assesses “[d]eficits in adaptive functioning that result in
[the] failure to meet developmental and sociocultural standards for personal
independence and social responsibility.”279 Adaptive functioning is assessed
in two ways; it is done with both clinical evaluations as well as with the use
of individualized psychometric measures.280 “Without ongoing support, the
adaptive deficits limit functioning in one or more activities of daily life . . .
.”281 There are three domains that are assessed by this criterion: Conceptual,
social, and practical.282
The conceptual—academic—domain involves competence in
memory, language, reading, writing, math reasoning, acquisition
of practical knowledge, problem solving, and judgment in novel
situations, among others. The social domain involves awareness
of others’ thoughts, feelings, and experiences; empathy;
interpersonal communication skills; friendship abilities; and social
judgment, among others. The practical domain involves learning
and self-management across life settings, including personal care,
job responsibilities, money management, recreation, selfmanagement of behavior, and school and work task organization,
among others.283

This criterion is met when at least one of the domains of adaptive functioning
is sufficiently impaired.284 Sufficient impairment is when the person needs
continual support in order to perform that function adequately in at least one
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
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life setting.285 Additionally, these adaptive functioning deficits must be
directly related to the intellectual deficit assessed for Criterion A.286
The final necessity, Criterion C, is that “[o]nset of intellectual and
adaptive deficits [is] during the developmental period.”287 Specifically, the
phrase developmental period refers to either childhood or adolescence; there
is no specific numerical age assigned to this period of time.288 The removal
of the cut-off age of eighteen is a significant change as this new term allows
for more subjective discretion.289 The DSM-5 states that the time of onset
may vary from person to person as it is dependent upon the specific and
individualized level of brain dysfunction.290 In order to make a proper
diagnosis, Criterion C, as well as both Criterion A and B, must be met by the
individual either within their specific history or past presentations or their
current presentation; in other words, all three must be met in order for an
individual to receive this diagnosis.291 The intended purpose of all of these
revisions was to “help clinicians develop a fuller, more accurate picture of
patients, a critical step in providing them with” treatment personally tailored
to each specific individual which will make it as effective as possible.292
B.

Cautionary Statement for Forensic Use

In its first few pages, the DSM-5 offers a cautionary statement
towards its use in forensic settings;293 this warning receives much more
emphasis compared to prior editions as it receives its own full page and
separate heading.294 It warns that it has been designed to assist mental health
clinicians in their work such as with assessments, diagnosis of patients, and
treatment plans.295 The warning stresses that the definition in this edition
was not developed to meet the needs of legal professionals.296 However, the
statement also states that if used appropriately, the DSM-5 can serve as a
useful tool to assist those in the legal profession to make necessary decisions
by providing the necessary information for a legal decision maker to
285.
Id.
286.
Id.
287.
Id. at 33.
288.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 38.
289.
See id.
290.
Id.
291.
Id.
292.
Intellectual Disability, supra note 9.
293.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 25.
294.
Compare AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at xxxvii,
with AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 25.
295.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 25.
296.
Id.
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understand the specific characteristics of a certain mental disorder.297 An
important point, particularly when assessing mental retardation, is that the
DSM-5 provides “diagnostic information about the longitudinal course
[which] may improve decision making when the legal issue concerns [the]
individual’s mental functioning at a past or future point in time.”298
However, as with prior editions, this edition does stress that the
information within its pages poses a risk for misuse or misunderstanding.299
It is noted that there is an imperfect fit between the DSM-5 information for a
clinical diagnosis and “the questions of ultimate concern to the law.”300 It
also stresses the importance of only trained, mental health professionals
using the Manual for the diagnosis of mental disorders.301 Finally, the
warning concludes that while the DSM-5 could be a helpful tool in the legal
field when used appropriately, it is important to note that the meeting of all
criteria for a certain disorder does not demonstrate the person’s behavior in
the particular moment in question.302
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF THESE CHANGES

As the DSM-5 has just been released, the direct result of the changes
remains to be seen, but it is inevitable that there will be ramifications
regarding the nation’s categorical ban of defendants with intellectual
disability from the death penalty.303 The now outdated DSM-IV-TR was
used as a guideline for many states when they created their legislation
regarding capital punishment for offenders with intellectual disability.304 As
mental retardation was revised to intellectual disability and the diagnostic
criteria has been revised, discrepancies and issues are likely to surface over
time in regard to the exact definition of intellectual disability for diagnosis.305
It will be important to deal with any issues quickly as this determination
could mean the difference between life and death for criminal defendants.306
The issues that will arise will be the direct result of the varying procedures
and definitions implemented by the each state’s legislation at the result of the
297.
Id.
298.
Id.
299.
See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at xxxvii; AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 25.
300.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 25.
301.
Id.
302.
Id.
303.
See id. at 33; Dilts, supra note 235; Hass, supra note 87, at 684.
304.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at xxiii, 39; Clark,
supra note 7, at 137.
305.
Appelbaum, supra note 210, at 1296.
306.
Id.
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Atkins case and definition and diagnostic criteria for the psychological field
in the DSM-5.307 The importance and use of the DSM in fields outside of
psychology is often overlooked, as are the implications of revisions made to
the Manual.308
The IQ score is highly emphasized in many state definitions, but has
been removed from the diagnostic criteria in the DSM-5.309 It can easily be
understood why it is hypothesized that this will cause confusion; a defendant
may meet the criterion for intellectual disability by an expert witness, but
may not meet the legislative standards for that state.310 The removal of the
focus on the objective assessment of an IQ score will inevitably cause
trouble in the courtroom as it “has traditionally been at the core of
diagnosing” intellectual disability.311 The focus for judges, attorneys, and
psychologists tends to remain on the IQ score.312 Even with the possible
negative effects, such as the Flynn Effect, the IQ score earned an important
spot in many state definitions.313 Variation did exist in the exact cut-off IQ
score used by states.314 For example, several states require an IQ below
sixty-five while others chose the traditional cut-off of seventy; however,
there are also states that chose not to identify a minimum IQ score in their
legislation.315 While it has been established that there are discrepancies
amongst the states as to how they define and implement their post-Atkins
procedures, regardless of their current system, problems are likely to arise.316
Most states modeled their current laws off of the clinical definition in the
DSM-IV-TR, that was current at the time of the Atkins decision, and made a
focus on the IQ score.317 With the revisions made to DSM-5, it is inevitable
that there are now differences between the state’s legal and new clinical
definition of intellectual disability.318 This will become problematic when
discrepancies exist between a diagnosis made by a testifying clinical forensic
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See Hass, supra note 87, at 684.
309.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33; see Hagstrom,
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See Gresham, supra note 122, at 93; Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 90.
314.
Natalie Cheung, Note, Defining Intellectual Disability and Establishing a
Standard of Proof: Suggestions for a National Model Standard, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 317, 327
(2013).
315.
Dowling, supra note 130, at 78991.
316.
See Clark, supra note 7, at 136, 139; Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 114.
317.
Clark, supra note 7, at 137; see also Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 89.
318.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33; Clark, supra note 7,
at 137; Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 89.
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psychologist who focuses on adaptive behavior, but the state court is looking
for an IQ score to make their determination.319
The focus now, according to DSM-5, is more on adaptive
functioning.320 According to DSM-5, this is a positive change as the IQ
scores became less valid on the lower end of the range where mild
intellectual disability is located.321 A focus on IQ has also been found to lead
to problematic outcomes in forensic settings.322 “IQ scores are too unreliable
and too sensitive to external factors for courts to rely on when a person’s life
is at stake.”323 Additionally, the new edition of the Manual states that IQ
scores are only approximations of a person’s intellectual functioning and
may not be sufficient enough to assess their functioning in real life
situations.324 However, as mentioned, most states put emphasis on the IQ
score in their legislation—which is no longer relevant for diagnosis—and
less concentration on adaptive behavior.325
Another problematic function of this shift is that adaptive
functioning is almost entirely based on third party accounts; while
assessments do exist, that is not the type of behavior that is easily assessed
with standardized testing.326 When it comes to adaptive behavior, there is
more difficulty in measurement and presentation of conclusive evidence to
the fact finder in court.327 Therefore, even as the need for clinical judgment
in the diagnosis has always been significant, the role of the psychologists
will become even more important.328 Their clinical judgment will be relied
upon even further for the subjective assessment of adaptive behavior.329
Even though it may seem minor, the change of the onset from age
eighteen to during the developmental period is also a cause for concern.330
This diagnostic factor was in place to help clinicians rule out other possible
319.
Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 260.
320.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33; see also Intellectual
Disability, supra note 9.
321.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33.
322.
Wakefield, supra note 251, at 143.
323.
Sharp, supra note 49, at 247.
324.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 37.
For example, a person with an IQ score above seventy may have such severe
adaptive behavior problems in social judgment, social understanding, and other
areas of adaptive functioning that the person’s actual functioning is comparable to
that of individuals with a lower IQ score. Thus, clinical judgment is needed in
interpreting the results of IQ tests.

Id.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
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Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 265.
Id. at 254, 260, 262, 265.
Id. at 262, 265.
See Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 825, 849.
Id.
Id. at 854–55.
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diagnoses—such as brain injury—that can occur later in life.331 In the
alternative, it could provide protection for younger defendants who never
took an intellectual assessment when they were below the age of eighteen.332
While before the age of eighteen and during the developmental period are
intended to refer to the same time frame, the lack of a solid age cut-off may
allow more room for malingering.333 The age-of-onset criterion served as a
safeguard to keep a defendant from being able to feign an intellectual
disability, but with a less restrictive terminology now in place, this safeguard
may not be as strong.334
So, why is this important? Changes and complications are in store
for the legislation that requires use of the DSM, particularly Atkins cases.335
The exact result will be dependent on the state in which the trial is
occurring.336 The reasons for that are the varying definitions and procedures
in place in each state for dealing with capital punishment and intellectually
disabled criminal offenders.337 However, despite these differences, a strong
fear has developed among defense attorneys, as their hypothesis is that this
new edition will allow for more executions of those that Atkins sought to
protect.338
Death penalty lawyers fear that this revision will allow courts to
execute offenders with IQ scores below seventy more easily.339 Arguably,
this shift in focus can give states more room to subvert the decision made in
Atkins and allow the execution of a mentally retarded defendant in the mild
range.340 The determination of adaptive functioning is exceptionally more
subjective than an IQ score, which will undoubtedly allow for each side to
have an expert witness arguing the alternative opinions on the diagnosis.341
By replacing a diagnosis that requires one objective part and one subjective
part with a fully subjective assessment, it gives courts more room to avoid
following the Atkins decision if they so choose.342 Research has found that
jurors have stereotypes of how they believe intellectual disability should
manifest.343 If a jury is the fact finder, it is more likely for a person with
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
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mild mental retardation to be executed, as they are unlikely to meet the
standards of the stereotype; the jury may not accept the subjective
assessment by a psychological expert witness because they will realize there
is room for interpretation in the diagnosis.344 If the decision is for a judge to
make and the defendant falls into a gray area for diagnosis based on their
level of adaptive behavior, the judge has room to interpret the facts and use
his or her own discretion to make a decision;345 this is a cause for concern as
judges are not trained in this field.346 Defendants with IQ scores lower than
seventy have been executed in the past several years despite the Atkins
decision, and the DSM revision is highly likely to make this worse with the
change to more subjective diagnostic criterion.347
With a focus on adaptive function, this could lead to more
executions of those the Atkins holding was intended to protect.348 It is
believed that the removal of adaptive behavior from the requirements could
actually bar more executions than required by the Atkins decision.349 A focus
on this requirement of adaptive functioning allows for more erroneous
findings of intellectual disability.350 With adaptive function, the focus is
always on the weaknesses and never the strengths.351 If the focus were to
return to the IQ score, the reach of Atkins exemption could arguably be
expanded.352
The DSM work group defends their decision and states that they do
not agree with the fear of the defense attorneys.353 The American Psychiatric
Association is a large organization that represents thousands of psychiatric
professionals; its goal is for them to all work together and create the best
mental heath care possible.354 Additionally, the prior focus on IQ scores is
more likely to result in a mentally retarded defendant facing the death
penalty due to its inherent limitations.355 A single IQ point could be the
difference between life and death for an offender if additional clinical
interpretation and analysis is not considered.356 For example, in a stricter
344.
345.
346.
347.

Id. at 339, 342–43.
Fabian et al., supra note 82, at 421.
See id. at 401.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 37–38; Dilts, supra

348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 824.
Id.; see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319, 320–21 (2002).
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 824.
Fabian et al., supra note 82, at 421.
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 824.
See Dilts, supra note 235.
Cheung, supra note 314, at 321.
Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 264–65; Rumley, supra note 128, at 1338–39.
Dilts, supra note 235.

note 235.
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cut-off state, such as Kentucky, a defendant must have an IQ score of
seventy or lower in order to be considered to have an intellectual
disability.357 An IQ score does not allow a legal fact finder to see the whole
picture of who the defendant is and why they did what they did, but it does
give them a numerical value as a comparison to assess their intellectual
function, which makes their execution more likely.358 The DSM work group
believes that their revision should be helpful to the courts by shifting the
attention to adaptive behavior; this way, the courts can analyze the defendant
more thoroughly and make more accurate decisions about the defendant’s
mental abilities.359
If the DSM does have a negative impact and results in the death of
more mentally retarded defendants, this is a violation of the protection
ensured to mentally retarded offenders by the Atkins decision.360 That
holding was intended to protect them from cruel and unusual punishment.361
In the Atkins holding, the Supreme Court of the United States intended to
provide a categorical protection to those with intellectual disability by
providing exemption from the death penalty that is now challenged by the
changing diagnostic criteria of intellectual disability.362 With this new
update to the diagnostic criteria of intellectual disability and the already
existing discrepancies amongst the states, confusion is inevitable and the
need for a uniform definition is even clearer.363
A.

Possible Solutions

In cases where the court is unclear as to whether or not a defendant
has an intellectual disability, the court should revisit the deciding factors in
the Atkins holding.364 The court should consider the goals of capital
punishment—deterrence and retribution—and whether they will in fact be
furthered by the death of the defendant.365 In the end, “the court[] must
conclude both that the defendant was more morally culpable than the average
criminal and that the rationale behind the death penalty applies”
appropriately to justify the most severe punishment in the country.366 In
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
U.S. at 321.
363.
364.
365.
366.
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addition, the states may just want to consider revising their legislation to
include the updated diagnostic criteria.367 Each state still has the ability to
determine the definition used to make their legislation to categorically
exempt intellectually disabled defendants.368 By making a revision, the court
can be assured that they will properly determine if the death penalty is
appropriate when faced with an Atkins case.369 Going back to the original
decision may help courts make a more appropriate decision.370
Another seemingly simple solution, however, would be to implement
a uniform national standard.371 A countrywide standard would eliminate the
state-to-state discrepancies.372 The new standard should be made in
accordance with the current psychological definition and diagnostic criteria
in the DSM-5 as well as the Atkins decision.373 In addition to eliminating the
confusion created by having multiple definitions, the standard should also
include procedural information such as when this determination should be
made, as well as whether the judge, jury, or both should make it.374 This
would prevent the possibility of different holdings for the same person
depending on which state their trial was held in.375 By embracing the new
edition of the DSM and finally creating a uniform way to enforce the Atkins
holding, those that the Atkins decision intended to protect are more likely to
be spared from execution.376
V.

CONCLUSION

In 2002, the Supreme Court of the United States made a
groundbreaking decision in Atkins v. Virginia and their decision created a
categorical exemption for mentally retarded offenders.377 However, their
lack of a uniform standard or specific guidance for the states regarding a
definition of mental retardation led the states to make their own decision
regarding legislation.378 Many states relied upon the DSM-IV-TR definition
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.

Cheung, supra note 314, at 344–45; see also Hall, supra note 2, at 385.
Dilts, supra note 235.
See Cheung, supra note 314, at 344.
Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 274–75; see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
Cheung, supra note 314, at 344.
See id.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at

374.
375.
376.

Cheung, supra note 314, at 348–49.
See id. at 344, 348–49.
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note

377.
378.

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304, 321.
Id. at 317; Cheung, supra note 314, at 326.

33.

8, at 25.
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that was cited in the Court’s decision, as it is not only present in the written
decision, it is also an important and highly used book in the psychological
field throughout the United States.379 The newly released fifth edition of
DSM makes significant revisions to intellectual disability, previously known
as mental retardation.380 In doing so, it is possible that the already
complicated implementation of post-Atkins legislation will become even
more convoluted.381 Defense lawyers fear that these changes will undermine
Atkins by allowing the courts to more easily execute a mentally retarded
defendant, but those behind the new edition of the DSM do not agree and do
not believe their revisions will be problematic.382 As the edition was
released so recently, these fears have yet to become reality.383 However, it is
an important point to be aware of, as it will inevitably have an effect on
criminal defense lawyers and courts that hear capital punishment cases with
mentally retarded offenders.384 These revisions and their implications are
something that the courts should be vigilant of and the states may want to
take in consideration.385

379.
See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 963 So. 2d 150, 154 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006);
see Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 39.
380.
Compare AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33, with AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41–42.
381.
Dilts, supra note 235; see AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8,
at 33.
382.
Dilts, supra note 235; see Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33.
383.
See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33; Dilts, supra
note 235.
384.
See Dilts, supra note 235.
385.
Dilts, supra note 235; see AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8,
at 33.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

With mass murders on the rise, the public demanded legislative
action to ameliorate the issue. Thus far, the legislature’s response has been
primarily comprised of gun reform proposals.1 Congress has been flooded
with bills and acts that call for stricter licensing practices, more in-depth
background checks, or bans on assault weapons and high capacity
magazines.2 However, the solution to the mass murder problem does not
likely lie within gun control, but rather, within prescription drug control.3
Antidepressant and antipsychotic medications are known to increase suicidal,
homicidal, and violent tendencies in some users.4 Individuals such as James
E. Holmes, Seung-Hui Cho, and Eric Harris were prescribed antidepressant
or antipsychotic medications.5 Afterward, these same individuals committed
the mass murders at Aurora Century movie theater, Virginia Polytechnic

* Marissa Duquette will graduate from Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center, in May 2015. Duquette would like to thank the board members and her
colleagues at the Nova Law Review for persistently working to improve and refine this article.
She would also like to thank Professors Rex Ford and Michael Richmond for their guidance
and support, as well as her family—Scott, Marie, and Rosco—for all of their dedication and
encouragement.
1.
See Jana R. McCreary, “Mentally Defective” Language in the Gun
Control Act, 45 CONN. L. REV. 813, 831 (2013).
2.
See id. at 832; JEFFREY A. ROTH & CHRISTOPHER S. KOPER, NAT’L INST. OF
JUSTICE, IMPACTS OF THE 1994 ASSAULT WEAPONS BAN: 1994–96 1 (1999).
3.
Jerome R. Corsi, Psych Meds Linked to 90% of School Shootings, WND
(Dec. 18, 2012, 10:16 PM), http://www.wnd.com/2012/12/psych-meds-linked-to-90-ofschool-shootings/; Bob Unruh, Are Meds to Blame for Cho’s Rampage?, WND (Apr. 23,
2007, 1:00 AM), http://www.WND.com/2007/04/41218.
4.
Corsi, supra note 3; Unruh, supra note 3.
5.
Corsi, supra note 3; see McCreary, supra note 1, at 823, 824 n.54.
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Institute and State University, and Columbine High School, respectively.6 A
simple analogy illustrates the point.
A drunk driver swerves off of the road and onto a crowded sidewalk,
killing some and injuring others. Nobody blames the vehicle. Legislators do
not call for sports car bans. The Department of Motor Vehicles is not
criticized for its failure to perform a more thorough background check before
issuing the driver’s license. Rather, society blames alcohol and its ability to
impair normal human functions.
Contrastingly, a drug-addled college student storms onto campus and
proceeds to slaughter thirty-two students with two semiautomatic handguns:
A Walther P22 .22 caliber and a Glock 19 9-mm.7 A sizeable number of
people blame the firearms.8 Legislators call for assault weapon bans and
high capacity magazine bans.9 The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms (“ATF”) is criticized for its inability to establish an effective
federal background check system.10 Very few people blame the college
student’s prescription medication and its ability to induce suicidal,
homicidal, and violent behavior.11
This article proposes that the gun—like the car—should not be the
subject of further regulation.12 Antidepressant and antipsychotic medications
should bear the blame for their capacity to induce violent behavior in users.13
As such, the pharmaceutical industry—not the gun industry—should be the
legislature’s focus if the mass murder problem is to be solved.14
This article begins with an overview of American gun control to
date.15 It then analyzes the legislature’s failure to curb mass shootings
through stricter gun laws.16 In doing so, the article negates two common
misconceptions: First, that gun control reduces the number of firearms in
criminal hands; and second, that a European-style ban on firearms would be
a possible and effective solution to the mass shooting problem.17 While
6.
McCreary, supra note 1, at 823–24; Corsi, supra note 3.
7.
McCreary, supra note 1, at 824, 829; see also Corsi, supra note 3; Unruh,
supra note 3.
8.
See Unruh, supra note 3.
9.
See ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 1.
10.
See Mark B. Melter, The Kids are Alright; It's the Grown-ups Who Scare
Me: A Comparative Look at Mass Shootings in the United States and Australia, 16 GONZAGA
J. INT'L L. 33, 55–56 (2012).
11.
See Corsi, supra note 3.
12.
See infra Part IV.
13.
See infra Part IV.
14.
See infra Part IV.
15.
See infra Part II.
16.
See infra Part III.
17.
See infra Part III.
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invalidating those false impressions, the article displays how increased gun
availability actually lowers mass shooting rates.18 The article then discusses
the link between mass shootings and prescription drug use and details how
such violence can actually be a treatment-induced problem.19 Finally, the
article closes with a new way for legislators to respond to the mass murder
problem.20 This involves a shift in responsibility from the gun industry to the
pharmaceutical industry by putting liability on the latter, and requiring drug
compatibility tests to be administered prior to prescribing a medication.21
II.

THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN GUN LEGISLATION

Modern gun control debates in the United States are typically
preceded by a tragic event; most often it is a mass shooting.22 However,
prior to the 1900s, gun control laws were enacted in response to slave
uprisings and were primarily aimed at keeping slaves and freedmen from
obtaining firearms.23 In 1911, New York enacted the Sullivan Law as a
response to the widely publicized shooting of novelist David Graham
Phillips.24 The Sullivan Law required that a permit be obtained before an
individual was allowed to possess or carry a handgun.25 This was among the
first major forms of gun control outside of the South.26
Prohibition in 1919 spurred alcohol smugglers and distillers to
engage in turf wars with one another, culminating in the St. Valentine’s Day
Massacre ten years later.27 Such extreme gun violence prompted legislators
to pass the National Firearms Act (“NFA”), which targeted the gangs’
weapons of choice: Machine guns and short-barreled shotguns.28 This Act
did not expressly prohibit the possession of such arms, but it did make
ownership of them financially infeasible.29 For example, the Thompson
M1928 (“Tommy Gun”)—a notoriously popular gun for smugglers and
18.
See infra Part III.
19.
See infra Part IV.
20.
See infra Part V.
21.
See infra Part V.
22.
McCreary, supra note 1, at 831; Corsi, supra note 3.
23.
David B. Kopel, The Great Gun Control War of the Twentieth Century—
and Its Lessons for Gun Laws Today, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1527, 1529 (2012).
24.
Peter Duffy, 100 Years Ago, a Killing that Spurred a Gun Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2011, at A.21; Author Phillips Shot Six Times; May Recover, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
24, 1911), http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F20911F93C5517738DDD
AD0A94D9405B818DF1D3.
25.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1529.
26.
Id.
27.
Id. at 1531.
28.
See id. at 1531, 1533.
29.
See id.
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gangsters—typically sold for around two hundred dollars in that time
period.30 The NFA placed a two hundred dollar flat tax for possessing that
gun, as well as any other machine gun or short-barreled shotgun.31 Hence,
owning a Tommy Gun after the ratification of the NFA would cost four
hundred dollars.32 Taking inflation into consideration, that is the equivalent
of $5,386.29 today, thus making possession of such a weapon practically
unachievable.33
Shortly after the NFA, Congress passed the Federal Firearms Act of
1938 (“FFA”).34 Under this Act, firearms dealers had to keep a record of all
gun sales and obtain a license before they could acquire or ship any weapon
over state lines.35 Additionally, the Act made it “unlawful for any person
who [was] convicted of a [violent crime] ‘to receive any firearm or
ammunition which had been shipped’” over state lines; as such, firearms
dealers were responsible for ascertaining that any prospective buyer had not
been previously convicted of a violent crime.36
In 1939, the NFA and the FFA were discussed in detail by the
Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Miller.37 In that case,
two defendants were charged with violating the NFA and the FFA when they
transported a sawed-off, double-barreled shotgun over state lines.38 In
response, the defendants argued that the Acts violated their Second
Amendment rights.39 Justice McReynolds, writing for the majority, found
that the Second Amendment did not protect the individual right to possess a
sawed-off double-barrel shotgun since it was not a common-use weapon and
bore no relationship to the preservation of a well-regulated militia.40
Although the Court tried to make it clear that the right to bear arms was an
individual right rather than a collective or states’ right,41 the decision in

30.
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FBI: A
CENTENNIAL HISTORY, 19082008 16 (2008); see BILL YENNE, TOMMY GUN: HOW GENERAL
THOMPSON’S SUBMACHINE GUN WROTE HISTORY 86 (2009).
31.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1533.
32.
See YENNE, supra note 30, at 86; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1533.
33.
See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
34.
15 U.S.C. § 902(f) (1938) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012));
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1533–34.
35.
15 U.S.C. § 902(f); Kopel, supra note 23, at 1534.
36.
15 U.S.C. § 902; United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 263 (3d Cir. 1942),
rev’d, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); Kopel, supra note 23, at 1534.
37.
307 U.S. 174 (1939).
38.
Id. at 175.
39.
Id. at 176.
40.
Id. at 175, 178.
41.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579–80, 592 (2008).
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Miller resulted in nationwide misinterpretation of the Second Amendment.42
One example comes from Commonwealth v. Davis,43 in which the state’s
supreme court said:
[T]he declared right to keep and bear arms is that of the people, the
aggregate of citizens; the right is related to the common defense;
and that in turn points to service in a broadly based, organized
militia.
....
[The Second Amendment] is not directed to guaranteeing the
rights of individuals, but rather, as we have said, to assuring some
freedom of State forces from national interference.44

From 1939 to 2008, courts across the United States erroneously used Miller
to justify otherwise unconstitutional restrictions on Second Amendment
rights.45
In 1967, New York City mandated long-gun registration.46
Eventually, the registry information was used to confiscate those firearms
after the city council erroneously decided that rifles and shotguns were
assault weapons.47 When federal legislators attempted to adopt New York
City’s gun registration methods, the House of Representatives amended
statutes to explicitly forbid federal agencies from compiling any information
that could be used for a national gun registry.48
The Gun Control Act of 1968 (“GCA”) slightly altered the recordkeeping requirements set forth by the FFA.49 It required firearms dealers to
record a buyer’s personal information and the gun’s identifying features such

42.
Id. at 627 (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 179); United States v. Warin, 530
F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976) (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178); Stevens v. United States, 440
F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971) (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d
261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942), rev’d, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 174);
Commonwealth v. Davis, 343 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Mass. 1976) (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 177–
78); Kopel, supra note 23, at 1550.
43.
343 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1976).
44.
Id. at 848–50.
45.
Warin, 530 F.2d at 106–07 (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178); Stevens, 440
F.2d at 149 (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178); Tot, 131 F.2d at 266 (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at
174); Davis, 343 N.E.2d at 850 (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 177–78).
46.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1541.
47.
Id.
48.
Id. at 1565–66.
49.
Id. at 1534, 1545. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(5) (2012), with 27 C.F.R.
§ 478.11 (2014).
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as its model and serial number on Form 4473 for each gun sale.50 Although
Form 4473 is a federal form, the gun sale would be registered by the dealer
and “would not be collected in a [national] registration list.”51 The pool of
civilians who were legally allowed to purchase or possess a firearm from a
licensed dealer was also the subject of GCA restrictions.52 Whereas the FFA
only prohibited gun sales to individuals convicted of a violent crime, the
GCA further prohibited gun and ammunition sales to illicit drug users and
those who were mentally defective.53
In the years following the enactment of the GCA, the phrase
mentally defective was interpreted differently by courts across the United
States.54 In 1973, the Eighth Circuit decided that a mental illness was not
synonymous to a mental defect.55 Rather, the court determined that “[a]
mental defective . . . is a person who has never possessed a normal degree of
intellectual capacity, whereas . . . an insane person[’s] faculties which were
originally normal have been impaired by [a] mental disease.”56 Therefore, in
the Eighth Circuit, individuals with a subnormal level of intelligence were
barred from owning guns, but individuals suffering from schizophrenia,
bipolar disorder, or a personality disorder were entitled to full Second
Amendment rights.57
In Huddleston v. United States,58 the Supreme Court attempted to
improve the lower courts’ ability to analyze the language of the GCA’s
prohibited persons categories.59 The Court stated that the ultimate goal of
the GCA was to keep “‘lethal weapons out of the hands of criminals, drug
addicts, mentally disordered persons, juveniles, and other persons whose
possession of them is too high a price in danger to us all to allow.’”60
Although this statement may have provided lower courts with the legislative

50.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1545; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(5).
51.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1545–46.
52.
McCreary, supra note 1, at 816.
53.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1546; McCreary, supra note 1, at 816. Compare
18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (2012), with 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2014).
54.
See United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2012); United
States v. Giardina, 861 F.2d 1334, 1337 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Hansel, 474 F.2d
1120, 1123–24 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Vertz, 102 F. Supp. 2d 787, 788 (W.D. Mich.
2000).
55.
Hansel, 474 F.2d at 1124.
56.
Id.
57.
Id. at 1125; McCreary, supra note 1, at 818 n.17, 844–45.
58.
415 U.S. 814 (1974).
59.
Id. at 823, 825.
60.
Id. at 825.
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intent behind the Act, it merely replaced the phrase mentally defective with
mentally disordered, which did little to actually clarify the definition.61
The ATF eventually revised its definition of the mentally defective
class of individuals who were not allowed to possess a firearm.62 To belong
to this class, an individual needed:
(a)
A determination by a court, board, commission, or other
lawful authority that a person, as a result of marked subnormal
intelligence, or mental illness, incompetency, condition, or disease:
(1)

Is a danger to himself or to others; or

(2)
Lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his own
affairs.
(b)

The term shall include—

(1)

A finding of insanity by a court in a criminal case; and

(2)
Those persons found incompetent to stand trial or found
not guilty by reason of lack of mental responsibility . . . .63

Correspondingly, there was no longer an issue as to whether mentally
defective referred to mental illness or subnormal intelligence; the term
encompassed both characteristics, and either one could disqualify an
individual from firearm possession.64 However, courts faced a new problem:
Whether commitment to a mental institution qualified as an adjudication of
mental defectiveness.65
In United States v. Giardina,66 the Fifth Circuit found that
involuntary hospitalization would not disqualify an individual from the right
to buy and possess a firearm under the statute.67 The court in United States
v. Vertz68 went even further, finding that adjudication by a probate judge that
a defendant required treatment because he was mentally ill was “not
61.
McCreary, supra note 1, at 846 (noting that courts have been known to
muddy the waters when it comes to interpreting the meaning of mentally defective). Compare
18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (2012), with Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 825.
62.
27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2014).
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
See United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 47, 49 (1st Cir. 2012);
United States v. Giardina, 861 F.2d 1334, 1337 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Vertz, 102 F.
Supp. 2d 787, 791 (W.D. Mich. 2000).
66.
861 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir. 1988).
67.
Id. at 1337.
68.
102 F. Supp. 2d 787 (W.D. Mich. 2000).
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sufficient to bring [the defendant] within the statute,” because “[t]he probate
court made no finding that [the defendant] was a danger to himself.”69
Finally, United States v. Rehlander70 established that full due process of law
was required before any individual’s Second Amendment rights could be
denied; as such, a voluntary commitment to a mental institution or a
commitment for observation would not bar an individual from buying a
firearm in the future.71 Although the ATF’s new definition was intended to
clarify the Legislature’s intent in enacting the GCA—“keeping ‘[guns] out of
the hands of . . . [those] whose possession of them is too high a price in
danger’”—it seems as though it just shifted the courts’ focus further away
from public safety concerns, and onto the Fifth Amendment rights of the
mentally ill.72
In 1986, Congress decided that “the rights of citizens to keep and
bear arms under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution . .
. require additional legislation to correct existing firearms statutes and
enforcement policies.”73 Accordingly, the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act
(“FOPA”) was made law that year.74 Originally, one of the major proposals
of the Act would have banned most of the center-fire rifle ammunition in the
United States, since Republican Mario Biaggi put forward a cop-killer bullet
ban and over-broadly defined what that would include.75 Fortunately, the
National Rifle Association made a compromise with Biaggi and modified the
text of the Act to simply “ban[] a category of ammunition that was no longer
being produced for the retail market.”76 In addition to banning certain types
of ammunition, “FOPA . . . banned the sale of new machine guns . . . to the
public,” placed restrictions on the ATF’s power, forbade federal gun
registration, and required firearms dealers to report certain gun sales directly
to the Attorney General.77 Specifically, FOPA required firearms dealers to
provide a report to the Attorney General when any one purchaser bought two
or more firearms within a five-day period.78
Although the FFA, GCA, and FOPA all specified classes of the
population that were ineligible to purchase a firearm, licensed firearms

69.
Id. at 788.
70.
666 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2012).
71.
Id. at 48–49.
72.
Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 825 (1974).
73.
Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 1, 100 Stat. 449,
449 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012)).
74.
Id.
75.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1572.
76.
Id. at 1573.
77.
§ 103, 100 Stat. at 455; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1574.
78.
§ 103, 100 Stat. at 455.
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dealers had no way of confirming a prospective buyer’s eligibility.79
Purchasers simply had to certify in writing that they were not a member of a
disqualified class—such as a convicted felon or adjudicated as mentally
defective—and the licensed dealer had to trust that this information was
true.80 Of course, ineligible individuals wishing to obtain a firearm were
inclined to falsely certify their eligibility, so in 1993, Congress attempted to
ameliorate this problem through the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act (“Brady Bill”).81
The Brady Bill mandated a five-day waiting period before a licensed
dealer could release a gun to a purchaser.82 In that five-day period, licensed
dealers collaborated with the local chief law enforcement officers, who
conducted a background check to verify the purchaser’s eligibility.83 Five
years later, the waiting period requirement expired pursuant to the terms of
the Brady Bill and was replaced with the National Instant Criminal
Background Check System (“NICS”).84 The NICS, maintained by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), cut out the chief local law
enforcement middleman and allowed firearms dealers themselves to conduct
background checks on potential buyers.85 To accommodate a prospective
gun buyer’s right to privacy, the NICS background check would only reveal
the buyer’s eligibility status, and not the reason behind it; i.e., the system
would only display ineligible rather than adjudicated as mentally defective.86
Unfortunately, even this system had its glitches.87 State agencies with
information related to a person belonging to a class of prohibited purchasers
were under very little pressure to report this information to the FBI.88
Consequently, compliance with reporting procedures was infrequent and the
NICS was rarely up to date, resulting in a prospective purchaser’s
ineligibility failing to show up on the NICS for months.89 In addition, “only
‘licensed’ importers, manufacturers, and dealers [were] federally mandated
79.
United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 263 (3d Cir. 1942), rev’d, 319 U.S.
463 (1943); Kopel, supra note 23, at 1534, 1546; McCreary, supra note 1, at 833.
80.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1546; McCreary, supra note 1, at 833–34.
81.
McCreary, supra note 1, at 834–35.
82.
Id. at 835.
83.
Id.
84.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1582–83; Melter, supra note 10, at 55.
85.
Melter, supra note 10, at 55.
86.
See McCreary, supra note 1, at 854.
87.
See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, STATE LAWS AND PUBLISHED ORDINANCES xiii–xv (31st ed. 2010–2011), available
at https://www.atf.gov/files/publications/download/p/atf-p-5300-5-31st-editiion/2010-2011atf-book-final.pdf; McCreary, supra note 1, at 837–38; Melter, supra note 10, at 55.
88.
See McCreary, supra note 1, at 835–36.
89.
See id. at 838.
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to perform background checks on weapons purchasers,” which meant that
private firearms sales—including sales at gun shows—could be conducted
legally without inquiry into a purchaser’s eligibility.90 Furthermore,
concealed carry permits and similar firearms licenses qualified as alternatives
to the background check requirements of the Brady Bill in nineteen states.91
Although a background check is almost always required in order to obtain
any sort of weapons permit, states had no federal obligation to keep permit
record information on a readily accessible database for licensed firearms
dealers to access.92
The NICS Improvement Act recognized that there were problems
with the Brady Bill’s background check requirement, but failed to correctly
identify them.93 Rather than providing incentives for state agency reporting
compliance, closing the gun show loophole, or eliminating the license
alternative to a background check, it merely required federal agencies with
any information regarding an individual’s ineligibility to “report that
information to the Attorney General . . . quarterly.”94
In 1994, the Clinton Crime Bill was enacted as a response to Patrick
Purdy’s mass murder in Stockton, California, and the intensifying turf and
drug wars conducted by gangs.95 It included one of the most irrational and
functionally inconsequential assault weapon bans in the history of American
gun control, ironically titled the Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use
Protection Act.96 The ban outlawed a mere nineteen guns by name, some of
which had already been banned since 1989.97 Of the nineteen explicitlybanned guns in the Act, there were at least twelve legal substitutes already on
the market.98 The Act also banned roughly two hundred more guns based on
“appearances [and] . . . accessories such as bayonet lugs and adjustable
stocks,” under what was called the Features Test.99
(30) The term “semiautomatic assault weapon” means—
....

90.
91.
at xiv–xv.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Published by NSUWorks, 2014

Melter, supra note 10, at 55–56.
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, supra note 87,
See id.; McCreary, supra note 1, at 835.
See McCreary, supra note 1, at 837–38.
See id. at 837.
ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 1; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1585.
See ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 1; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1585–86.
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(B) a semiautomatic rifle that has an ability to accept a
detachable magazine and has at least [two] of—
(i) a folding or telescoping stock;
(ii) a pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously
beneath the action of the weapon;
(iii) a bayonet mount;
(iv) a flash suppressor or threaded barrel
designed to accommodate a flash suppressor; and
(v) a grenade launcher . . . .100

The Features Tests for semiautomatic pistols and shotguns were similarly
focused on aesthetics.101 The overbroad and generic nature of the Features
Test allowed firearms manufacturers to disconnect the frills, rename the
weapons, and ultimately sell guns that were “operationally the same as the
banned guns.”102 Moreover, roughly six hundred firearms, such as the Ruger
Mini-14, were explicitly exempted from the ban because of their large
ownership base even though they were “functionally identical to banned
guns like the AR-15.”103
The Act also banned the sale of high capacity magazines—defined
as “ammunition-feeding devices designed to hold more than [ten] rounds”—
but did not outlaw possession or use of them.104 As such, this ban was futile
as well because “when one considers many of the older model guns . . . such
as the AR-15 (in production since the 1960s) . . . the world-wide inventory of
ammunition magazines holding more than [ten] rounds was probably in the
tens or even hundreds of millions.”105
Paradoxically, the most notable effect of the assault weapons ban
was the influx of so-called assault weapons into civilian hands.106 While the
Act was being debated in Congress, the production of soon-to-be-banned
guns such as the Colt AR-15, SWD M-10, and TEC-9 skyrocketed.107 In
1994, 203,578 assault weapons were produced just before the ban became
100.
Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, H.R. 4296,
103d Cong. § 2(b)(30)(B) (1994).
101.
See id. § 2(b)(30)(C)–(D).
102.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1586; see ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 4.
103.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1585–86.
104.
ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 2; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1586.
105.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1586.
106.
See ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 4.
107.
Id. at 3–5.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss2/1

208

: Nova Law Review 38, #2

370

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

law later that year.108 This is in stark contrast to the annual average
production of 91,137 assault weapons from 1989 to 1993.109 Since the
market became flooded with assault weapons and high capacity magazines
just before the ban was enacted, the price of these commodities dropped
significantly the next year.110 Prior to the ban, an AR-15-type rifle sold for
anywhere between $825 and $1325; by the very next June, the price of the
same rifle had fallen to about $660.111 Although the transfer of an assault
weapon was prohibited after 1994, individuals who paid a high pre-ban price
and then “watched as their investment depreciated after the ban took effect”
were prone to sell the weapon at a discount price to an ineligible purchaser,
and then report the gun as stolen to an insurance company in order to collect
on the policy.112 In essence, the Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use
Protection Act made assault weapons more available and less expensive to
those who could not pass a NICS background check.113 Thankfully, the
assault weapon ban expired in 2004.114
The Supreme Court of the United States had a chance to discuss gun
bans—albeit a little late—in the 2008 case, District of Columbia v. Heller.115
The law at issue in the case “totally ban[ned] handgun possession in the
home” and was struck down.116 In making its decision, the Court relied on
the common use principle.117 The common use principle dictates that a
“prohibition of an entire class of arms” is unconstitutional if that class of
arms is “overwhelmingly chosen by American[s]” for a lawful use, such as
self-defense or sporting.118 Justice Scalia poignantly stated:
It is no answer to say . . . that it is permissible to ban the
possession of handguns so long as the possession of other firearms
(i.e., long guns) is allowed. . . . There are many reasons that a
citizen may prefer a handgun for home defense: It is easier to
store in a location that is readily accessible in an emergency; it
cannot easily be redirected or wrestled away by an attacker; it is
easier to use for those without the upper-body strength to lift and
108.
Id. at 6.
109.
Id.
110.
Id. at 5.
111.
See ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 3, 5.
112.
Id. at 1, 45.
113.
See Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, H.R.
4296, 103d Cong. § 2 (1994); ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 5; Melter, supra note 10, at 55–
56.
114.
H.R. 4296 § 6(2); Kopel, supra note 23, at 1604.
115.
554 U.S. 570, 573 (2008).
116.
Id. at 628, 635.
117.
Id. at 627; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1608; Melter, supra note 10, at 46.
118.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 627–28.
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aim a long gun; it can be pointed at a burglar with one hand . . . .
Whatever the reason, handguns are the most popular weapon
chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home, and a complete
prohibition of their use is invalid.119

Under this common use interpretation, a future ban on semiautomatic AR15s and the like would arguably be unconstitutional as well, because they are
some of the most popularly owned guns in America.120
III.

THE PROBLEMS WITH GUN LEGISLATION

Unfortunately, the GCA and FOPA were not enough to stop Laurie
Dann from obtaining a firearm and shooting seven children in 1988.121 The
Acts were insufficient to keep Patrick Purdy from killing five children and
wounding thirty others in Stockton, California with a Kalashnikov-style
semi-automatic rifle in 1989.122 The Public Safety and Recreational
Firearms Use Protection Act did not keep Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold
from obtaining a Savage-Springfield 67H, Hi-Point 995, TEC-9, or Stevens
311D, all of which were used in 1999 to kill thirteen and wound twenty-four
others at Columbine High School.123 The NICS did not reveal that SeungHui Cho had been involuntarily committed to a mental institution, and was
thus ineligible to buy the Walther P22 and Glock 19 that he used to kill
thirty-two people at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University.124 These instances alone should indicate that gun control is not
effectively reducing mass shootings, but they are only some of the most
notable.125 As of 1976 under the GCA, until FOPA was enacted, there were
190 mass shootings and 880 victims in America.126 In the time span between
the enactment of FOPA and the Brady Bill, there were 140 mass shooting

119.
Id. at 629.
120.
EDWARD W. HILL, MAXINE GOODMAN LEVIN COLL. OF URBAN AFFAIRS,
CLEVELAND STATE UNIV. HOW MANY GUNS ARE IN THE UNITED STATES? AMERICANS OWN
BETWEEN 262 MILLION AND 310 MILLION FIREARMS 3 (2013), available at
http://www.urban.csuohio.edu/publications/hill/GunsInTheUS_Hill_032813.pdf; Kopel, supra
note 23, at 1608.
121.
See Unruh, supra note 3.
122.
See Kopel, supra note 23, at 1578; Unruh, supra note 3.
123.
Janet L. Kaminski Leduc, OLR Research Report: Weapons Used in Mass
Shootings, ST. CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/rpt/2013R-0057.htm; Unruh, supra note 3.
124.
McCreary, supra note 1, at 824, 829–30; Kaminski Leduc, supra note
123; Unruh, supra note 3.
125.
See Melter, supra note 10, at 41; Unruh, supra note 3.
126.
Melter, supra note 10, at 60.
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incidents and 620 individuals either wounded or killed.127 During the era of
the Clinton Crime Bill, 193 mass shootings occurred, leaving 875 people
either dead or injured.128 Since 2004, when the assault weapons ban ended,
there have been 178 mass shootings and 969 victims.129
Still, about twenty-four percent of the nation’s citizens believe that
tighter gun restrictions would prevent mass shootings in America.130 This is
despite the fact that countries with even more stringent gun laws than the
United States have had their fair share of mass shootings.131 England—with
a mere 6.2 guns per one hundred people—experienced a mass shooting in
2010, which claimed the lives of twelve citizens.132 Germany had “three of
the five worst school shootings worldwide over the past fifteen years,”
despite the country’s incredibly strict gun laws.133 But two instances hardly
prove the point: It could be argued that Europeans have only seen about
twelve mass public shootings and just over one hundred people killed by
gunfire, during those shootings, since 2001, which is notably less than what
Americans have experienced in the same time frame.134 It is worthy of note,
however, that although the number of mass shooting incidents in Europe is
less than that in America, the number of mass murders is roughly the same;
perpetrators simply resort to bombs and arson instead of firearms.135
Even supposing that the prevalence of guns in the United States is to
blame for mass shootings, gun bans have proved ineffective in the past and
government seizures of firearms would be just as unsuccessful in reducing
gun availability.136 There are between 262 and 310 million firearms
privately owned in America.137 Guns are not registered or tracked, so there
is no reliable way for the government to hunt down and seize each one.138
Furthermore, pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, gun owners would need to
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 60–61; MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS, ANALYSIS OF RECENT
MASS SHOOTINGS 6–23 (2013), available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Sections/
NEWS/A_U.S.%20news/US-news-PDFs/Analysis_of_Mass_Shootings.pdf.
130.
Melter, supra note 10, at 42; Amy Roberts, By the Numbers: Guns in
America, CNN (Aug. 9, 2012, 1:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/09/politics/btn-gunsin-america.
131.
Melter, supra note 10, at 42–43.
132.
Id. at 43.
133.
Id.
134.
Id. at 43–44, 60–61 tbl.1.
135.
See “Assault Weapons,” GUNCITE, http://www.guncite.com/gun_control_
gcassaul.html (last updated Oct. 24, 2010); see also Melter, supra note 10, at 42, 44, 60–61
tbl.1.
136.
See Melter, supra note 10, at 46–47, 49–51.
137.
HILL, supra note 120, at 2.
138.
Id.
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be adequately compensated if the government chose to confiscate their
property.139 This would require “hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars,”
which is simply not in national or states’ budgets.140 Hence, it is highly
unlikely that gun owners would receive even half of the fair market value of
their firearms, let alone a single penny for their ammunition and add-ons.141
Even if government agencies were able to confiscate fifty percent of the guns
in the United States—with adequate compensation to the owners—over 100
million guns would still remain.142 Against those numbers, it is difficult to
imagine that a potential mass shooter would have any trouble gaining access
to a firearm.143 As such, a government seizure of guns in America would be
operationally impossible, financially impracticable, constitutionally
impermissible, and ultimately ineffective.144
Contrary to popular belief, research shows that the overwhelming
presence of firearms actually has a deterrent effect on mass shooters.145 As
one author noted, “mass shootings rarely take place within the hunting aisles
of Wal-Mart or at the local shooting range.”146 In fact, “mass shooter[s]
[almost] always pick a location in which” law-abiding citizens will not be
armed, such as a school or a place of worship.147 Conversely, areas where
citizens can lawfully carry a concealed handgun are sixty-seven percent less
likely to experience a mass-shooting incident.148 This is primarily because
armed civilians are not suitable prey—they possess the ability to neutralize
the shooter—and mass shooters are looking for a target, not a duel.149 In
light of this, Americans may want to think twice before they blame mass
shootings on the prevalence of firearms.150
IV.

THE LINK TO ANTIDEPRESSANT AND ANTIPSYCHOTIC USE

Mass shooters have more in common than the fact that they all—by
definition—used a firearm to effectuate death and injury.151 This has led
139.
U.S. CONST. amend. V; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1564.
140.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1564.
141.
Id. at 1564–65.
142.
Melter, supra note 10, at 51.
143.
Id.
144.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V; HILL, supra note 120, at 2, 8 figs.4 & 5
(noting the sheer number of households that contain a firearm); Kopel, supra note 23, at 1564;
Melter, supra note 10, at 49–51.
145.
Melter, supra note 10, at 41–42.
146.
Id. at 53.
147.
Id.
148.
Id. at 42.
149.
See id. at 41.
150.
See Melter, supra note 10, at 41.
151.
See id.
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authors and researchers to propose alternatives to gun control that could be
used to arrive at an actual solution to the mass murder problem.152 For
instance, most mass shooters have a documented history of mental illness.153
Hence, numerous researchers have proposed that gun buyers should be
required to provide firearms vendors with a certificate guaranteeing the
buyer’s mental health.154
While this seems like a viable solution to the mass shooter problem,
it suffers from the exact same flaws as previous gun control legislation, but
with more of a negative economic impact.155 Looking at the mental health
certificate idea objectively, it is plain to see that it is just an additional form
of permit or background check that gun purchasers would need to supply.156
Firearms dealers would still have the burden of verifying the certificate’s
authenticity, and states would still be under no obligation to keep records in a
readily searchable database in order to facilitate verification; in fact, as seen
with the NICS, states are sometimes reluctant to comply even when they are
urged to supply records for a federal database.157 Prospective gun buyers
without insurance might not be able to afford the doctor’s visit, and
therefore, they would be denied their Second Amendment rights purely
because of their economic status.158 If Medicare or Medicaid covered the
cost of the doctor’s visit for those without adequate funds, then the alreadystrained federal budget would be put under even more stress.159
Furthermore, the mental health certificate may rely on the opinion of a single
doctor, which may not always be accurate.160 Even if accurate, the practice
of denying Second Amendment rights to those diagnosed as mentally ill
would be constitutionally impermissible because those individuals would not
have received due process of law before their rights were stripped.161
Essentially, there are too many problems with the mental health certificate
idea for it to be a viable solution.162
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 56; McCreary, supra note 1, at 855.
See Unruh, supra note 3.
McCreary, supra note 1, at 855; Melter, supra note 10, at 56.
See McCreary, supra note 1, at 855–57.
Id. at 855.
Id. at 838, 856.
See U.S. CONST. amend. II; McCreary, supra note 1, at 838, 856.
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND
MEDICARE ON THE FEDERAL BUDGET 1 (2002), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/
files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/39xx/doc3982/11-14-longrangebrief6.pdf; McCreary, supra note 1, at
857.
160.
See McCreary, supra note 1, at 827 (noting that Cho was released from a
mental health facility after one doctor said that he was not a danger to himself or others).
161.
United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2012).
162.
E.g., McCreary, supra note 1, at 857.
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Fortunately, the fact that many mass shooters had a documented
mental illness means that they have yet another characteristic in common:
Most of them sought—or were forced to undergo—treatment from a
physician or psychiatrist.163 Similarly, the treatments offered to these mass
shooters were comparable in the sense that they were all antidepressant or
antipsychotic medications.164 For example: Laurie Dann, on Anafranil and
Lithium, opened fire on seven children in 1988, killing one;165 Patrick Purdy,
prescribed Thorazine and Amitriptyline, killed five children and wounded
thirty others with an AK-47 assault rifle in 1989;166 that same year, Joseph T.
Wesbecker gunned down twenty of his coworkers just a month after he
began taking Prozac;167 unnamed “‘prescription medications related to the
treatment of psychological problems”’ were found in Seung-Hui Cho’s
possession just after his shooting rampage at Virginia Tech left thirty-two
dead;168 finally, James Eagan Holmes was prescribed sertraline—a generic
form of Zoloft—and Clonazepam shortly before he began stockpiling
firearms and ammunition for his 2012 massacre in Aurora, Colorado;169 and
those are just to name a few. Thus, this pattern is a factor that cannot be
ignored when trying to solve the mass shooting problem in America.170
The availability of antipsychotics and antidepressants has been
steadily increasing since the 1950s, with more than twenty types being
introduced to the market since then.171 The number of Americans on
antidepressants has doubled every ten years since the 1970s, and today,
roughly ten percent of Americans are prescribed at least one of these
drugs.172 There are four popular types of antidepressants: Tricyclics,
163.
Id. at 825; Unruh, supra note 3; Jenny Deam, James Holmes’ Psychiatrist
Warned He May Pose Threat, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/
04/nation/la-na-james-holmes-documents-20130405.
164.
See Corsi, supra note 3; Unruh, supra note 3.
165.
Unruh, supra note 3.
166.
Robert Reinhold, Killer Depicted as Loner Full of Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
20, 1989, at A.8; Unruh, supra note 3.
167.
Ronald Smothers, Disturbed Past of Killer of 7 Is Unraveled, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 16, 1989, at 1.10; Unruh, supra note 3.
168.
Corsi, supra note 3.
169.
McCreary, supra note 1, at 823; Deam, supra note 163.
170.
See Corsi, supra note 3. Approximately “[ninety] percent of school
shoot[ers]” were prescribed these drugs. Id.
171.
Bruce L. Saltz et al., Recognizing and Managing Antipsychotic Drug
Treatment Side Effects in the Elderly, 14 PRIMARY CARE COMPANION J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
14, 14 (Supp. 2 2004), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC487007/
pdf/i1523-5998-6-52-14.pdf.
172.
Unruh, supra note 3; William Weir, Hartford Firm’s Genetic Tests Help
Identify Effective Antidepressants for Individual Patients, COURANT (Dec. 29, 2011), http://
articles.courant.com/2011-12-29/health/hc-hartford-hospital-depression-0102-20111229_1_
antidepressants-dna-analysis-genomas.
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monoamine oxidase inhibitors (“MAOIs”), selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors (“SSRIs”), and serotonin and norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors
(“SNRIs”).173 Popular SSRI brand names include Prozac, Paxil, Celexa, and
Zoloft, whereas popular SNRIs are marketed under names such as Effexor
and Cymbalta.174 SSRIs and SNRIs are more popular than tricyclics and
MAOIs because they are newer, and, in comparison, users may have a
decreased risk of developing long-term involuntary movement disorders.175
However, patients react to drugs differently and “no one-size-fits-all
approach to medication exists.”176
Doctors and patients have to conduct trial-and-error experiments
with different psychoactive drugs and different dosages in order to
“maximize relief while minimizing side effects.”177 This is because
antipsychotics and the four most popular categories of antidepressants are
metabolized in the human body by two enzymes: Cytochromes P2D6 and
P2C19 (“CYP2D6” and “CYP2C19”).178 The body’s production of these
enzymes determines how an individual will react to psychoactive
medications.179 Accordingly, if a patient’s body naturally produces high
amounts of CYP2D6 or CYP2C19, then the patient will metabolize an
antidepressant such as Prozac very quickly, the drug will only effect the
patient minimally, and only for a short amount of time.180 Conversely, if a
patient’s body does not produce enough of these enzymes, then a normal
dose of the psychoactive drug will cause the active ingredient to build up in
the patient’s system.181 Such an accumulation of the drug in the human body
causes serious side effects.182
173.
117 AM. JUR. Trials § 1 (2010).
174.
Id.
175.
Id.; Jack J. Chen, Drug-Induced Movement Disorders: A Primer, U.S.
PHARMACIST (Nov. 19, 2007), http://www.uspharmacist.com/content/c/10205/?+=alzheimer’s
_and_dementia,neurology.
176.
Trials, supra note 173, § 1.
177.
Id.
178.
What is CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?,
CEPMED, https://cepmed.dnadirect.com/grc/patient-site/psychiatric-drug-response/index.html
(last visited Feb. 16, 2014); see also Weir, supra note 172.
179.
See Sara Hoffman Jurand, Lawsuits Over Antidepressants Claim the Drug
Is Worse than the Disease, TRIAL, Mar. 2003, at 14, 16–17; see also M.J. Kuhar & A.R. Joyce,
Is the Onset of Psychoactive Drug Effects Compatible with a Protein-Synthesis Mechanism?,
28 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 94, 94–95 (Supp. 2003), available at http://
www.nature.com/npp/journal/v28/n1s/pdf/1300140a.pdf; What is CYP2D6 and CYP2C19
Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?, supra note 178.
180.
What is CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?,
supra note 178.
181.
Jurand, supra note 179, at 16–17.
182.
Id.
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The side effects experienced by poor metabolizers can range
anywhere from nausea and dizziness to aggression and violence.183
Akathisia is a reported side effect of psychoactive drug use that is
characterized by “a terrible inner sensation of agitation accompanied by a
compulsion to move about.”184 Patients experiencing akathisia often
“describe it as wanting to ‘jump out of their skin.’”185 This condition has
been known to trigger violent behavior and drive patients to commit suicide
and homicide.186
Nevertheless, pharmaceutical manufacturers insist that akathisia is
not a side effect at all:
“[P]atients taking [antidepressants and
antipsychotics] suffer from clinical depression—and . . . depressed people
can be suicidal.”187 However, doctors often prescribe these drugs for medical
conditions other than depression, and with good reason.188 Zoloft alone has
been approved by the FDA as suitable for treating panic disorder, pediatric
OCD, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, and social anxiety disorder, to name
a few.189 Patients who received psychoactive drugs as a treatment for
ailments such as these, and showed no homicidal or suicidal behaviors prior
to taking the medication, suddenly committed violent acts up to and
including homicide.190 For example, Vicky Jo Hartman received Zoloft from
a family doctor despite the fact that “[s]he was not diagnosed with—or even
evaluated for—clinical depression, anxiety attacks, or any other
psychological disorder.”191 After a short period of taking the medication as
directed, Vicky shot her husband and then committed suicide.192
Furthermore, in spite of the confident facade that pharmaceutical companies
183.
John Alan Cohan, Psychiatric Ethics and Emerging Issues of
Psychopharmacology in the Treatment of Depression, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
115, 122–23, 149 (2003); see Corsi, supra note 3; Unruh, supra note 3; What is CYP2D6 and
CYP2C19 Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?, supra note 178.
184.
Unruh, supra note 3.
185.
Jurand, supra note 179, at 14.
186.
Id.; Corsi, supra note 3; Unruh, supra note 3; see Geoffrey Ingersoll, The
Antipsychotic Prescribed to Adam Lanza Has a Troubled History All Its Own, BUS. INSIDER
(Dec. 18, 2012, 2:36 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/adam-lanza-taking-antipsychoticfanapt-2012-12.
187.
Stephanie Francis Cahill, Luvox Lawsuit: Columbine Survivor Claims
Antidepressant Caused Gunman’s Actions, A.B.A. J. Sept. 13, 2001, available at Westlaw, 1
No. 35 ABA J. E-Report 2; Jurand, supra note 179, at 14.
188.
See Jurand, supra note 179, at 16.
189.
Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Liability of Prescription Drug
Manufacturer for Drug User’s Suicide or Attempted Suicide, 45 A.L.R. 6th 385, 402 (2009).
190.
See Estates of Tobin v. SmithKline Beecham Pharm., 164 F. Supp. 2d
1278, 1280, 1283–84 (D. Wyo. 2001); Jurand, supra note 179, at 14; Corsi, supra note 3.
191.
Jurand, supra note 179, at 14.
192.
Id.
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put up—that the disease is to blame, not the drug—Solvay Pharmaceuticals
settled with Columbine victims after it was alleged that Luvox caused Eric
Harris’s high school rampage in 1999.193 In another case, the manufacturer
of Paxil was found liable in a wrongful death suit in excess of six million
dollars after expert testimony revealed that some individuals experience
severe reactions to SSRIs such as Paxil and Prozac, that the shooter was one
such individual, and that his ingestion of Paxil caused his homicidal and
suicidal behavior.194 Instances such as these are evidence that homicidal and
suicidal tendencies are not always a symptom of a pre-existing mental
illness, but are sometimes a treatment-induced problem.195
Despite the increasingly clear connection between psychoactive drug
use and akathisia-related side effects, it was not until 2006 that the Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”) even considered requiring the warning labels
to include these risks.196 Still, the failure to adequately warn about suicidal
and homicidal tendencies has been the main source of litigation against
pharmaceutical companies in recent years.197 Much of this litigation has
proved to be unsuccessful for the plaintiffs for a few reasons.198
According to Comment k in Section 402A of the Second
Restatement of Torts, there are some products—such as antidepressants and
antipsychotics—that are unavoidably unsafe.199
Unavoidably unsafe
products are those that have the potential to pose a serious risk to users even
if the product is used as directed.200 Manufacturers of products that fall
under the meaning of Comment k are generally exempted from strict liability
in suits for injuries related to the use of the product.201 Manufacturers are
able to put unavoidably unsafe products—such as psychoactive
medications—on the market as long as the medication is not unreasonably
dangerous.202 A product is only unreasonably dangerous when its benefits

193.
Taylor v. Solvay Pharm. Inc., 223 F.R.D. 544, 549 (D. Colo. 2004);
Cahill, supra note 187.
194.
Estates of Tobin, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1280, 1283–84, 1290.
195.
Cahill, supra note 187; see Corsi, supra note 3.
196.
Trials, supra note 173, § 5.
197.
Id. §§ 1, 5; Cahill, supra note 187; Jurand, supra note 179, at 14.
198.
Diane Schmauder Kane, Annotation, Construction and Application of
Learned-Intermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R. 5TH 1, 26–27 (1998); Rosenhouse, supra note 189,
at 396–97.
199.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965); Trials, supra
note 173, § 10.
200.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k; Trials, supra note 173,
§ 10.
201.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k; Trials, supra note 173,
§ 10.
202.
Trials, supra note 173, § 10.
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fail to outweigh its risks.203 Since the medical utility of an antipsychotic or
antidepressant is so great, pharmaceutical manufacturers are rarely held
liable for putting an unavoidably unsafe product on the market.204 As such,
they can usually only be held liable for injury resulting from use of their
product when they failed to provide an adequate warning.205
In order to be sufficient, the warning label on psychoactive drug
packaging “must: (1) indicate the scope of the danger, (2) communicate the
extent or seriousness of the potential danger, (3) alert a reasonably prudent
practitioner to the danger, and (4) be conveyed in a satisfactory manner.”206
The third adequate warning requirement brings up a problem known as the
learned-intermediary doctrine (“LID”).207
The LID functions as a major obstacle to plaintiffs asserting a failure
to warn claim against pharmaceutical manufacturers.208 Under the LID, a
pharmaceutical manufacturer has no duty to warn a patient of possible side
effects.209 Rather, the manufacturer is only obligated to warn the medical
practitioners who will be prescribing the drug.210 The LID applies to claims
in strict liability and negligence, and it is used to break the chain of causation
between the pharmaceutical manufacturer and the drug-induced violence of
the patient.211 The rationale behind the LID is that the “physician is in the
best position to evaluate the often complex information provided by the
manufacturer concerning the risks and benefits of its drug . . . and to make an
individualized medical judgment, based on the patient’s particular needs and
susceptibilities, as to whether the patient should use the product.”212 In order
to prove that a drug was not accompanied by a sufficient warning, a doctor,
qualified as an expert, must testify that had a stronger warning been given, he
would not have prescribed the drug to his patient.213 This requirement
almost always sets the plaintiff up for failure, and the reason why is clear
when one considers the abovementioned information about CYP2D6 and
CYP2C19.214 Under the current scheme, doctors do not test a patient’s rate
203.
Id.
204.
Id.
205.
Id.
206.
Kane, supra note 198, at 29.
207.
Rosenhouse, supra note 189, at 397.
208.
Kane, supra note 198, at 26; Rosenhouse, supra note 189, at 397.
209.
Kane, supra note 198, at 27; Rosenhouse, supra note 189, at 397.
210.
Kane, supra note 198, at 27; Rosenhouse, supra note 189, at 397.
211.
Rosenhouse, supra note 189, at 397.
212.
Kane, supra note 198, at 26.
213.
Id. at 30–31.
214.
See Trials, supra note 173, § 16; Jurand, supra note 179, at 16–18; Kuhar
& Joyce, supra note 179, at 94–95; Weir, supra note 172; What is CYP2D6 and CYP2C19
Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?, supra note 178.
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of enzyme production prior to prescribing an antipsychotic or
antidepressant.215 They operate under the assumption that every patient’s
body has a normal level of CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 and will thus be capable
of metabolizing the drugs properly.216 Since violent akathisia-related side
effects do not occur when a drug is metabolized properly, doctors are
justified in prescribing a medication—regardless of the known possible side
effects—because a patient with normal CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 levels is
statistically unlikely to suffer them.217 As such, physicians typically cannot
testify that a stronger warning would have deterred them from prescribing a
drug to a particular patient because it is not the content of the warning that
has the most effect on their decision, but the probability that the warning’s
content will occur.218
If a doctor is capable of providing the necessary testimony in a
failure to warn claim, the plaintiff’s next major obstacle is the
pharmaceutical company’s federal preemption defense.219 Since the failure
to warn is a state law cause of action, pharmaceutical companies are inclined
to argue that “the federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive as to leave no
room for supplementary state regulation, or state law conflicts with federal
law, making compliance with both either impossible or frustrating to the
purpose of the federal law.”220 In cases such as these, the pharmaceutical
companies insist that the FDA regulations create “both a floor and a ceiling
for drug labeling” requirements.221 Under this theory, which was the
common understanding of FDA regulations until 2008, pharmaceutical
companies were discouraged from strengthening their warnings above what
was required for FDA compliance.222 This was intended to reduce the risk of
over-warning, because over-warning would “exaggerate [the drug’s] risk[] . .
. to avoid liability,” which could “discourage [the] appropriate use of a
beneficial drug” or “cause meaningful risk information to lose its
significance.”223

215.
See Jurand, supra note 179, at 16–17 (noting that a test exists and
implying that it is not used); Weir, supra note 172.
216.
See Jurand, supra note 179, at 16; Weir, supra note 172; but see What is
CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?, supra note 178.
217.
Kuhar & Joyce, supra note 179, at 94–95; Weir, supra note 172; What is
CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?, supra note 178.
218.
See Trials, supra note 173, § 16.
219.
Id. § 4; Kane, supra note 198, at 31; Rosenhouse, supra note 189, at 400–
01.
220.
Kane, supra note 198, at 127.
221.
Rosenhouse, supra note 189, at 401.
222.
Id. at 396–97, 399, 401, 403.
223.
Id. at 401.
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However, some courts have noted that the federal regulations
imposed by the FDA do not always preempt a state law cause of action
against pharmaceutical manufacturers.224 One such case was Tucker v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp.,225 which involved a wrongful death claim
against the manufacturer of the antidepressant Paxil.226 In that case, the court
analyzed the language of the federal statutes that govern changes to a
psychoactive drug’s warning label.227 The court noted that “the FDA
regulations allow a manufacturer to modify pharmaceutical labels
unilaterally and immediately, without prior FDA approval, when the
manufacturer has reasonable evidence of a serious hazard.”228
[T]he ongoing ability, authority, and responsibility to strengthen a
label still rest squarely with the drug manufacturer. . . . [T]he
FDA’s power to disapprove does not make the manufacturer’s
voluntarily strengthened label a violation of federal law, which is
what it would take to establish an actual conflict between state tort
law and federal law.229

Many cases after Tucker have followed a similar line of reasoning, finding
that a pharmaceutical manufacturer has the duty to revise its warning label as
soon as a possible risk is brought to light.230 Rather, the manufacturer’s duty
to warn is dependent on the risks that it has reason to know about, and it is
under a continuous obligation to notify prescribing physicians of any
possible side effects that could possibly be related to the drug’s use.231 A
causal relationship between the drug’s use and the purported risk does not
need to be established in order for the duty to warn to apply.232
Although a causal relationship need not be shown in order for the
manufacturer to have the duty to warn, causation is a key element that
plaintiffs need to prove at trial.233 The causation element is another large
problem in failure to warn cases, because it requires the plaintiff to show that
the suicide, homicide, or other event would not have occurred if the patient
was not prescribed the medication.234 Since pharmaceutical manufacturers
224.
E.g., Tucker v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 596 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1237–
38 (S.D. Ind. 2008).
225.
596 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (S.D. Ind. 2008).
226.
Id. at 1226–27.
227.
Id. at 1227–29.
228.
Id. at 1227.
229.
Id. at 1229.
230.
Trials, supra note 173, § 21.
231.
See id.
232.
Id. § 5.
233.
Id. §§ 5, 16.
234.
Id. § 16.
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are typically the only party with access to information about a drug’s ability
to actually cause suicidal and homicidal behavior in patients, the plaintiff
often has trouble establishing the required showing of causation.235
V.

THE SOLUTION

In recent years, biomedical companies have been investing in
pharmacogenetic studies, the results of which “offer[] the promise of
‘personalized medicine.’”236 Pharmacogenetics is the study of differences in
drug metabolism and response due to differing levels of enzyme
production.237 Pharmacogeneticists recognize that some individuals are
chemically incompatible with—or poor metabolizers of—certain prescription
drugs.238 As a result, pharmacogeneticists have developed a simple test,
which allows a physician to determine the CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 levels in
a patient’s body.239 This compatibility test begins with a cheek swab, and
after two days, a prescribing doctor is able to tell whether a patient will
experience adverse side effects if prescribed a certain type of medication.240
According to pharmacogenetic researchers, “[t]he solution . . . is to assess
enzyme activity and then prescribe medication compatible with that . . .
activity.”241 Accordingly, the compatibility test is intended to ensure that
individuals suffering from psychosis, depression, anxiety, or other
psychological disease will receive a medication that will work with their
body chemistry.242 Administering the test to patients prior to prescribing an
antipsychotic or antidepressant will reduce the likelihood that a patient will
experience violent, homicidal, and suicidal side effects.243
The proposal, then, is to require pharmaceutical companies to
provide physicians and psychiatrists with the means necessary to conduct
one of these tests for each patient who may need a psychoactive medication.
If less people suffer from akathisia-related side effects, then there is a
decreased likelihood that individuals will engage in mass shootings.244
235.
See Trials, supra note 173, § 20.
236.
Weir, supra note 172.
237.
See id.
238.
See id.
239.
Jurand, supra note 179, at 16–17; Weir, supra note 172; What is CYP2D6
and CYP2C19 Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?, supra note 178.
240.
Weir, supra note 172.
241.
Id.
242.
See Jurand, supra note 179, at 16–17; Weir, supra note 172; What is
CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?, supra note 178.
243.
See Jurand, supra note 179, at 16–17; Weir, supra note 172; What is
CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?, supra note 178.
244.
See supra Part IV.
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The financial burden of providing the compatibility tests should not
fall squarely on the doctors or medical facilities for a few reasons. First,
medical facilities such as hospitals, doctors’ offices, mental institutions, and
psychiatrists’ offices are under a huge financial burden as it is.245 Their
budgets should not be put under additional stress, especially because
requiring them to foot the bill for the compatibility test could have a negative
impact on patient treatment: If the medical institution is required to foot the
bill for the compatibility test, then doctors may be convinced to avoid
prescribing psychoactive drugs in order to save the facility money. This
would be an undesired effect, as it may result in patients not receiving the
treatment they need. Putting the cost of providing the test on the prescribing
physician or the medical facility could also cause doctors to continue
prescribing psychoactive drugs, but simply not administer the test in an effort
to save money. If akathisia-related side effects in the patient occurred
thereafter, then the doctor could lose his or her license and be held civilly
liable to the patient.246 This would be yet another undesired effect. Instead,
putting the cost of the compatibility tests on the pharmaceutical
manufacturers easily avoids these issues.
Second, it is a standard principle of tort law that the duty to warn
falls on the party with the most information available about the product,
which is the manufacturer.247 The compatibility test is no more than a tool
that establishes a personalized warning for each patient by providing the
statistical likelihood of adverse side effects on the user.248 Therefore, the
duty of providing the test or warning should fall on the manufacturer.249
Third, this proposal complies with FDA regulations regarding manufacturersupplied warnings, because there is no federal law explicitly prohibiting
pharmaceutical companies from providing the statistical likelihood that an
individual patient will experience side effects.250
Finally, this proposal serves as a way around the often-troubling
LID: If pharmaceutical companies were required to provide compatibility
tests to medical practitioners in order to satisfy the adequate warning
requirement and they failed to do so, then doctors could testify that they
245.
Parija Kavilanz, Doctors Driven to Bankruptcy, CNN MONEY (Apr. 8,
2013, 11:20 AM), http://www.money.cnn.com/2013/04/08/smallbusiness/doctors-bankruptcy/.
246.
See Trials, supra note 173, § 20; Peter Eisler & Barbara Hansen, Six
Types of Misconduct that Get Doctors in Trouble, USA TODAY (Aug. 21, 2013, 1:29 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/08/20/troubled-doctors-misconductfindings/2678511/.
247.
Rosenhouse, supra note 189, at 405.
248.
See Weir, supra note 172.
249.
See Rosenhouse, supra note 189, at 405.
250.
Id. at 396–97.
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would not have prescribed the drug if they knew that the patient was a poor
metabolizer. Currently, doctors, patients, and shooting victims bear the risk
of loss for injury when akathisia-related side effects occur.251 This proposal
places the risk of loss onto pharmaceutical manufacturers instead because
they are in a better position to financially handle “the loss by distributing it
as a cost of doing business.”252 Ultimately, this proposal opens the door for
pharmaceutical company liability.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Mass shootings in America are not going to be stopped by simple
gun regulations.253 The failures of previous gun laws and the sheer number
of mass shootings that occurred during America’s strictest gun control eras
should testify to that point.254 Government-sponsored gun buy-backs, future
gun bans, and mental health certificates are not viable solutions either
because of their inherent unconstitutionality and impracticability.255 When it
comes to mass shootings, gun restrictions are analogous to treating a
symptom; it is never going to cure the disease because it does not target the
root cause.256 Instead, if Americans wish to find a solution to the massshooting problem, they need to focus on targeting the source of mass
shooters’ suicidal and homicidal proclivities.257 One such source is akathisia
as a result of psychoactive drug use.258 Accordingly, the best way to reduce
the likelihood of mass shootings is to reduce the likelihood that patients will
suffer from akathisia after taking a prescription medication.259 One way to
help ensure that this side effect will not occur is by conducting a simple
compatibility test to determine the patients’ ability to metabolize
psychoactive drugs.260 The compatibility test requirement also makes the
pharmaceutical companies vulnerable to civil suit.261
The doors for pharmaceutical company liability need to be opened
when it is discovered that a mass shooter was using that company’s drug, and
rightly so. If it is discovered that an antipsychotic or antidepressant was
being used by a mass shooter at the time of the massacre in question, then
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
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pharmaceutical companies should bear some risk of liability. This will
undoubtedly help the survivors and the families of the deceased. Typically,
these individuals cannot recover from the shooter because he is either dead—
shot by the police or committed suicide at the scene—or because he is not
financially capable of adequately compensating his victims. The victims
cannot recover from gun manufacturers under the current regulatory scheme
because they are immune from suit in these circumstances.262 Survivors and
the families of the deceased cannot recover from the owner of the shooting’s
location because they would have to prove that the owner knew or should
have known that this venue would be the place of an attack and he failed to
hire security accordingly, which oftentimes requires a previous, similar
violent instance at that location.263 Opening liability on the pharmaceutical
companies gives the victims a chance to recover damages, have their medical
expenses covered, or have their loved ones’ funeral service paid for. It will
also help because it will encourage the pharmaceutical companies to
independently—on their own time and dime—work toward reducing the
likelihood of their product causing a violent event.
Aside from lifting the burden off of the gun industry, saving money
on ineffectual gun legislation attempts, helping to reduce the mass shooting
problem, and assisting victims in their struggle to recover, this solution also
secures the rights of those suffering from mental illness. With the
compatibility test administered, these individuals do not have to suffer
through a trial-and-error method of treatment; it is likely that they will get
the most effective medication for their ailment the very first try—the best
possible treatment for their illness—thus securing their right to
comprehensive mental health care. Further, this solution will assist in
securing the Second Amendment rights of all American citizens—regardless
of their health—because it does not impose additional disqualifiers for
firearm ownership, nor does it mandate additional certifications or checks.

262.
See Katrina vanden Heuvel, The Case for Gun Liability Laws, NATION
(Sept. 24, 2013, 9:42 AM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/176317/case-gun-liability-laws#.
263.
Deborah J. La Fetra, A Moving Target: Property Owners’ Duty to
Prevent Criminal Acts on the Premises, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 409, 409–10 (2006).
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